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Notes on style 
 
Chinese and Japanese names are not italicised and are given with the surname first, 
so Mao Zedong’s family name is Mao and not Zedong. Other Chinese and Japanese 
terms are italicised, and written in pinyin and romaji respectively. In the People’s 
Republic pinyin is normally written in lower case. However, for ease of reference this 
study uses sentence-style capitalisation for the titles of films, books, documents, 
papers and texts (in pinyin), as well as for place names. For the sake of clarity, words 
commonly used in English are usually chosen in preference to their Chinese and 
Japanese counterparts; for example “Taipei” (a city in Taiwan), is used in preference to 
the Chinese Taibei. 
A character glossary of the most important Chinese terms is provided. A list of 
abbreviations used in the text is at the beginning of the bibliography. Dates in the 
footnotes are presented in abbreviated British format, such that August 15, 1945 
becomes 15/8/45.  
Many of the individuals interviewed for this project did so on the condition that 
they remain anonymous. Interviews in this study therefore follow the format used by 
Perry Link in his book The Uses of Literature: Life in the Socialist Chinese Literary 
System (2000), whereby the name of the interviewee is included only when he or she 
agrees to be named. Full interview transcripts are available on request.  
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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis presents a study of Chinese views of Japan since the foundation of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949. The introduction summarises the main aims of 
the thesis, which are to compare and contrast the way in which different “institutions” 
(such as the Chinese media) have presented Japan to mass audiences from a historical 
perspective. The introduction also describes the theoretical models used and outlines 
the most important recent scholarship on the research topic. Chapter one offers an 
overview of elite representations of Japan, by concentrating on critical junctures 
where the Chinese leadership’s views of Japan changed. The role of the patriotic 
education campaign is explored, as well as the hypothesis that since 1949 Chinese 
Communist Party leaders have always been intensely interested in Japan. The thesis 
then moves on to four chapters, which analyse how Japan is presented in key 
institutions. Chapter two on war museums suggests that national and provincial party 
officials have frequently clashed over the way in which memory of the 1937–45 
Anti-Japanese War is depicted. Chapter two also examines the rationale for the rash of 
museum building during the 1980s. Chapter three concentrates on textbooks, but also 
deals with the way in which classroom discourses on conflict with Japan are used as a 
means of emphasising selected government policies. Furthermore, I suggest that the 
way in which textbook compilers have sought to portray Japan in schools has shown 
remarkably little variation over the past 60 years. Chapter four analyses war films. My 
aim here is to explain both why, as in textbooks, the war is used as a vehicle for 
pursuing unrelated policy objectives, and also why conflict with Japan is still virtually 
the only acceptable means of portraying that country on celluloid. Chapter five deals 
with newspapers, and as in chapter two, I find that views of Japan at the national and 
provincial level are frequently at variance. Chapter six concludes the thesis and 
summarises its findings, as well as making suggestions for further research. 
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Introduction 
 
 
In late 2007, one of China’s most respected television presenters, Bai Yansong, 
narrated a controversial but widely viewed Central China Television (CCTV) 
documentary series called Yansong Looks at Japan (Yansong kan riben).
1
 At the start 
of the first episode Yansong noted that “[we] Chinese people often admit that we don’t 
understand Japan, we just hate it.” Whilst the television series (and the accompanying 
book) portrayed some aspects of Japan in a positive light, most episodes homed in on 
sensitive bilateral issues, such as the “history problem”2 and its relation to the 
Anti-Japanese War.
3
 Yansong Looks at Japan was highly contentious in other ways 
too, a fact that was candidly discussed in the book’s preface by Liang Xiaotao, the head 
of news programming at CCTV. For instance, Liang noted that during the first half of 
2006 the Central Propaganda Department repeatedly refused permission to commence 
filming the series, and final approval was only granted 24 hours after Prime Minister 
Koizumi Junichiro stepped down from office in September of that year.
4
 Liang’s 
comments raised as many questions as they answered, such as why should propaganda 
be relevant to a Chinese television series about Japan? What image of Japan is the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) trying to create?
5
 Who, if anyone, is directly 
                                                 
1
 Bai Yansong, Yansong kan riben (Beijing: Zhongguo wenxue chubanshe, 2007).  
2
 The “history problem” refers to sharp differences between the way in which the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) and Japan officially interpret their recent past, especially with respect to the First and 
Second Sino-Japanese Wars (1894–95 and 1937–45 respectively).    
3
 The exact definition of the war is endlessly contested. Unless otherwise stated I define the 
Anti-Japanese War, the War of Resistance, and the War of Resistance against Japan, as all mainland 
Chinese armed opposition to Japanese forces between the years 1931–45, including the outbreak of 
full-scale war after the so-called Marco Polo bridge incident on 7/7/37. In the PRC the terms Second 
Sino-Japanese War, the Second World War, World War Two (in the Far East) and the War against 
Fascism are frequently understood as applying only to the fighting between 7/7/37 and the Japanese 
defeat on 15/8/45. 
4
 Prime Minister Koizumi was extremely unpopular in China, not only for his controversial visits to the 
Yasukuni shrine (where the souls of Japanese war criminals are enshrined), but also for advocating 
policies that the PRC perceived as aggressive, such as lobbying for a permanent seat on the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC). 
5
 Definitions of “Japan” differ according to the period signified. For example, during the Anti-Japanese 
War Japan could be taken to include the occupied territories of Taiwan and possibly even Manchukuo; 
2 
 
responsible for formulating that image? What do political actors in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) understand by the term history? Whose history are they 
arguing about anyway?  
 
Argument 
 
This study attempts to address some of the questions posited above, in order to 
identify the normative character of mainland Chinese imagery of Japan. The thesis 
presents research in the field of modern Chinese history, with emphasis on building up a 
more complete picture of how political actors in the PRC have portrayed Japan from 
1949 to the present.
6
 My aim is to focus on exactly what (verbal and visual) image of 
Japan the Chinese establishment has tried to fashion, as well as teasing out the main 
actors involved and their rationale for doing so. Additionally, I analyse how 
information relating to the State of Japan (its emperor, government, politicians, 
political factions and people) has been presented to the Chinese masses over the past 65 
years. These outcomes are then carefully examined not only for what they can tell us 
about PRC representations of Japan since 1949, but also for what they reveal about how 
China portrays itself, with its implications for Chinese identity.
7
  
 Previous scholarship holds that since the foundation of the People’s Republic, the 
subject of Japan, and especially its invasion of mainland China, was largely taboo. In 
                                                                                                                                            
whereas between the years 1945–52 Japan lost control over those lands as well as its own sovereignty, 
as a result of its occupation by the United States. However, in the PRC the word Japan is rarely 
carefully defined, and is frequently taken to mean all aspects of the State of Japan, all its territory, its 
people, their activities and that country’s 1931–45 war record. Except where indicated, this latter 
definition is used throughout this study.    
6
 Unless otherwise stated, I take the terms Chinese political actor and Chinese state actor to include all 
CCP politicians of Central Committee rank. This influential corpus of approximately 320 individuals 
includes members of the politburo and its standing committee.  
7
 Whilst the word “representation” is a key term in this study, its precise meaning is contested. In the 
following chapters I use the definition used by Andrew Edgar, whereby representation is “linked to 
practices and norms of representing…in order to present images of particular social groups. 
Representation here does not necessarily signify the interests of the group or individual represented, 
which means that a group can be represented in a way conceived as stereotyping. In this context 
representation can be characterised as misrepresentation, presentation or construction of identity.” See: 
Andrew Edgar and Peter R. Sedgwick, Cultural Theory: The Key Concepts, 2nd ed. (London: 
Routledge, 2007), 294.  
3 
 
this way, after 1949 Chinese people were shielded from the true nature of the 1931–45 
Japanese occupation. For example, in 1989 the American sinologist Allen Whiting 
asserted that “younger generations [lacked] first-hand knowledge of war, except for 
what was transmitted by the family.”8 Nearly 20 years later, the modern Chinese 
history scholar Yinan He stated that it was only during the 1980s that “domestic 
political needs highlighted Japanese war atrocities and Chinese victimhood.”9 
This seductively coherent narrative has problems, because it fails to account for 
the fact that from 1949 onwards, senior Chinese politicians, generals in the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), bureaucrats at both the Central Propaganda Department and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and myriad other state actors were intensely 
interested in Japan, not least because of worries of how to prevent a resurrection of 
Japanese militarism. Of course, until the commencement of “reform and opening up” 
in 1978 (hereafter the reform era) mainland archives were closed to foreigners, and it 
was highly problematic for western scholars to obtain primary source material with 
which to deconstruct Chinese representations of Japan. Even so, overviews of basic 
sources by sinologists such as Peter Berton, Eugene Wu and Andrew Nathan, suggest 
that by visiting disparate collections outside of the PRC (albeit with the aid of a very 
generous travel allowance), it should have been possible to piece together a coherent 
account of how PRC elites viewed Japan as early as the 1960s.
10
  
Whilst a number of studies have at least attempted to show the influence of 
post-1949 Marxist politics on the writing of Chinese history, they neglect analysis of 
historiography on Japan, preferring to focus on issues such as emancipation of 
peasants.
11
 Other scholars from different fields have sought to interpret Sino-Japanese 
relations by examining specific ideational components, such as Elizabeth Perry’s work 
                                                 
8
 Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 5. 
9
 Yinan He, “History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict,” Journal of 
Contemporary China 16, no. 50 (2007): 2. 
10
 Peter Berton and Eugene Wu, Contemporary China; a Research Guide (Stanford, CA: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1967); Andrew J. Nathan, Modern China, 1840–1972: An Introduction to Sources and 
Research Aids (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Chinese Studies, 1973). 
11
 For an account of these papers see: Dorothea A. L. Martin, The Making of a Sino-Marxist World View: 
Perceptions and Interpretations of World History in the People’s Republic of China (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1990). 
4 
 
on protest and Michael Swaine’s study of the role of domestic policy in Chinese 
foreign affairs.
12
 What these arguments tend to ignore, however, is a historically 
informed overview of Sino-Japanese relations over the past 65 years, instead often 
concentrating on a tightly delineated period of time. In doing so, such analysis ignores 
the evolution of trends over the course of the PRC’s existence. I will argue that the only 
way to operationalise such a relatively long period of time—during which enormous 
changes took place in China—is to approach the problem from a historical perspective, 
which forms the first main idea of my work.  
 
Why History? 
 
By focusing on the dynamics of the research topic as they relate to changing PRC 
representations of Japan (especially previous acts of Japanese aggression committed 
against Chinese forces or civilians), we can recover both agency and contingency in the 
historical manufacture of those images. The utility of this historical approach lies in 
deconstructing some of the most egregious Euro-centric and America-centric 
assumptions about the contours of the way in which China has viewed Japan over the 
past six decades. In turn, this sheds light on the mechanisms by which information 
about Japan is transmitted by the CCP and its intendant [sic] state apparatus. In other 
words, this study is not about the history of conflict between China and Japan, but the 
changing way in which history has been used as a “weapon” with which to verbally 
attack Japan and, as we will see, other political enemies. 
 If history is being used as a weapon, it is worth reflecting for a moment on what, 
exactly, is meant by the term history. At its most basic level, history is a means of 
presenting information in the social sciences. Yet, as with many other concepts in the 
discipline, its precise meaning is endlessly contested. In Europe, prominent early 
                                                 
12
 Elizabeth J. Perry, “Challenging the Mandate of Heaven: Popular Protest in Modern China,” Critical 
Asian Studies 33, no. 2 (2001): 163–80; Michael D. Swaine, China: Domestic Change and Foreign 
Policy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995). 
5 
 
modern historians such as Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886) argued that the task of the 
historian was “simply to show how it was.” 13  A century later the International 
Relations (IR) scholar E. H. Carr famously demurred, noting that “facts do not…‘speak 
for themselves,’ or if they do it is the historian who decides which facts shall speak.”14 
The logical corollary of this statement is that historical presentation of facts ipso facto 
involves misrepresenting them, because “the past…conjured up…is largely an artefact 
of the present…[As a result] the past is a foreign country whose features are shaped by 
today’s predilections, its strangeness domesticated by our own preservation of its 
vestiges.”15 In other words, historians are trapped by the present in which they write 
about the past, and it is precisely that evolving, shifting present that will be carefully 
examined in this study.  
 Chinese notions of history have also changed with time, but in very different 
ways to those conceived by von Ranke and Carr back in Europe. In imperial times 
Chinese scholars conceptualised history by likening it to a mirror which, if correctly 
angled, would reflect a golden age upon which present action had to be based or at least 
rationalised.
16
 In post-1949 China though, history was driven by politics rather than 
acting as a mirror to affairs of state, as the Chinese historian Harold Kahn argues: 
 
[I]deology is, rightly considered, a datum of history. When it [ideology] becomes the datum of 
history—the end of the scholar’s search as well as his means—the rules of the game change and 
historical inquiry becomes essentially a political exercise….[As a result, history] moves from an 
effort to discover what actually was (Ranke’s hope) to an effort to confirm what in fact should be.17  
 
Kahn’s contention is that in the PRC history is not merely a means of presenting 
information, rather it is inextricably interlinked with politics and ideology. This means 
that other conceptual tools are needed to unpack the deeper layers of meaning in 
                                                 
13
 Edward Hallett Carr, What Is History? 40th anniversary ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), xiv. 
14
 Ibid., 3.  
15
 David Lowenthal, The Past Is a Foreign Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
xvi–xvii. 
16
 W. G. Beasley and Edwin G. Pulleyblank, Historians of China and Japan (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1961), 6. 
17
 Harold Kahn and Albert Feuerwerker, “The Ideology of Scholarship: Chinaʼs New Historiography,” 
China Quarterly 22 (Apr.–June 1965), 1.  
6 
 
Chinese historical imagery of Japan.  
 
Why culture studies? 
 
Therefore, the second idea of my work is to locate it in culture studies, in order to 
analyse more fully the representations noted above and their relationship with another 
contested concept, ideology. These representations can either be mimetic (i.e. realist, 
whereby the image is merely a product of what already exists in the real world) or 
socially constructed. If the latter, it can be constructed in the form of signs (after the 
French philosopher Roland Barthes), or discursive formations set within regimes of 
power (after Michel Foucault, another French philosopher), or “framed within a 
‘dominant ideology’ which renders power inequalities invisible, natural or just,” (after 
the culture studies scholar Stuart Hall).
18
 In this latter context ideology is taken to 
mean a “set of ideas and representations in which people collectively make sense of the 
world and the society in which they live.”19 
 Many culture studies scholars have written persuasively on the correlation between 
ideology and representation.
20
 One of the most cogent descriptions is by Raymond 
Williams, who posits that “any society [such as Communist China] at any time has 
dominant values, meanings and a central system of practices. Within that effective 
dominant culture there is a ‘selective tradition’ passed off as ‘the tradition,’ the 
significant past.”21 Edward Said, though not a culture scholar per se, further explores 
the links between representation and ideology, as well as explaining why it is 
efficacious to place them within a historical context: 
 
Each age…reinterprets Shakespeare, not because Shakespeare changes, but because despite the 
existence of numerous and reliable editions of Shakespeare, there is no such fixed and no trivial 
                                                 
18
 Su Holmes and Sean Redmond, Stardom and Celebrity: A Reader (London: Sage, 2007), 258.  
19
 Richard Dyer and Paul McDonald, Stars, 2nd ed. (London: BFI Publishing, 1998), 2. 
20
 For a good overview of the subject see: David Oswell, Cultural Theory (London: Sage, 2010). 
21
 Raymond Williams, “Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory,” in Cultural Theory, ed. 
David Oswell (London: Sage, 2010), 1:21. 
7 
 
object as Shakespeare independent of his editors, the actors who played his roles, the translators 
who put him in other languages, the hundreds of millions of readers who have read him or watched 
performances of his plays since the late sixteenth century.
22
 
 
Said’s point is that any myth generated gains its identity from the interaction of the 
historical moment with readers or viewers of books, films and plays about the object of 
that myth as constructed by humans.
23
 Applying Said’s insight to the Sino-Japanese 
case, little emphasis has been placed on how the trivial object of Japan is continually 
refashioned. Therefore, my intention is to unpack the content of post-1949 “messages” 
on Japan, for what they can tell us about Chinese ideology as defined above.  
 
Why propaganda?  
 
The third and final aim of this study is to locate the production of Chinese 
representations of Japan within the post-1949 state bureaucracy. In other words, the 
objective is not only to analyse the “message” on Japan (using culture theory) and 
how it evolved with time (from a historical perspective), but to place the social 
construction of verbal and visual imagery on Japan within the framework of Chinese 
foreign policy and propaganda organs. I therefore argue that it is necessary to 
supplement historical and cultural studies scholarship, with theoretical tools from the 
fields of communication and propaganda studies.  
To achieve this, I intend to use the theoretical model outlined by the British 
communication studies theorists Kevin Robins, Frank Webster and Michael Pickering 
in 1987. They contend that since 1945 the study of communications and propaganda 
has become the preserve of psychology and sociology, which has obscured crucial 
debates in areas including, inter alia, IR and politics. They further argue that it is 
necessary to “[re-] locate the study of propaganda and communications within the 
                                                 
22
 Edward W. Said, “Orientalism Reconsidered,” in Cultural Theory, ed. David Oswell (London: Sage, 
2010), 1:33. 
23
 A myth “encapsulates and expresses beliefs and values that are shared by, and definitive of, a 
particular cultural group.” Edgar and Sedgwick, Cultural Theory, 217. 
8 
 
wider context of political phenomena and theory: legitimation…bureaucracy, social 
administration, public opinion, social control [and] the nation state.”24  
The Robins, Webster and Pickering model is particularly useful for studying 
Chinese imagery of Japan, since the fundamental tenet that propaganda is a “matter of 
the politics of information [flow],” can be applied both quantitatively and qualitatively 
to examine how the CCP and Chinese government organisations view Japan.
25
 
Bringing the three strands of this study together (historical, cultural studies and 
propaganda) allows the formation of a working hypothesis, namely that since the 
foundation of the People’s Republic in 1949, management of imagery of Japan has 
been inherently routine and normative. In short, this research investigates the 
distortion of imagery on Japan, and how the trope changes with time.  
 Assuming that the Chinese state is heavily involved in most aspects of how Japan 
is represented, the metaphor of a cinema provides a useful conceptual framework for 
drilling down into specific aspects of how China views Japan (however, note that  
examination of Anti-Japanese War films only forms one part of this study). For the 
sake of argument, the film shown at our imaginary cinema is called Angry States. 
However, before the image can be transferred from celluloid to the screen a projector is 
needed (or continuing our metaphor: a transmission system such as newspapers), as 
well as a lens through which to focus the content (the Propaganda Department, for 
example) and projectionists who decide what is screened in the auditorium (the CCP 
and various government organs). Finally, since 1949 the movie itself has been subject 
to frequent remakes. This thesis uses the theoretical paradigms outlined above (history, 
cultural studies and propaganda) to analyse these remakes, as well as the activities 
going on inside the projection room, in order to discover how and why Angry States 
was screened in the first place.   
                                                 
24
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Historiography 
 
Sino-Japanese relations and the question of how China represents Japan is a 
pertinent one in the question of understanding the mechanics of how (both verbal and 
visual) imagery of Japan is formed in the PRC. Whilst relations between China and 
Japan have historically been presented as “friendly nations with 2,000 years of shared 
history separated by a thin strip of ocean,” for much of the past 65 years research on 
many aspects of Japan was off-limits, owing to the political sensitivities associated with 
academic debates in this area.
26
  
Here is not the place for an extended exegis on the history of post-1949 Chinese 
scholarship on Japan, and several excellent overviews of research in different facets of 
the subject exist. However, it is a fact that much research on Japan is heavily censored, 
which shapes the way in which Chinese scholars present Japan, as a professor from 
Fuzhou University explains:  
 
While chief editors are generally only interested in the academic merit of an article or book, on each 
and every editorial board, there always sits a CCP member whose job it is to check whether or not a 
proof is politically acceptable. There has never existed any document which sets out what is and 
what is not acceptable material about Japan, instead the editorial board member unofficially 
responsible for censorship (e.g. the wife of a city mayor!), will judge the work according to the 
political views of the day.
27
 
 
However, Professor Gui Yongtao from Beijing University sees the problem slightly 
differently, arguing that how elite leaders view Japan is central to understanding how 
China views that country because:  
 
Censorship is not a question of whether the management of an editorial committee is light or heavy, 
but more a question of scope. For example, in your country this scope problem does not change very 
quickly, so if Hitler was thought of as a monster 50 years ago, then he is almost certainly one now. 
But in China political shifts can be large and sudden…This is our biggest problem as scholars, 
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reading the political tea leaves, in order to gauge what is and what is not acceptable. If you look at 
the problem in terms of current policy, we do not really know which elite politicians like or hate 
Japan, which makes it very difficult to know what the limits are, especially when they keep 
changing. As an example, Hu Yaobang supported Japan but many of his contemporaries loathed it.
28
 
 
It is precisely because of this censoring of material relating to Japan, coupled with 
unpredictable shifts in the politically dictated limits on research, that so much about 
Japan “just can’t be said.” It also follows that if mainland Chinese views on Japan are 
poorly understood, then the devices by which that country is presented for 
consumption by mainland Chinese audiences are under-theorised as well.  
 Despite these problems, there still exists a growing body of Chinese scholarly 
research on Sino-Japanese relations. Two of the best overviews on Mao era 
Sino-Japanese relations and historiography on the same subject are Documents on the 
Japan Problem (Riben wenti wenjian) (five volumes covering the period 1949–65) 
and the Almanac of Japanese Study in China, 1949–90 (Zhongguo riben xue nianjian, 
1949–90) (1991).29 There is also a wealth of recently published literature relating to 
Chinese perspectives on the bilateral relationship. For example, the historian Wang 
Xinsheng provides one of the most objective views of Sino-Japanese contact from the 
Late Stone Age through to the present day.
30
 The IR scholars Li Jianmin and Liu 
Jiangyong instead explore the subject from a Cold War perspective.
31
 A number of 
Sino-Japanese relations scholars such as Feng Zhaokui and Xu Zhixian emphasise 
discord, whereas the journalist Ma Licheng is something of a lone voice arguing for a 
more rational attitude towards Japan.
32
 Yet other authors have focused on the 
so-called triangular relationship between the United States, Japan and China, such as 
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the IR scholar Lian Degui and the Sino-Japanese relations expert Jin Xide.
33
 Memoirs 
by the top leadership also provide a window on Sino-Japanese affairs, albeit a view 
afflicted by the same problems of bias, inaccuracy and political point scoring as exist 
in archival records. Examples include volumes by former premier Zhou Enlai (often 
highlighting cordial relations), the Japanese policy expert Zhang Xiangshan (focusing 
on normalisation) and MFA advisor Liao Chengzhi (who was instrumental in 
formulating early PRC policy towards Japan).
34
      
The subject of how China views Japan has not generated a large English language 
historiography, and much of what exists focuses on Chinese foreign policy. As a result, 
most published work lacks the ability to detect the underlying workings that drive the 
formulation of Chinese imagery on Japan. Chalmers Johnson’s 1972 journal article 
How China and Japan See Each Other is deficient in that ignores the role of the war 
in the bilateral relationship.
35
 China Eyes Japan (1989) by Allen Whiting is still 
considered by many to be the best work on the subject, but it lacks historical 
perspective in that it narrowly focuses on the 1980s.
36
 Peter Van Ness (1970), Harold 
Hinton (1966, 1972) and John Fairbank (1962) are all reliable accounts of Chinese 
foreign policy during the Mao era, however they all fail to recognise the importance 
of Japan in the PRC’s foreign relations.37 Of the more recent works on Chinese 
foreign policy the works of David Shambaugh (1994), Denny Roy (1998) and 
Michael Yahuda (1996) come to mind for the clarity of their writing on Japan.
38
 The 
two best later works on Chinese foreign policy towards Japan are Ming Wan’s 
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Sino-Japanese Relations and Liao Xuanli’s Chinese Think-Tanks Policy Towards 
Japan (2006).
39
 Additionally, investigating the relationship from a twenty-first 
century perspective Michael Heazle and Nick Knight in China-Japan Relations in the 
Twenty-First Century (2007) glibly note “the fact that Japan sees the war differently 
causes problems.”40 They also (correctly) claim that perceived injustices relating to 
the war underpins China’s contemporary national identity, regrettably without 
exploring this contention further.  
Other scholars have conducted important studies of the Chinese political system, 
of which it is only possible to mention a few of the most recent here. These include 
Susan Shirk’s Fragile Superpower (2008), which contends that China’s increasing 
political power is not necessarily concomitant with a stable China.
41
 Sean Breslin’s 
new book Online Chinese Nationalism (2010) focuses on the activities of Chinese 
internet “hyper-nationalists,” in contrast to Strong Society, Smart State (2012) by 
James Reilly, who focuses more on foreign policy outcomes.
42
 Finally, David 
Lampton offers a riposte to the realist school of IR by arguing that Chinese foreign 
policy is driven by factors other than raw power, such as the calibre of its cadre 
class.
43
        
 No coherent account exists of how Chinese government actors filter Japan related 
content for domestic consumption. Anne-Marie Brady’s Marketing Dictatorship 
(2008) contains much technical detail but no overview.
44
 Daniel Lynch’s After the 
Propaganda State (1999) has many useful insights into how the propaganda system 
works in China, although his thesis that the state is losing control over the 
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manipulation of information is now somewhat dated.
45
 Anecdotal descriptions of the 
early Communist Propaganda Department in Timothy Cheek’s Propaganda and 
Culture in Mao’s China (1997) are similarly revealing, but virtually ignore Japan.46 
One of the best treatments of propaganda and persuasion is the 2006 standard text of 
the same name by Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, which clearly sets out recent 
research on propaganda in addition to its basic theoretical concepts.
47
  
 There is an extensive historiography relating to Chinese nationalism and the way 
in which Japan (generally) and the war (specifically) continue to shape Chinese 
memory. Caroline Rose’s two books on Sino-Japanese relations, the first focusing on 
the 1982 first textbook crisis, and the second examining the history problem, both 
analyse how memory of the Second World War has caused exasperation on both sides 
of the Yellow Sea.
48
 Rana Mitter’s article on the changing historiography of the war 
(2003), intricately charts evolving perceptions of the War of Resistance against Japan 
from the vantage point of contemporary Chinese scholarship on the subject.
49
 His 
edited volume four years later, Ruptured Histories (2007) intentionally declines to 
give prominence to Chinese views of Japan during the 1950s and 60s, however.
50
  
Peter Hayes Gries China’s New Nationalism (2004) scrutinises nationalist 
sentiment by Chinese people towards Japan on the basis of “face” (as in gaining or 
losing face).
51
 Gries maintains that the history problem relates to Japan’s perceived 
inability to give face to China, by apologising in a way that is acceptable to Chinese 
people. William Callahan’s recent volume China: The Pessoptimist Nation (2010) 
discusses, as the title implies, the thesis that Chinese leaders have always had 
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ambivalent feelings about how their country should relate to the outside world.
52
 Also 
worthy of mention is the important study by Prasenjit Duara Rescuing History from 
the Nation (1995), which traces nationalism in China from a historical perspective, 
concluding that Chinese elites have long advocated the construction of an Other by 
which to define their “Chineseness.”53  
 The subject of apologies is another line of inquiry relevant to the research topic. 
Perhaps the most widely cited study of post-war forgiveness and reconciliation is by 
Homi Bhabha (1990), which explores the rationale for widely varying attitudes to 
World War Two by Japan and Germany in the wake of that conflict.
54
 Works by 
Jennifer Lind (2008) and Yinan He (2009) both competently compare reconciliation 
by the same two countries, although they come to radically different conclusions as to 
the Chinese domestic drivers of attitudes.
55
 There are also a number of excellent 
studies of how Japanese people and elites conceptualise forgiveness, such as recent 
works by Franziska Seraphim (2006) and Philip Seaton (2007).
56
   
Particularly relevant to this study is an identification of the major political actors, 
ministries and departments involved in dictating how Japan is depicted to the Chinese 
masses. As already noted, although the number of books on the PRC propaganda 
apparatus is very small, an extensive corpus of work does exist on the political system. 
Although a historiography of this area would require a complete study in itself, below 
are listed some of the most important works relevant to the research topic.  
Officially published compendiums of writings exist for most elite leaders, such as 
the collected or military works of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping.
57
 
Mention should also be made here of well-written books on Deng and the reform era 
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by Richard Baum (1996), and the volume using newly released sources by Ezra Vogel 
(2011).
58
 Collected works also exist for lesser well-known politicians, such as Hu 
Qiaomu, Mao’s former secretary, whose musings on Japan feature prominently in this 
thesis.
59
  
 Two older works provide the most comprehensive treatment of Chinese Marxism 
and PRC governance respectively, namely Maurice Meisner’s Mao’s China (1999) 
and Kenneth Lieberthal’s Governing China (1995).60 The former’s thesis is that 
Mao’s economic reforms set the foundations for China’s subsequent rapid 
development, whilst Mao Zedong Thought has now been quietly jettisoned as a 
guiding ideology. The latter’s excellent book suffers only in that it relies too 
extensively on interviews on order to “peek behind the scenes” at the way one-party 
rule is structured in China. A more up-to-date version of how the CCP interacts with 
state organs is given by Franke Pieke (2009), although he himself admits that it is still 
extremely difficult to persuade cadres to talk about the inner workings of the Chinese 
bureaucracy.
61
 Of the many secondary works on Chinese history, three of the clearest 
are John Fairbank’s China: A New History (1998), the Cambridge History of China in 
15 volumes and Jonathan Spence’s In Search of Modern China (1999).62            
Few if any published sources exist relating to how different PRC institutions 
portray Japan over time.
63
 It has therefore been necessary to look for books and 
papers on these specific forms of transmission. The work edited by Stephanie Donald 
(2002), the recent volumes by James Reilly (2012) and Susan Shirk (2011), as well as 
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the earlier journal article by Allen Whiting (1979), are all useful in evaluating the role 
of mass media in formulating state views on Japan.
64
 Additionally, Donald Zagoria’s 
1962 study The Sino-Soviet Conflict is still considered an essential handbook for 
deciphering political messages concealed in state media output.
65
   
 In contrast, there exist only a small number of secondary works on images of 
Japan in Chinese film, such as Jay Leyda’s 1972 magnum opus Film (which is more 
of an industry overview) and John Weakland’s 1971 journal article.66 Later China 
film scholars instead classify films from the vantage point of different generations of 
movie makers, for example the work of Paul Pickowicz (2006).
67
 Additionally, two 
of the best reviews of the way in which politics shapes Chinese film are Paul Clark’s 
1987 book Chinese Cinema and Politics since 1949 and Jerome Silbergeld’s China 
into Film (1999).
68
  
 A limited number of works focus on the various clashes between China and Japan 
over the depiction of history. These include works by Caroline Rose discussed above 
and Saburo Ienaga.
69
 In fact, most education scholars and pedagogues approach the 
interaction of Chinese politics and education from a sociological viewpoint. In this 
regard the most influential scholars in the field include Emily Hannum (2008, 2010), 
Vanessa Fong (2004) and Michael Apple (1991, 1996).
70
 Finally, as with the other 
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institutions examined above, there is only a very limited English historiography of 
Chinese war museums and their representations of Japan. Important works here include 
Kirk Denton’s 2007 journal article Heroic Resistance and Victims of Atrocity, Joshua 
Fogel’s work on the controversy surrounding the Nanjing massacre and its 
eponymous museum The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography (2000), and 
Sheldon Harris’s now rather dated work on the former Unit 731 (1994).71 
The historiography indicates that no one volume on Chinese state manufacture of 
images of Japan exists. However, the important works described in this section all 
contribute to our knowledge on different facets of production of “Japan.” 
Interrogation of primary sources will test validity of the thesis that since 1949 Chinese 
political actors have been intensely interested in Japan, its government, politicians and 
people.  
  
Methodology and chapter structure 
 
Before outlining the structure of the thesis, it is important to note the issues that 
this study does not deal with. First, this is not a study of the post-war International 
Relations of East Asia. Many excellent works discussed above cover this subject in 
detail and besides, IR is of limited relevance to the wider question of how Japan is 
portrayed in China. Secondly, in order to keep the research manageable, the thesis 
does not include inquiry into public opinion and mass reaction to the images 
transmitted. To do so would require a separate study. Space constraints similarly 
preclude treatment of the way in which the Chinese Nationalists portrayed Japan both 
prior to 1949 (in the Republic of China) and after 1949 (on Taiwan). Finally, this 
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thesis intentionally ignores the influence of the internet and social networks on the 
transmission of imagery of Japan. This is not because the web, computers and 
smartphones are unimportant, but rather because, with respect to the research topic, 
their influence has only been felt during the last 15 years of the period covered by this 
study.    
The following five institutions together form the conceptual framework of 
analysis in this thesis, with one chapter allocated to the study of each: the state (elite 
views), museums, textbooks, film and mass media (newspapers). This choice of 
categories has been influenced by Evgeny Dobrenko’s Stalinist Cinema and the 
Production of History (2008), which analyses how ideology informs identity from the 
Soviet perspective.
72
 Dobrenko’s work forms the broad structure for this thesis, in 
that he explicitly attempts to deconstruct the role of the state in the production of 
history, through the institutions of archives, museums, writing and film. Whilst my 
categorisation differs from the one used by Dobrenko, I believe that his study 
provides a robust frame for examining the way in which socialist societies 
manufacture an angry state.   
Chapter one contains a detailed narrative of the way in which imagery of Japan is 
produced. Salient features of this system are described, along with an assessment of 
their efficacy. It then sets this information in the context of case studies, which 
examine the manufacture of imagery at key historical junctures. These include elite 
debates over how and on what dates to celebrate victory over Japan during the early 
1950s, the role of Japan in the formulation of a patriotic education campaign during 
the 1980s, and behind the scenes preparation for the high-profile sixtieth anniversary 
of the end of World War Two celebrations in 2005. The thesis then moves to four 
chapters, which investigate different aspects of the state’s involvement in the social 
construction of an image of Japan.   
Chapter two concentrates on the manufacture of representations of Japan, in the 
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form of an extended case study on the former Unit 731 war museum near Harbin.
73
 
This museum has been selected because despite its importance in discourse on the 
Anti-Japanese War, it has been relatively neglected in both Chinese and western 
academic debates on the interplay between history and memory, an omission which 
this chapter intends to rectify. An account of the museum’s history and the site on 
which it stands is assessed from pertinent policy deliberations since the 1950s, 
including the rationale for the founding of the museum in 1982. The chapter 
concludes with an assessment of the means by which archival material (so-called 
exhibits) relating to Unit 731, has been used as an ideological weapon with which to 
fight elements of the Japanese political establishment.  
Chapter three is a study of Chinese history and (to a lesser extent) language 
textbooks as they pertain to the research topic. It initially focuses on the policy 
deliberations which inform the production of texts, followed by a description of how 
Japan is presented in history textbooks. Working on the assumption that only periods 
of bilateral discord and war with Japan are presented in teaching materials, the 
investigation is divided into three main periods: Ming dynasty wokou piracy, and the 
First and Second Anti-Japanese Wars (1894–95, 1937–45 respectively). The chapter 
concludes that representations of Japan have been “sticky,” in that the way in which 
China’s former enemy is presented in Chinese schools has shown remarkably little 
change since 1949.  
 Chapter four describes how history is constructed through imagery in film. The 
relevant features of Anti-Japanese War movies are unpacked, in order that the 
underlying ideology can be teased out. Using a variety of motion pictures about the war, 
some of them never written about in English before, this chapter then analyses the 
construction of myth in celluloid. This myth is deconstructed by means of examination 
of its component parts, such as race, dress, discipline, stereotypes and attempts to 
define Japan as China’s aggressive Other. 
 Chapter five determines the role of newspapers in defining a particular image of 
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Japan. Following an introduction to the propaganda functions of the press in the 
People’s Republic, content analysis of prominent party newspapers is used to gauge the 
way in which commentary on Japan has evolved with time. It then examines the 
mechanisms by which newsprint about Japan is used to pursue domestic policy 
objectives.  
 This thesis concludes that manipulation of verbal and visual imagery of Japan since 
1949 has been routine and normative. However, careful investigation of five 
institutions involved with the manufacture of representations of Japan, shows that there 
is no single image that Chinese propagandists, filmmakers and newspaper editors are 
trying to project; as demonstrated, for example, by the disagreements between 
authorities in Beijing and Harbin over the preservation of Unit 731.  
The way in which Chinese political actors have produced, defined and presented 
Japan has evolved with time. However, the resulting images do not appear to have 
changed at the same speed, as shown by the fact that some textbook views of Japan 
have hardly altered since the 1950s, whilst during the past two decades tropes of the 
World War Two Japanese soldier on film have changed out of all recognition. These 
differing projections of “Japan” have continually been used by elite politicians as a 
means of pursuing domestic policy objectives, a variety of which are discussed in 
detail in the thesis. Finally, perhaps the strongest leitmotif of this study is that time and 
time again, across a range of transmission media, PRC state actors have unconsciously 
used representations of Japan as a means of defining Chinese identity.   
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Chapter 1 
Elite Views of Japan 
 
Introduction 
 
 
This first chapter shows the way in which Japan is presented and defined from an 
elite Chinese perspective.
1
 In order to both lay the groundwork for subsequent 
chapters and to situate Chinese views of Japan within a historical context, the analysis 
here deconstructs the role of the state in the production of post-1949 imagery of 
Japan.
2
 By linking the manufacture of a highly-charged trope (namely, “Japan” as 
defined in the thesis introduction) to Chinese politicians, the key aim is to 
demonstrate that elite PRC discourse on Japan has continually been used as a political 
weapon for pursuing unrelated policy outcomes. 
My research reveals that since the founding of the People’s Republic, elite 
Chinese cadres rarely thought of the State of Japan or its citizenry as an unchanging, 
fixed image. Instead PRC representations of Japan have always been tailored to suit 
the political objectives of the day. As a result, within the Communist Party leadership 
there has never been a linear progression in the development of views of Japan (e.g. 
from enemy to friend, or from friend to trading partner). On the contrary, analysis 
based on newly-released material suggests that there has been a more chaotic, almost 
cyclical progression in elite views (e.g. from enemy to friend and back to enemy 
again). In other words, whilst cornerstone issues such as normalisation (pre-1972) and 
                                                 
1
 Most of the figures discussed in this chapter are of politburo rank, currently 25 in number. See: 
Lieberthal, Governing China, 160. 
2
 Imagery is taken to include both verbal and visual aspects of Japan. See: Peter Burke, Eyewitnessing: 
The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence (London: Reaktion Books, 2001), 1. 
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bilateral trade were frequently touted as key objectives, actual representations of 
Japan were often hijacked by leaders in pursuit of unrelated policy goals. These goals 
ranged from garnering support for peaceful coexistence by Zhou Enlai (1955), to 
enhancing the CCP’s mandate for continued one-party rule (2005).  
My contribution is to identify the processes which underpin the ongoing 
construction of Chinese identity, where identity relates to norms and practices of 
(mis-)representing images of particular social groups (Japanese Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) politicians, so-called militarists, etc.). This objective is operationalised 
by interpreting Chinese government papers in such a way that allows us to tease out 
strategies for presenting “Japan.” Wherever possible, data is cross-referenced with 
other source material—memoirs of senior party figures, for example—in order to 
calculate how the trope of Japan serves diverse political ends.  
In many respects this chapter presents a revisionist story, which argues for an 
increased role for Hu Qiaomu in formulating the patriotic education campaign with its 
harsh focus on Japan’s wartime role.3 I present evidence which demonstrates that the 
patriotic education campaign pre-dated rather than post-dated the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square incident.
4
 This finding’s importance lies in the way in which the campaign 
deftly emphasises a shared experience of the fight against Japan, in order to buttress 
evolving notions of Chinese nationhood before 1989.  
The analysis below is composed of a series of case studies, not as a chronological 
narrative, but rather as a selection of critical junctures where the official stance 
towards Japan changed. At all times I attempt to distinguish between elite attitudes 
and official policy towards China’s erstwhile foe, with the caveat that the distinction 
is rarely clear-cut. The focus is mainly on narratives of the 1931–45 war fought 
between the two sides, because since 1949 that conflict has frequently formed a 
substantial component of PRC debate on Japan. Just as importantly, the war can be 
                                                 
3
 Hu was also instrumental in designing the economic agenda at the start of the reform era, see: Hu 
Qiaomu, Anzhao jingji guilü banshi, jiakuai shixian sige xiandaihua (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 
1978). 
4 
See: Suisheng Zhao, “A State-led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen 
China,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31, no. 3 (Sept. 1998): 287–302. 
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thought of as a lens for viewing how imagery of Japan changes with increasing 
distance from the Japanese surrender in 1945. 
This chapter is divided into two main parts. Part I concentrates on the Mao era 
(pre-1976) and discusses the cyclical nature of the relationship through the 1950s and 
60s, as well as how continually changing attitudes towards Japan impacted on 
representations of that country. Part II covers the reform era (post-1978), and pieces 
together how the CCP leadership seized on Japanese actions in the 1931–45 conflict as 
a means for sustaining one-party rule at home. 
 
Part I 
 
From the founding of the PRC until the early years of the reform era, 
Sino-Japanese relations cyclically alternated between friendly (1953–57, 1963–64, 
1971–82) and hostile relations (1949–52, 1957–62, 1965–71). The forces 
underpinning these abrupt changes were rarely dictated solely by the state of bilateral 
ties. For example, anti-Japanese mass protests in 1965 were designed in such a way as 
to both criticise Japanese politicians and to bolster support for Mao Zedong’s political 
line at the same time. Taken together, the events described below lend support to the 
thesis that there was no linear progression in thinking on how to present Japan to the 
masses, because the issue of Japan—and especially its war record—was too useful as 
a political weapon in pursuit of other policy objectives. The key thing to bear in mind 
in this rather incohesive set of events, is that commemoration of the 1931–45 conflict 
was like some form of readily available “ammunition” that could be used at will, 
whenever a Chinese leader needed additional firepower for achieving other goals. The 
analysis below, running broadly chronologically from 1949 onwards, unpacks 
seemingly disparate events for insights on how Chinese elites produced Japan.  
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Japan is an enemy of the state (1949–52) 
   
From the very earliest days of the PRC, China acquired Soviet protection against 
Japan by adopting a foreign policy close to that of the USSR, known as the 
“lean-to-one-side” policy. In the same way, Japan obtained American protection against 
the Soviet Union by adopting a foreign policy similar to that of the United States.
5
 In 
this way, for most of the 1950s Chinese policy towards its former enemy lacked 
independence of action, because all major decisions had to be agreed with Moscow.
6
 
Even within this relatively short timeframe however, Chinese political elites vacillated 
over how to present Japan, suggesting either that there were rifts within the leadership 
on the issue or, more likely, the way in which China’s former opponent was presented 
to the masses reflected the expediencies of domestic politics.  
In the months following the founding of the PRC the situation was relatively 
clear-cut, in that Chinese rhetoric mirrored Soviet policy. For example, when 
convicted Japanese war criminals were released from the Sugamo prison in Tokyo in 
May 1950, under pressure from the “Parole for war criminals movement,” Premier 
Zhou Enlai echoed Soviet condemnation of the United States when he contended that, 
“This arrogant action seriously harms the rights of the Chinese people, who fought a 
bloody eight year war in order to punish Japan’s war crimes.”7 In effect Zhou was 
publicly endorsing the Soviet demand for harsher treatment of Japanese war criminals, 
a policy which he was to abandon within the space of a few years.  
The following year in 1951, the Chinese opted to increase their support for the 
USSR by forging a narrative emphasising their joint victory over Japan. After taking 
advice from the North-Eastern Department Propaganda Bureau (read the Soviet Union), 
the Central Propaganda Department in Beijing instructed all military personnel, 
factories, schools and newspapers to celebrate victory over the Japanese annually on 
September 3, “taking extra care to propagandise Soviet aid and assistance in helping 
                                                 
5
 Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, 369.  
6
 Numerous archival documents attest to this, for example see: MFA doc. #105-00217-01, 1–2.      
7
 Richard H. Minear, Victors’ Justice; the Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1971), 172–73; RW, 1:45–46.   
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our country to defeat the Japanese invaders.”8 The rather embarrassing fact that much 
of the wartime assistance provided by the Soviet Union was given to the Chinese 
Nationalists (the Guomindang or GMD) and not to the Communists, and the fact that 
the USSR had only declared war on Japan a week before it surrendered was ignored. 
This is because the Russians were China’s new ally, and in order to cement Sino-Soviet 
ties, every opportunity had to be taken to praise Stalin’s contribution to defeating the 
Japanese.
9
  
 Rather confusingly, the next year (1952) the CCP Central Committee (hereafter 
the CCPCC) instructed ministries, military districts, and provincial governments to 
celebrate an event which had nothing to do with beating Japan. This was the fifteenth 
anniversary of the July 7, 1937 Marco Polo bridge incident (also known as “7.7” or 
“qiqi”), which from now on was taken as the start of full-scale war between China and 
Japan. Newspapers were not to print their own analysis of the 1937 Marco Polo bridge 
clash, instead they were to “stress and propagandise the coming together of the Asian 
peoples, emphasise struggle, and oppose American ‘re-armism’ of Japan, by changing 
Japan into a Far Eastern invasionary base for the carrying out of invasionary plans 
[sic].”10 Newspapers in new China were not permitted independent thought on Japan 
(or any other matter) because their purpose was to serve the party in pursuit of its 
political aims, which in 1952 meant blatantly using history to publicly rail against 
American imperialism in Japan.
11
   
The way in which Japan was depicted in the nation’s press was of crucial 
importance at this time, because papers were the main conduit for transmitting elite 
views on Japan to the masses. Radios were initially scarce and China’s first television 
station (Beijing TV) was not founded until 1958, greatly reducing their usefulness as 
conduits of information about Japan.
12
 In newspapers the Japanese political class was 
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only one of three foreign enemies, the other two being the Chinese Nationalists on 
Taiwan and the American imperialists (meiguo diguozhuyizhe). These three foreign 
foes were often roundly criticised in the same breath. Japanese politicians were 
branded as enemies mainly because of lingering worries about a resurrection of 
Japanese militarism, which might have led to a renewal of armed aggression against the 
PRC. The GMD, led by Jiang Jieshi, was criticised even more harshly than the 
Japanese, because the Nationalists also claimed the right to rule the mainland, they had 
just fought and lost a bitter civil war against the CCP (1946–49) and they had prevented 
the return of Taiwan to the mainland by illegally occupying it.
13
 As for the United 
States, even before the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, everything that America 
stood for was now anathema to Mao Zedong. Mao was worried that “American 
imperialism [had] now replaced Japanese imperialism to oppose the Chinese 
revolution,” partly driven by fears that the United States might remilitarise and re-arm 
Japan.
14
   
It would be rather simplistic though, to say that the CCP leadership only criticised 
Japan, without trying to understand that country or trade with it. At this time a state of 
war technically existed between Communist China and Japan, because there had been 
neither a bilateral ceasefire agreement nor a restoration of diplomatic relations, as after 
regaining independence in 1952 Tokyo recognised Taipei and not Beijing. This meant 
that there was almost a complete absence of official communication, which threw up 
obstacles in the way of trade and also posed problems for cadres in deciding how to 
depict Japan.
15
  
For this reason, the Beijing government closely scrutinised any information on 
Japan that it could lay its hands on. For example, the MFA circulated cuttings from 
                                                                                                                                            
Consumption, Content and Crisis, ed. Stephanie H. Donald, Michael Keane, and Hong Yin (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 19. 
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 Wang Dongxing, Wang dongxing riji (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1993), 167. Mao 
made this statement in Moscow in December 1949.  
15
 Yoshihide Soeya, Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945–1978 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998), 42–43.  
27 
 
Japanese newspapers which showed that only 30 percent of the Japanese population 
supported American bases on their soil, 73 percent thought that American forces should 
only be used to protect Japan and more than half opposed the [Korean] War.
16
 Analysis 
was not just limited to events in Japan however, as tens of thousands of Japanese were 
still stranded on Chinese soil following the Japanese defeat in 1945. As a result, in the 
north-eastern city of Shenyang, it was considered necessary to survey the attitudes of 
Japanese living or held captive there, so as to properly propagandise them and 
neutralise any threat that they might pose as infiltrators.
17
 Following the outbreak of 
the Korean War this was a matter of great urgency, since whilst some Japanese 
expatriates hoped that “there would be no war [between China and the U.S.]” because 
“they knew that if war came they could never return [to Japan],” others “spread 
rumours” that if there was fighting with the United States in north-eastern China “then 
they would be quickly liberated.”18 These polls were not conventional public opinion 
surveys, in that they focused on Japanese nationals in China, and their results were 
never released. Instead, the findings were transmitted right the highest echelons of 
government (the politburo), as input on how the party leadership ought to present 
Japan to the masses.     
 
Improving relations with the Japanese (1953–57) 
  
Barely five years after the founding of the PRC, there was a complete shift in 
ideology (i.e. ideas and representations) towards Japan. This sharp reversal, away 
from narratives of war towards ones of trade and normalisation, was driven as much 
by events in the Soviet Union (e.g. the death of Stalin and Soviet normalisation of 
relations with Japan) as by Chinese initiatives. In fact, the Korean War which broke 
out in June 1950 and ended in July 1953 did much to alienate the PRC and Japan, before 
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they even had a chance to explore ways in which to come to terms with the bitter 1931–
45 war that they had so recently fought. Animosity towards Japan throughout the 
Korean War led to the Japanese being depicted as “running dogs” and stooges of the 
American imperialists. Needless to say, this did not win the Chinese many friends in the 
Yoshida Shigeru administration, after the American occupation ended in April 1952.  
In spite of this bad feeling, in private the Chinese admitted that harsh economic 
reality almost forced them to seek trade with Japan. However after the United States 
passed the Battle Act in 1951, Sino-Japanese trade was prohibited not just in 
armaments, but also in any trade stuffs that could potentially be used to aid the Chinese 
war effort in Korea.
19
 As a result, only 5.5 percent of the commerce agreed in the June 
1952 first Sino-Japanese trade agreement was realised.
20
 This was a disaster for the 
PRC, since a run of poor harvests coupled with acute shortages of industrial products 
(such as tyre rubber), meant that China badly needed trade with its neighbour. It was 
therefore always likely that the PRC would start making bold positive overtures to the 
Japanese with the aim of resuming trade, regardless of developments in the Korean War 
and the economic straightjacket imposed by the Battle Act.   
The Chinese were certainly bold in their overtures to the Japanese, in that they 
were made within 24 hours of Stalin’s death. This “charm offensive” came in the form 
of announcing the repatriation (from China to Japan) of tens of thousands of Japanese 
expatriates trapped on the mainland since World War Two.
21
 It might just be a 
co-incidence that China publicised the repatriation immediately following Stalin’s 
death, but it is also plausible that the Soviet leader would never have permitted the PRC 
to take such a step towards a country (Japan), which was providing support for the 
United States in the ongoing Korean conflict.
22
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 By July 1953, even before the Korean armistice was signed on the twenty-seventh 
of that month, Sino-Japanese relations had thawed sufficiently to drop the idea of 
commemorating the “7.7” Marco Polo bridge incident. As a result, there was no 
mention in the official media of the start of the Anti-Japanese War 16 years earlier on 
July 7, 1937. In its place was an article approving the Japanese idea of a “friendly 
relations month” between the peoples of China and Japan (see fig. 1), which was 
typeset in such a way that suggested the CCP wished to foster goodwill with the 
Japanese people but not their government.
23
 The figure graphically shows that the 
piece supportive of the Japanese people is surrounded by articles highly critical of their 
politicians, by emphasising strikes by three million Japanese workers, poorly conceived 
Japanese industrial policies, numerous company bankruptcies and so on.
24
 In this 
respect Deng Tuo, the People’s Daily editor, was “constructional and not 
representational, expressing his…thoughts in the architectural disposition of his 
material,” ridiculing the Japanese political class in a very Chinese way.25    
 During the two years following the Korean War armistice, a number of events 
assisted in producing a more conciliatory attitude on both sides. Firstly, there was a 
broadly positive response from the Japanese public to the repatriation of 29,000 of their 
nationals, which the PRC had cleverly organised in a series of staged transfers for 
maximum publicity. Secondly in August 1954, 417 Japanese war criminals were 
released and repatriated.
26
 Thirdly, in April 1954 Zhou Enlai and the Indian Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru jointly announced the “five principles of peaceful 
coexistence,” which were elaborated and expanded on at the conference of Asian and 
African states held in Bandung, Indonesia the following year. 
Unfortunately for the Chinese side, in 1955 the new LDP administration led by 
Hatoyama Ichiro tried to neutralise the Chinese propaganda advantage, by virtually 
ignoring the mass repatriation of Japanese expatriates and war criminals. Instead, in  
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Figure 1. People’s Daily article showing support for the Japanese people framed by news highly critical 
of the Japanese government (7/7/53 edition, p. 4).   
August that year the Japanese government insisted that 40,000 of their nationals were 
still unaccounted for, which provoked the angry response in the People’s Daily 
newspaper, “How dare they bring up such ‘problems’ when they massacred over 10 
million Chinese people, caused over 10 billion [U.S.] dollars’ worth of damage, caused 
Article proposing a 
Sino-Japanese friendly 
relations month in late 
1953 
News of strikes by 3 
million Japanese workers, 
protesting against their 
government’s industrial 
policy 
The United States is 
increasingly isolated 
internationally  
American imperialists 
misuse of technology to 
make war on innocent 
people  
Bad news from Japan—more 
floods 
Owing to economic mis- 
management, 200 Japanese SMEs 
go bankrupt in first half of 1953  
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untold losses to public and private property, captured thousands and thousands of 
Chinese people, and took them to Japan where they were either made slaves or 
killed.”27 Despite this problem with the Japanese government, in public the Chinese 
media continued to depict the Chinese and Japanese people as friends, in accordance 
with the five principles of peaceful coexistence mentioned above. Nineteen fifty five 
was also the year in which a formal policy on Japan was finally published, drafted by 
Wang Jiaxiang, the head of the CCPCC International Liaison Department and (from 
November 1954) a vice minister at the MFA. Wang was one of Mao’s most trusted 
lieutenants and he was given the job of formulating policy on a range of sensitive 
issues.
28
 The broad tenets of the policy were that China sought firstly to forestall the 
re-emergence of Japan as a major military and political power in Asia; secondly, to 
manipulate domestic [Japanese] opposition to the policies of Japanese conservatives; 
thirdly, to increase semi-official contact with Japan through trade and cultural missions; 
fourthly, to exploit U.S.-Japan policy differences, and finally to step up the campaign to 
normalise relations.
29
   
Foreign policy (as drafted by Wang) and propaganda requirements converged for 
the first time, when on August 3, 1955 the Central Propaganda Department ordered that 
anniversaries of the Japanese surrender were not to be celebrated from now on. “Should 
newspapers decide to comment on the end of the war at all,” the document opined, 
“articles should be written in accordance with Comrade Zhou Enlai’s recent speech to 
the National People’s Congress (NPC) concerning the international situation and our 
country’s foreign policy, that is, promoting peace in the Far East and making 
normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations [our] core [policy].”30 The circular ended by 
emphasising that there would be no future need to propagandise the War of Resistance, 
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which was almost certainly because to have done so would have derailed the improving 
relations between the two countries.
31
  
The initial response from the Japanese government, or rather the absence of one, 
was not particularly encouraging. Despite the fact that the Chinese side had repatriated 
thousands of Japanese nationals, treated hundreds of Japanese war criminals leniently 
and repatriated the remains of Japanese soldiers killed in action, the Japanese 
government had done little to further the goal of restoring relations. On the contrary, 
successive LDP governments seemed to deny the very existence of the PRC by 
returning Chinese expatriates to Taiwan instead of to the mainland because, as already 
noted, after regaining sovereignty Tokyo recognised Taipei and not Beijing.
32
 In spite 
of this setback, the PRC leadership continued to court Japan both publicly and in 
private. Of the 1,063 Japanese war crime suspects remaining incarcerated in China, 
1,012 were released and returned to Japan in Spring 1956, whilst the remaining 51 
were tried and sentenced.
33
 In stark contrast to the war crimes trials conducted in 
occupied Japan (and indeed similar trials held by the GMD in China prior to 1949), not 
a single war criminal tried in the PRC was put to death, a fact which was applauded by 
the Japanese public.
34
 
 Gradually thawing relations allowed cultural diplomacy towards the Japanese 
people to gather momentum, which got underway with a 50 day tour by the leading 
Beijing opera star Mei Lanfang.
35
 So important was Mei’s tour in attempting to break 
the ice with Japan, that Zhou Enlai personally debriefed him during a four hour banquet 
on his return to China.
36
 A second part of the cultural diplomacy offensive was the first 
ever mainland “Japan film week,” which was held in cities nationwide during June 
1956. One editorial reviewing the festival gushed that it “built mutual sympathy and 
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fraternal love” between the two countries. Audiences in Beijing, Urumqi and Harbin 
apparently “shed tears on seeing such warm affectionate Japanese people on 
celluloid.”37 Evidently, the festival was careful to choose movies that depicted a harsh 
life for the Japanese proletariat under the despotic rule of the American imperialists, as 
the Chinese filmmaker Jia Ji explained when writing about the film All for Love 
(Zhengshi weile ai):  
 
We can all learn from this independent film. In the true faces of ordinary Japanese people we see the 
image of a kind, industrious people loving life and loving peace. Even though they have suffered 
grossly under the U.S. military occupation, even though modern Japanese society is being choked 
[by America] in such a way that even flowers die…there is yet an awakening of spirit.
38
  
 
This speech demonstrates how CCP propagandists cleverly spliced positive sentiment 
towards the Japanese people with anti-American feeling, by trying to drive a wedge 
between the masses and their political masters (who condoned U.S. military bases on 
Japanese soil). This neatly served the newly minted Chinese foreign policy towards 
Japan, by increasing semi-official contact—via the film festival—whilst at the same 
time attempting to turn Japanese public opinion against the United States.
39
  
It is just possible that these activities would have been permitted to take place 
regardless of the state of bilateral relations, as the cultural charm offensive coincided 
with a perceptible reduction of political interference in the arts during the run up to the 
1956–57 hundred flowers movement. However, it is more likely that as the Soviet 
Union had normalised relations with Tokyo in March 1956, the CCP spied an 
opportunity to follow suit. This is possibly why in a broadcast given the day after 
Moscow and Tokyo exchanged ambassadors, the head of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (CASS) Guo Moruo referred to the Japanese in glowing terms, calling 
that country’s politicians “our beloved Japanese friends” and referring to the State of 
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Japan using the politest possible Chinese appellation “your honourable country.”40 
This was a far cry indeed from just a few years earlier when Japan was labelled as an 
enemy and its politicians were vilified as dogs.    
 
A second downturn in Sino-Japanese relations (1957–60)  
      
The charm offensive towards Japan failed. After the election of Kishi Nobusuke 
in February 1957, it became increasingly obvious that the ruling Japanese LDP were 
oblivious to Chinese blandishments, and the CCP leadership reverted to its position 
prior to 1953, of branding Japan as an enemy and its ruling party as militarists. In 
1960, the Chinese Communists once more found it expedient to propagandise the war, 
not so much to whip up mass hysteria against the Japanese, but to try and save a 
Sino-Soviet alliance on the verge of breakdown. Much of this was foreseen by the 
United States intelligence services, who posited that: 
 
If Japan embarks on either a major rearmament programme, or reverses the present policy of 
permitting the expansion of unofficial relations with Peiping [sic], then China might publicly revert 
to the position that Japan is a major threat to peace and launch a campaign of threats and 
intimidation designed to reinforce leftist opposition within Japan.
41
    
 
In fact this is exactly what happened, because after Kishi became prime minister, he 
embarked on a course of action that was utterly unacceptable to the Chinese. In June of 
that year he visited Taiwan, the first ever visit of a Japanese prime minister in office, 
where he agreed with Jiang Jieshi that “if it is possible to recover the mainland, I think 
that would be extremely good,” and a few weeks later he even claimed that “the CCP is 
trying to seep into every Asian country.”42 Bad feeling on both sides in private quickly 
spilt out into the open, because politics had been allowed to interfere with non-political 
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aspects of the relationship.  
 Matters came to a head over the “Nagasaki flag incident” in May 1958, where the 
PRC national flag was torn down and despoiled at the Nagasaki trade fair. The Chinese 
leadership petulantly accused the Kishi administration of conniving in the desecration 
of their flag, so as to avoid officially acknowledging the existence of the People’s 
Republic.
43
 As a result of this incident, coupled with the failure of a bilateral trade 
agreement the previous month, the MFA argued that public attacks on Kishi in the 
Chinese press should be continued right up to the May 1958 election, because “after the 
Japanese government destroyed the [April] fourth Sino-Japanese trade agreement; we 
strengthened our counterattacks, but their attitude was despicable, [because they] 
continued to carry out malicious attacks and provocations, dissembling that even if 
there was no trade agreement, trade could still be conducted as normal.”44 Certainly, 
this hostile stance towards Japan was partly related to the sharp leftward veer in 
Chinese domestic politics associated with the Great Leap Forward (dayuejin) (1958–
60).
45
 However, an increasing number of mainland scholars now argue that relations 
were bound to worsen once Kishi took office, because his administration interfered on 
issues that China regarded as domestic, such as the Taiwan problem and whether or not 
the PRC had the right to a seat at the United Nations.
46
  
Trading of insults continued after Kishi won re-election such that by the 1958 
anniversary of the “7.7” incident, Japan was being compared to Nazi Germany, in that 
“Japan is now a tool in the service of the U.S. imperialist invasionary strategy…[and] 
secretly harbours the desire to exert an imperialist hegemony over East Asia…Japan is 
now better armed than Hitler at his rise to power, and even has the technology for the 
propulsion of nuclear warheads.”47 The following year (1959) the CCPCC admitted 
that trade, or lack of it, could be used as a political weapon, by stating that “because 
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Kishi refuses to rescind the policy of regarding us as an enemy, in principle we will not 
consider restoring Sino-Japanese trade…[because] we equate politics with trade, even 
as we criticise them [the Kishi administration] for doing so.”48  
Chinese leaders were so angry with the Japanese prime minister that they would 
not countenance a renewal of trade negotiations with Japan, even though mainland 
China at that time was wracked by a man-made famine caused by Great Leap Forward 
agricultural policies.
49
 To have condemned Japanese leaders one minute and then have 
pleaded with them for grain to feed starving peasants the next would have caused the 
Chinese to lose face. In many ways elite Chinese discourse at this time replicated 
criticism of Japan in the early 1950s, because two of the drivers underlying the 
bilateral relationship were unchanged, namely fear of a possible resurgence of 
Japanese militarism, exacerbated by the presence of American bases on Japanese soil.   
 
Japan renews its security alliance with the United States (1960) 
 
 In 1960 the PRC suffered three major political setbacks, the man-made famine 
induced by the Great Leap Forward worsened (all year), Japan signed a revised 
security treaty with the United States (January) and Soviet advisors started withdrawing 
en masse (July).
50
 Attitudes towards Japan at this time were influenced by all three 
setbacks, suggesting that the way Japan was presented to the masses was affected as 
much by external events as deliberate policy.    
In order to try and prevent the signing of the Japan-U.S. treaty, CCP and 
government organs were instructed to organise mass protests at home, which would 
“persuade the Japanese people that a security treaty with the United States was 
worthless garbage.”51 The MFA, masquerading as the “Committee for preservation of 
world peace,” orchestrated supposedly spontaneous demonstrations in provincial 
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capitals in January 1960, with the aim of denouncing the proposed security alliance. 
Speeches were planned and indeed made by organisations that had nothing whatsoever 
to do with foreign affairs, such as the All-China Women’s Federation, to demonstrate 
how united the Chinese people were in their opposition to the treaty. The planning for 
this event was meticulous, from noting exactly what was to be written on banners to 
how many thousands of protesters this or that party committee was to provide.
52
 The 
fact that this and similar demonstrations across the country were given blanket 
coverage in the nation’s media, suggests that the spectacle was as much for domestic as 
Japanese consumption. Whilst government papers offer no proof that these events were 
being used to deflect attention away from the famine, it is plausible that they were 
broadcast nationally at least partly with this aim in mind.  
 
Table 1. MFA instructions concerning how the USSR should be represented during the 1960 victory over 
Japan celebrations 
 MFA instructions on how the Soviet Union should be represented during the 1960 fifteenth 
anniversary victory over Japan celebrations: 
1) Representatives from the Sino-Soviet friendship association should be present at all mass 
commemoration events  
2) During all activities wreaths should be laid at the graves of Soviet war heroes 
3) Speeches should praise the Soviet soldiers and people for the role they played in…hastening the 
final collapse of Japanese fascism 
4) The Soviet peoples should be praised for sending troops to NE Asia [in the closing days of the war] 
and for their attacks on the invading Japanese armies 
5) The Soviets should be thanked for the massive assistance they bestowed on our country 
6) All mass meetings are to emphasise the enormous glorious significance of Sino-Soviet unity  
7) It is permitted to hold anniversary dinners (make sure the Soviets are invited)  
8) It is permitted to hold photographic exhibitions, especially those concentrating on Sino-Soviet 
heroic deeds 
Source: MFA doc. #105-00737-05. 
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Plans for further mass demonstrations were drawn up by the Foreign Affairs 
Leading Small Group (LSG), designed to coincide with the security treaty’s coming 
into force four months later in May 1960.
53
 These protest plans were approved by the 
CCPCC and then expanded to include 33 cities involving an estimated 17 million 
workers.
54
 The fact that the state was willing to organise protests involving so many 
people at short notice in the middle of a famine, indicates that the CCP leadership was 
willing to devote scarce resources to influencing an event taking place on Japanese soil, 
that is, preventing ratification of the security treaty.
55
        
 Nineteen sixty also marked the first time since 1953 that public criticism of Japan 
had focused on the Anti-Japanese War. However, this time social remembering of the 
conflict was confined to north-east China (dongbei), and focused on praising the Soviet 
contribution to the war effort (see table 1).
56
 As noted in the thesis introduction, time 
and time again CCP leaders followed the example of their imperial forbearers by using 
historical precedent in order to realise contemporary policy objectives.
57
 In this case 
the historical “vehicle” was victory in the 1931–45 Anti-Japanese War, and the 
contemporary policy objective was minimising the political damage caused by the 
withdrawal of thousands of Soviet advisors a few weeks beforehand. The fifteenth 
anniversary victory celebrations’ emphasis on Soviet deeds and achievements listed in 
table one, shows that the Chinese leadership was subtly trying to apologise to the 
Russians in that part of China where their influence had been greatest.  
  
Relations improve for a second time (1963) 
   
 By this stage a cyclical pattern in Sino-Japanese relations becomes apparent, with 
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cycles of “friendly-unfriendly” or “hot-cold” relations lasting seven to eight years. 
Unfriendly relations are characterised by focusing on the war (as in 1950–52 and 
1960), whilst friendly relations emphasise trade and normalisation.
58
  
At the end of 1963 relations started to thaw, exactly a decade after Zhou Enlai had 
returned large numbers of Japanese expatriates to their homeland. Attacks in the press 
gradually petered out and a more conciliatory attitude was taken towards Japan affairs 
in general. For example, in October 1963 Vice Premier Chen Yi met with Japanese 
journalists noting that “the current state of and construction of Sino-Japanese relations 
is more-or-less acceptable, we just lack a [Japanese] ambassador and lack a [Japanese] 
embassy,” indicating that normalisation remained a top foreign policy objective for the 
PRC.
59
 After the Ikeda Hayato government publicly stated that Japan had the right to 
“act for itself” in its dealings with the United States, Chinese diplomats were swiftly 
instructed to “soften their attitude towards Japanese officials in third countries [sic].”60 
Trade missions were now sent to Japan with instructions not only to explore 
commercial opportunities, but also to promote the restoration of Sino-Japanese 
relations. It seems that the beginnings of a second charm offensive were in the making 
(the first one having lasted only from 1953–57), as cadres dealing with Japanese 
nationals requesting a return to their homeland were asked “to be polite, friendly and 
warm, as the state of Sino-Japanese relations requires it.”61  
 However, Chinese people were not easily swayed by such blandishments, as the 
CCPCC soon felt it necessary to indoctrinate the masses on the benefits of foreigners, 
following a number of incidents in which the latter were attacked or threatened. For 
instance in early 1964 Japanese émigrés working as engineers in Taiyuan city were 
followed around by “staring committees,” who taunted them with names such as devils 
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(guizi) and Japanese bastards (riben wangbadan).
62
 The need to signify those Japanese 
remaining in China as friendly was thought necessary to “avoid harm from capitalists, 
revisionists and imperialists,” which was a roundabout way of saying that if Japanese 
nationals living in China were not made to feel welcome, then the PRC would be 
scoring a propaganda “own goal” in the eyes of the Japanese political establishment.63 
  
Relations deteriorate for the third time (1965) 
   
The thaw in relations lasted less than two years, since Japanese electoral politics 
rudely intruded on Chinese plans for normalisation following the election of Sato 
Eisaku in November 1964. Like the earlier Kishi administration, Sato’s government 
was perceived as an enemy of China, because he wanted to, “Consolidate domestic and 
international opposition, both to the Communist system and to dialogue with China. 
His dream is to attack China’s influence…so as to expand his influence in south-east 
Asia and to satisfy the demands of the monopoly capitalists.”64 This reference to 
monopoly capitalists was an indirect swipe at Japan’s provision of bases for American 
forces waging war in North Vietnam.
65
 Major Japanese companies were seen to be 
making huge profits from the war, such as the Idemitsu Kosan Oil Corporation, which 
supplied 92 percent of the napalm used by the United States in Vietnam.
66
  
Condemnation of Japanese support for American warmongering was swift, when 
three months after Sato’s election a People’s Daily editorial averred that “Japanese 
militarism has come out into the daylight…it is now basically openly admitted,” and 
that Japan “aims to attack China and North Korea, [whilst] the militarists want to 
plunder and rob China’s Taiwan.”67 The editorial concluded by suggesting that the 
Japanese people solve this problem by “rising up and chucking America into the 
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sea…like trash.”68 This reference to America is a classic case of what the Chinese call 
“pointing to the mulberry bush and abusing the locust” (zhisang mahuai), or making 
indirect accusations. Chinese elites were worried that the United States might invade 
China from Vietnam, and one obvious way of preventing this would be to stop Japan 
from offering logistics support to American forces en route to south-east Asia.    
The commentary above would suggest that the 1965 downturn in Sino-Japanese 
relations and indeed the way Japan was presented in the media was related to 
Japanese electoral politics. However, secret planning directives issued by the Central 
Propaganda Department, stated that the main target of the forthcoming twentieth 
anniversary celebrations of victory over Japan was neither the Japanese militarists nor 
the American imperialists, but internal CCP factions who opposed Mao Zedong:  
 
In order to commemorate the magnificent historical significance of this victory day, to present the 
historical experience of the Anti-Japanese War, to present the great significance of Chairman Mao’s 
thinking on People’s War and Chairman Mao’s political line and the military political line, to rebut 
the modernists (with reference to the people’s liberation activities and their misconceptions 
concerning the problems of people’s armed struggle)…it is recommended that nationwide 
commemoration activities are held from August 15 to September 9 this year.
69
    
 
The 1965 commemoration activities were organised on a gigantic scale. In addition to 
mass rallies staged across the country, the national media provided coverage of the war 
for a whole month. Short stories, poems, novels and songs published during the war 
were reprinted (e.g. the national anthem!), museums held War of Resistance exhibitions, 
and cinemas screened Anti-Japanese War films (such as the 1965 classic Underground 
War) back-to-back.
70
 Propaganda instructions were clear, however, that the 1945 
victory over the Japanese was a subsidiary theme for the celebrations, which should 
instead concentrate on propagandising Mao Zedong Thought, the ongoing 
achievements of the PLA and smashing the United States in Vietnam.  
It might therefore seem odd that 500 Japanese youth leaders were invited to China 
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at the same time that millions of Chinese were demonstrating against the Sato 
government. However, such incongruities are less surprising when considered in the 
light of long-term PRC foreign policy objectives. In fact, the revolutionary aims 
espoused during the twentieth anniversary victory celebrations were complementary to 
the youth visit. This is because, as noted earlier, ever since the founding of the People’s 
Republic China’s leaders had wanted to end the United States’ military occupation of 
Japan. However, as the PLA was not strong enough to forcibly expel American forces 
stationed there, Mao and his acolytes felt that the only feasible way to achieve this goal 
was via the Japanese ballot box. The broad idea was that a political party sympathetic to 
the CCP’s aims, such as the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), should win office in 
Japan and then legislate to expel U.S. forces.
71
 The JCP had long been China’s main 
cheerleader in Japan, but it was politically inconsequential, mainly because, like the 
CCP, it espoused violent revolutionary change. Therefore, the explicit aim of the visit 
was to raise the JCP’s profile with centre and right-wing Japanese youth leaders, who 
formed a major part of the 500 strong delegation.
72
  
The very occurrence of the 1965 Japanese youth visit sent different messages to 
different audiences. To the JCP, China was reaffirming its support. To the Chinese 
masses, the Central Propaganda Department intended to show that China was a friend 
of the Japanese people and an enemy of the Japanese state. To the leaders of Japanese 
youth organisations, the visit was a rare opportunity to not only increase contact with 
the JCP in a controlled environment (i.e. on Chinese soil), but also to showcase the very 
best that revolutionary China had to offer.  
 Had the onset of the Cultural Revolution (wenhua da geming) (1966–76) in 
August 1966 not caused the PRC to rapidly withdraw from the international arena, it is 
likely that the dual strategy of cultivating support for the JCP coupled with attacks on 
the Sato administration would have continued, especially since anti-Japanese 
demonstrations continued right up to that time.
73
 Instead, on August 8, 1966 the 
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CCPCC formally approved the Cultural Revolution,
74
 after which time foreign affairs 
were virtually ignored as the masses were “subjected to an intense revolutionary 
experience, which…[took] the form of xenophobia or pressures for simple withdrawal,” 
suggesting that policy towards Japan invariably took second place to domestic power 
struggles.
75
 Elites found that for the time being foreign policy could serve as a 
minimum source of added anxiety or even a useful distraction.
76
 The MFA was 
attacked and occupied by Red Guards, and many government organs simply ceased to 
operate.
77
  
As for Japan, neither “people’s diplomacy” nor semi-official cooperation was 
possible in an era when the formal Chinese bureaucracy had stopped functioning. 
Political activity on the mainland, such as existed during the latter-half of the 1960s, 
was confined to disorder, public struggle sessions and general mayhem. 
Representations of Japan in the public domain were limited to a handful of 
Anti-Japanese War films such as Underground War noted above, which were 
repeatedly shown in the few cinemas still operating.
78
 Japan, if it was referred to in 
print at all, was not one but two of the four enemies (sige diren), namely American 
imperialists (who had bases in Japan), Soviet revisionists (who had normalised 
relations with Japan), Japanese oppositionists (the LDP and its supporters) and 
Japanese revisionists (the JCP).
79
 The mere fact that the Chinese media was now 
calling the JCP—China’s staunchest ally in Japan—a revisionist, shows how unstable 
mainland domestic politics had become.  
 
Normalisation of relations (1972) 
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By 1971 both sides realised that there was more to be gained from dialogue than 
from labelling each other enemies, and informal private talks that year agreed that it 
was harmful to relations if revolutionary rhetoric was used to continually attack Japan 
about the war.
80
 This marked the third upturn in relations in two decades (the others 
being 1953–57 and 1963–64). This renewed dialogue and drive towards normalisation 
was fast-tracked by the “Nixon shock,” which led to a rapprochement between the 
United States and the PRC. The Mao-Nixon communique issued on February 28, 
1972 following the meeting of American and Chinese leaders, paved the way for 
Sino-Japanese normalisation in 1972.
81
     
It is outside the scope of this research to examine in minute detail the formal 
restoration of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972, and the subsequent Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship between the People’s Republic of China and Japan (hereafter the Peace 
Treaty) signed six years later. However, for our purposes a number of useful inferences 
can be drawn from the events surrounding normalisation. Firstly, as a result of the 
PLA’s increased influence during the ongoing Cultural Revolution, the army had 
usurped editorial control over key newspapers including the People’s Daily. This meant 
that party elites were sometimes unable to exert influence over content to the extent that 
they would have liked. In particular, it appears that Zhou Enlai could not pressure 
generals to include positive coverage on Tanaka Kakuei, who had made it clear that he 
was receptive to normalising relations after winning the July 7, 1972 Japanese general 
election.
82
 Nevertheless, the army was not immune to the potential consequences of 
events unfolding in Tokyo, and as a result PLA media censors prepared domestic public 
opinion for a possible restoration of diplomatic relations. They achieved this by 
cleverly equating normalisation (which the Chinese wanted) with opposition to a 
resurrection of Japanese militarism (which they emphatically did not).
83
   
Secondly, even though many Chinese scholars refer to the decade following the 
1972 normalisation as the “golden age” of post-war Sino-Japanese relations, there were 
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problems right from the very start. For example, during the September 25, 1972 
welcoming banquet for Prime Minister Tanaka immediately prior to the normalisation 
talks, he referred to the war as a period during which “Japan-China relations suffered 
unfortunate progress, our country made tremendous troubles for the Chinese people 
and I would like to once again express my deep regret.”84 Tanaka used the term 
meiwaku, which was translated as “to give somebody minor trouble or inconvenience” 
(mafan). During subsequent talks Tanaka was roundly criticised by both Mao and Zhou, 
for daring to refer to the deaths of millions of Chinese people during the war as mafan. 
The Japanese prime minister protested his sincerity, by averring that “making trouble” 
in Japanese was not a light word, and that it could be used to constitute an apology.
85
 
Despite normalisation, there was no meeting of minds on the war. Not only had the 
Japanese side declined to proffer a formal apology for their wartime invasion of China, 
but in April 1975 Miki Takeo became the first post-war Japanese prime minister to visit 
the Yasukuni shrine. Worse, in 1978 the souls of 14 class A war criminals were moved 
there as well.
86
 Had such events occurred even 10 years later, then there would have 
been uproar in mainland China and elsewhere too, because for a Japanese politician to 
visit the Yasukuni shrine was seen as condoning atrocities committed by the war dead 
whose souls were enshrined there. But because fostering friendly relations was 
paramount, these sleights were ignored to the extent that when the People’s Daily 
reviewed progress in the bilateral relationship made since normalisation on August 15, 
1975 (30 years after the end of the war), the only news concerning Sino-Japanese ties 
was good news, reaffirming the Chinese maxim, “Report only good news and ignore 
the bad” (bao xi bu bao you). Unfortunately for the two countries, within a few years 
the way the war was presented in Japanese schools caused relations to rapidly 
deteriorate, with the onset of the first textbook crisis in 1982.   
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Part II 
 
This second part finds that following the outbreak of the first textbook crisis in 
1982, the war was used as ammunition in pursuit of a more focused, smaller range of 
policy objectives, namely rehabilitation of the GMD and the maintenance of one-party 
rule via a patriotic education campaign. Yu Tiejun, an International Relations 
professor at Beijing University sums up this change, “During the Mao era, we all 
knew that mass protests against Japan were really about the war and institutional 
hatred of Japan. The big difference from the 1980s onwards was that ‘resisting Japan’ 
in the public domain became more organised.”87    
In the first half of this chapter I argued that Mao era Sino-Japanese relations, and 
indeed the way Japan was presented to the masses, was characterised by rapidly 
fluctuating “hot-cold,” “friendly-unfriendly” relations. This tendency continued into 
the age of Deng Xiaoping, the second generation paramount leader after Mao 
Zedong.
88
 The political scientist Richard Baum argues that reform era “letting-go 
(fang) and tightening (shou) cycles were forced on the leadership as economic 
reforms were often destabilising, which gave political and economic reform a 
discontinuous pulsating quality.”89  
After normalisation in 1972, the first highly-visible hardening of sentiment 
towards Japan (shou) came with the first textbook crisis, which erupted in July 1982. 
The incident occurred when it transpired that the Japanese Ministry of Education 
planned to release new history textbooks, which crucially changed Japan’s wartime 
invasion (qinlüe) of northern China to an advance (jinxing). This caused international 
outrage, especially in countries such as Korea and China, which bore the brunt of that 
invasion.
90
 Much of the narrative below traces the chain of events during the decade 
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following the first textbook crisis, because it defines the normative framework in 
which Japan has been presented to the masses since that time.  
The events described here also highlight the important role played by Hu Qiaomu, 
in driving the way the trope of Japan is produced by the Chinese leadership. As Mao 
Zedong’s former secretary, who was informally known by the sobriquet “one of China’s 
two pens” for his political reliability, Hu Qiaomu was well placed to shape the 
direction of reform in the decades following Mao’s death. As an illustration of the 
man’s importance, Hu was a member of the Records and Archives LSG, which gave 
him enormous influence over which party documents were released to whom and 
when.
91
 Importantly for views on Japan, he was also chosen by Deng Xiaoping to draft 
the CCPCC resolution “Concerning some historical questions since the founding of the 
People’s Republic” (Guanyu jianguo yilai dangde ruogan lishi wentide jueyi) 
(hereafter the resolution) on June 27, 1981, which as we will see was used to 
rehabilitate the GMD’s role in the war.92        
Returning to the textbook crisis then, this event acted as a catalyst, by providing 
Hu Qiaomu with an opportunity to voice disquiet over China’s post-1972 
rapprochement with Japan. Less than a week after the outbreak of the imbroglio, Hu 
wrote a blistering attack on Japan in the hard-line PLA Daily (Jiefang ribao), which 
was subsequently reprinted in newspapers around the country.
93
 The newspaper gave 
the author of the attack as “one of our in-house commentators,” which is often a 
euphemism for a top leader, and it was only after Hu Qiaomu’s memoirs were published 
posthumously in 1993 that his authorship of the original editorial was revealed.  
Superficially the crisis had a negligible effect on the growing friendly ties between 
the two countries’ leaders.94 This is why on September 28, 1982 at a time when the 
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brouhaha had still not died down, CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang felt confident 
enough to say to Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko, “When China and Japan 
cooperate there will be two benefits (fortune for our descendants and peace), and when 
there is discord there will be two harms (losses for our descendants and war),” with an 
emphasis very much on the former.
95
 Hu Yaobang continued to press for good relations 
both in November 1983 when he addressed the Japanese Diet in Tokyo, and again in 
1984 when he invited Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro to stay at his house 
during a state visit to Beijing. Perhaps the high-tide in bilateral relations was an 
invitation made by General Secretary Hu to Prime Minister Nakasone for 3,000 
Japanese young people to visit China in September that year (1984).
96
    
 Yet beneath the surface, events were taking place which would force elite discourse 
on Japan in the opposite direction to that which Hu Yaobang was trying to lead it, as 
concerted efforts were being made to strengthen memory of the war. This suggests that 
different cliques within the leadership sought to use the Japan issue for differing 
political ends. Put differently, the leading 1980s proponent of improved Sino-Japanese 
relations, the politically liberal Hu Yaobang (wanting more reform), was a bitter 
political enemy of the arch-conservative Hu Qiaomu (wanting less reform). Relations 
between the two titans were so strained, that in 1986 a committee set up by Hu Yaobang 
ordered the arrest of Hu Qiaomu’s son on corruption charges, which if proven could 
have carried the death penalty. As the offspring of other elite leaders who opposed Hu 
Yaobang’s economic liberalisation were also targeted, the charges “carried a strong hint 
of political retaliation.” 97  In 1987 Hu Yaobang was removed from office, partly 
because of a campaign to oust him led by Hu Qiaomu and other party conservatives, 
and partly because of alleged mistakes in his handling of the Sino-Japanese relationship, 
such as inviting thousands of Japanese youths to the PRC at taxpayers’ expense.98 
Whilst it is improbable that Hu Qiaomu persuaded the party to start aggressively 
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publicising Japan’s wartime atrocities as a means of undermining Hu Yaobang 
politically, until the full publication of Hu Yaobang’s memoirs it is impossible to 
discount this possibility.
99
 What this political squabbling does indicate, however, is 
that the Japan issue frequently rises in importance when political leaders are vying for 
supremacy.       
 
Hu Qiaomu and rehabilitation of the GMD   
 
During the 1980s Hu Qiaomu became a leading agent of change for the way 
Chinese elites thought about Japan. This change manifested itself in two critical areas, 
the rehabilitation of the Nationalists and the patriotic education campaign. Taking 
these two issues in turn, rehabilitation of the GMD was closely linked to China’s 
number one foreign policy objective, reunification with Taiwan. By pressing hard for 
renewed cooperation with the GMD in the mid-1980s, Hu Qiaomu and other CCP 
leaders tried to forestall moves towards Taiwanese independence which erupted with 
the foundation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in September 1986. For 
example, a People’s Daily editorial on August 22, 1985, intimated that Nationalist 
cooperation with the CCP (and not with independence-minded Taiwanese democrats) 
was the best way forward now, by writing that in the 1930s “owing to the unceasing 
efforts of the CCP, resistance of the whole country to the Anti-Japanese War rapidly 
developed, and finally, the GMD suffered to cooperate with the CCP, in a correct 
viewpoint of united opposition to Japan.”100 In other words, the Chinese beat Japan in 
World War Two because the GMD cooperated with the CCP, and the time was now ripe 
for the two parties to cooperate again.
101
 Hu Qiaomu even made a direct plea to the 
GMD to cooperate (and preferably re-unite) with the mainland in the party’s top 
theoretical magazine Red Flag (Hongqi), using the following argument:  
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Following the Japanese invasion of China, through the joint cooperation for the second time of the 
two parties, and the ardent participation of every patriotic [Chinese] nationality, the Chinese War of 
Resistance against Japan developed into a war by a united China...Despite the fact that following 
the joint victory the GMD wilfully insisted on civil war afresh, China has now become a civilised 
and advanced socialist country.
102
 
 
Further on in the article, Hu Qiaomu announced that the amount of research on the 
Anti-Japanese War (in the form of papers, books, local histories and foreign translations) 
ought to increase substantially because: it was of great historical significance; the 
Chinese people had made the biggest wartime sacrifices; it was every historian’s duty to 
write about the war; and because in thousands of small ways, Japan was trying to 
conceal or gloss over atrocities committed during the war. Early examples of books 
resulting from this carefully orchestrated campaign include He Li’s A History of the 
War of Resistance against Japan (Kangri zhanzheng shi), which even included a 
section on why the CCP and the GMD should cooperate again, and numerous books on 
the Nanjing massacre, which gave “the government a potent weapon with which to try 
to intimidate Japan…to see that Japan accorded China the respect which it [felt] it 
[deserved].”103  
Hu Qiaomu’s exhortation to renew cooperation with the mainland amounted to a 
complete U-turn in PRC policy, as previously the GMD (along with the Japanese 
government) had been branded as lackeys of the American imperialists. To determine 
the reason for this change in direction, it is necessary to examine the CCPCC June 1981 
historical questions resolution mentioned above. The head of the committee drafting 
this resolution was none other than Hu Qiaomu, who was personally nominated for this 
task by Deng Xiaoping, the new paramount leader. This document was important 
because it sought to apportion blame for the excesses of Mao’s leadership and the 
Cultural Revolution. For our purposes though, the significance of the resolution lies in 
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its formal reappraisal of the Anti-Japanese War, because for the first time it accepted 
that the GMD played a major role in the fight against the Japanese. The fact that the 
CCP decided to expend so much effort in promoting this new policy demonstrates how 
much reunification meant to the party leadership, even during a period of far-reaching 
economic reform which was consuming much of their attention.  
 
Hu Qiaomu, the patriotic education campaign and Japan’s role in it  
 
 Hu Qiaomu’s imprimatur is also evident in the way he used the patriotic 
education campaign to help fashion reform era debate on Japan. This new campaign 
was developed by Hu and several of his hard-line colleagues independently of the 
education system, and then folded into reform era school curricula during the early to 
mid-1980s (see chap. 3).  
The analysis presented below forms the basis of a revisionist argument. It differs 
from the current consensus of scholarly opinion, which assumes that the main force 
behind the patriotic education campaign (and its heavily nationalist bias against Japan) 
was the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident.
104
 Instead, I argue that the driver of the 
education campaign was neither the nationwide student protests centred on 
Tiananmen Square nor their suppression by the army in June of that year.
105
 I contend 
that the focus of the patriotic education campaign was initially re-educating cadres 
and only latterly educating young people about history. I further posit that Japan was 
only one of many targets of the campaign (the others included Great Britain, France 
and other imperialist powers) who were perceived to have slighted China during the 
so-called century of humiliation.
106
       
 Current thinking on the patriotic education campaign is that it was a post-Cold 
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War phenomenon which “appealed to nationalism in the name of patriotism, to ensure 
loyalty in a population that was subject to many domestic discontents.”107 The crux of 
the campaign was to:  
 
[Warn] of the existence of hostile international forces [mainly the Japanese and the United States] in 
the world perpetuating imperialist insult to Chinese pride. The patriotic education campaign was a 
state led nationalist movement, which redefined the legitimacy of the post-Tiananmen leadership in 
a way that would permit the Communist Party’s rule to continue on the basis of a non-Communist 
ideology.
108
  
 
In other words, following the debacle of the Tiananmen Square incident elite Chinese 
leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Premier Li Peng saw a need to indoctrinate youth, 
in order to make them “identify the party with the nation.” In this way, criticism of the 
party by young people who demonstrated in June 1989 would be seen as unpatriotic.
109
 
Rapidly enacted legislation turned plans for the patriotic education campaign into 
reality, culminating in the September 1994 “Outline for conducting patriotic 
education.”110 This outline came replete with instructions on how students should 
devote more study to the century of humiliation, a period which included both the first 
and second Sino-Japanese Wars (1894–95 and 1937–45).  
The above argument has been accepted by many western scholars as the definitive 
view on how “top-down” patriotic nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment became 
entrenched in the post-1989 education system. Subsequently, most other scholars 
writing on Chinese nationalism have defined their standpoints relative to it, for 
example by discussing “bottom-up” or “grassroots” nationalism, as opposed to 
Suisheng Zhao’s top-down version.111 However, I argue that the patriotic education 
campaign started gathering momentum almost ten years before the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square incident. This means that Tiananmen cannot be the sole reason for the virulently 
anti-Japanese patriotic education campaign (with its shrill denunciations of Japan and 
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other great powers during the century of humiliation), because it predated the events of 
June 1989 by almost a decade. 
The CCP has long used appeals to patriotic sentiment as a means of both 
supporting the socialist cause and settling scores. As early as 1967, the history editor of 
Red Flag magazine, Qi Benyu, used patriotism as a cloak for attacking political 
opponents in the opening stages of the Cultural Revolution.
112
 However, it was not 
until 1981 that the first indications of a concerted patriotic education campaign 
appeared in print. The book From the Opium Wars to the May the Fourth Movement 
(Cong yapian zhanzheng dao wusi yundong) was the first that sought to change the 
dominant Chinese history narrative from one of victory, that is, “we won the war” to 
one of victimhood, or “we need to remind ourselves of the crimes and atrocities 
committed during the century of humiliation.” 113  The book was written by the 
conservative Hu Sheng, who in 1955 had been the deputy director of the Propaganda 
Department.
114
 Although the tome was neither a best-seller nor used in Chinese 
classrooms, a review in the People’s Daily indicates that party elites saw the value of 
its content because: 
 
This book’s strength is…that it used patriotic thinking to analyse historical events…[and that it was] 
neither Empress Cixi nor Emperor Guangxu who were the main actors facing history…but the 
hundreds of millions of exploited, oppressed destitute peasants engaged in hard manual labour 
struggling for an existence. [This means that] only if there is leadership of the proletariat will the 
revolution eventually be won; only if there is a system for the establishment of socialism will it be 
possible to save China! This helps us to know better, that a real patriot, ought to be a protector of the 
socialist system and the leadership of the party.
115
     
 
This article was entitled “Vivid patriotic education material” (Shengdong aiguozhuyi 
cailiao), which suggests that the book was a riposte to the Japanese, who were just in 
the process of publishing textbooks which glossed-over Japan’s war crimes. 116 
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However, the article was published a full eight months before the Chinese noticed the 
content of the amended Japanese textbooks (resulting in the 1982 first textbook crisis), 
which discounts this possibility as a reason for implementing the patriotic education 
campaign. The book itself was not used as part of the campaign, rather it was a 
catalyst which changed the way in which party elites saw both history and Japan’s 
place within it. As a result of this growing interest in Hu Sheng’s new book, Wang 
Zhen, the director of the Central Party School in Beijing, invited Hu to discuss 
“studying history and promoting the patriotic spirit,” in terms of a patriotic education 
for party cadres.
117
 Wang argued that:  
 
Lin Biao did not have the slightest shred of common historical knowledge and it was this lack of 
even a basic history education that led to the calamity of the Cultural Revolution. Had Lin Biao had 
even a rudimentary knowledge of history, and the great contributions of many other famous thinkers, 
politicians, generals, outstanding scholars and literati then he would not have blindly peddled the 
cult of Mao which wreaked havoc in the late 1960s. However, this is not to repudiate Mao’s 
immortal contribution to China’s history, but reading of this kind of history would allow us to see 
how imperialists worked to the detriment of China, and to place [history] in context of the 
resolution “Concerning some historical questions since the founding of the People’s Republic.”118     
 
Wang’s withering criticism was not just directed at the party elite. He urged all CCP 
cadres to read history, in order that they might avoid problems besieging the party at 
that time, such as embezzlement, bribery and overstaffing. Certainly, Wang believed 
that young Chinese people could learn from history too, but he felt very strongly that 
cadres should learn first. This history was not simply the war against Japan writ large. 
On the contrary, the party was now seeking to inculcate cadres in such a way that 
emphasised China’s past.  
Interestingly, a People’s Daily editorial published shortly afterwards omitted all 
reference to cadres, concentrating solely on exhorting youth to “ardently love the 
motherland, ardently love the party and ardently love socialism,” all by means of a 
                                                                                                                                            
no. 2 (1999): 205–06. 
117
 Hongqi 2 (1982), 2–5.  
118
 Ibid., 3.    
55 
 
patriotic education.
119
 The reason for this omission is not clear, but it is plausible that it 
was to avoid embarrassing the party leadership over the issue of blame for the Cultural 
Revolution, a topic which remains sensitive to this day. The editorial insisted that the 
word on patriotic education should be spread by every means possible, via news, 
publishing, television and radio, with publishers in particular exhorted to “increase the 
output of patriotic education works for everyday reading.”120 This was the first time 
that the nation’s media organs had been simultaneously urged to produce patriotic 
education work.
121
      
In July of the following year the Propaganda Department and the CCPCC 
secretariat jointly issued a “Call for comments on strengthening the dissemination of a 
patriotic education,” which was made on the front page of the People’s Daily.122 Three 
points can be inferred from the call. Firstly, although the Chinese government is 
technically required to request comments on all new legislation, it is relatively common 
for it not to be publicised, or if it is the window for making comments is often extremely 
short. Therefore this call must have been considered of high importance because it was 
given publicity on the front page of the party’s most prestigious newspaper. 123 
Secondly, it is normally ministries rather than the CCPCC secretariat that request 
comments, which means it is highly likely that the politburo authorised the wording of 
the call in this case. Thirdly, and again highly unusually for draft legislation, the call 
included not only the full text of the draft, but a detailed analysis of why the new law 
was important.
124
  
In contrast to Wang Zhen’s treatise on patriotism in Red Flag a year earlier, by 
1983 the focus of the patriotic education campaign was now squarely on educating 
young people about history, of which conflict with Japan formed only a part. The 
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campaign was centred just as strongly on “the motherland’s stunning beauty and its 
ancient cities, historical relics, outstanding scientists in history” and their overall 
contribution to China. In other words, one should love one’s country as well as learn 
from history. A month later, China Education News (Zhongguo jiaoyu bao) published 
an instruction to the effect that the new patriotic education campaign should be 
implemented across the whole country, at every age (including kindergartens), using 
“multiple-delivery techniques so as to ensure the widest possible dissemination.”125    
Up to the mid-1980s, the overall picture is one of formulating a new patriotic 
education campaign for indoctrinating cadres, which then rapidly morphs into a means 
of educating young people to better love and appreciate their country. Both strands of 
the campaign focus on humiliation of China by foreigners including but not limited to 
the Japanese. The period between September 1986 and February 1987 showed a 
marked hardening of attitude towards Japan and its role in the patriotic education 
campaign. The reasons for this are not clear, although it coincided with both 
arguments with the Japanese government over their supply of Overseas Development 
Aid (ODA), as well as domestic unrest associated with high unemployment, social 
inequalities and inflation.
126
 On September 29, 1986, Hu Qiaomu attended an 
educational materials selection conference, at which he said that the entire education 
process (including higher education) should be linked to patriotic thinking, rather than 
Mao Zedong Thought or Marxism, because:  
 
Students study in order to contribute to the modernisation of the socialist undertaking…We need to 
develop students’ patriotic sentiment…in order that they will not think that the “grass is greener on 
the other side of the fence” or that after leaving the country they don’t want to come back…An 
important reason why graduating students at different times have differing views on the level to 
which they serve the motherland [is that] during their entire education they do not have enough 
patriotic education.
127
  
 
In other words, history teaching should be emphasised in order to stop the brain drain of 
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China’s top talent, by making them love their country and know that the “fruits of 
socialism” (Hu Qiaomu’s words) were hard won. Six months later, when Deng 
Xiaoping was meeting with the president of Gabon, he expanded on Hu Qiaomu’s 
argument, averring that: 
 
As soon as China abandons socialism, it will return to a semi-colonialist, semi-feudalist society, not 
to mention today’s “reasonably well-off society” (xiaokang), we wouldn’t even be able to guarantee 
food and warm clothing. Therefore understanding one’s own history is vital. Young people don’t 
understand this history, [but] we will use history to educate young people…This history tells us, 
that it is impossible for China to take the capitalist road, apart from the socialist road there is no 
other road for China to take.
128
  
 
This speech implied that young people needed to know more about humiliation by 
Japan and other so-called great powers in order to learn “why socialism?” and “why 
history?” On the very same day that Deng made his comments (February 18, 1987), the 
arch-conservative Li Peng (soon to be promoted to number two in the CCP rankings 
after the Tiananmen crisis) attended yet another youth patriotic education campaign 
conference, along with Wang Zhen who, as we saw earlier, sowed the seed of an idea 
for patriotic education of cadres in 1982. Incidentally, these conferences were held 
shortly after both Hu (Qiaomu) and Wang’s children were under investigation for 
corruption, by discipline committees loyal to Hu Yaobang, a leader who wanted 
friendship with and not criticism of Japan. It is therefore possible that the 
intensification of the patriotic education campaign at this time was intended as a riposte 
to General Secretary Hu, by orchestrating a crusade that would criticise Japan in every 
classroom in the land.    
The communiqué from the 1987 conference lends further credence to the idea of 
teaching Chinese youth about history, in order to bolster support for the party before the 
1989 Tiananmen Square incident. This was achieved in a number of ways including: 
teaching more history (especially 1931–45 war history); paying attention to the flag 
raising ceremony; National Day activities to be held annually on October 1 (in order to 
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understand where the PRC came from); and visiting hero commemoration, 
revolutionary history and other historical sites.
129
 As the history of the party’s rise to 
power is largely one of resistance against the Japanese, the above list of activities 
implied paying much more attention to the CCP’s wartime role. The article concluded 
with a very clear indication of what patriotic education was for, that is, “establishing the 
lofty ideas of communism” and what it was against, namely “others who proclaim 
westernisation as the classic model, this is totally the wrong way.”130    
As part of the new pre-Tiananmen patriotic education campaign, party newspapers 
took to recommending books which captured the movement’s zeitgeist. These were not 
textbooks as such, but “patriotic everyday reading material”131 directed at youth, which 
explored patriotism in detail.
132
 Patriotic reading competitions were also held, giving 
prizes for books which not only recounted the exploits of patriotic national heroes (such 
as those who sacrificed their lives in defeating the Japanese), but also those who made 
outstanding contributions to politics, military affairs, science and philosophy.
133
 
Criticising the Japanese for their actions during the century of humiliation was not 
the only theme in this growing output of patriotic educational literature. During the 
Anti-Japanese War Mao noted that “patriotism is a historical category, which changes 
along with the changing times.”134 Later writers took this utterance to mean that the 
category could be divided into different classes, such as “proletarian patriotism” and 
“socialist patriotism.” The latter form of patriotism was considered especially 
important because “only socialism could save China,” and because “ardently loving the 
motherland meant ardently loving the CCP.”135 Therefore, to be socialist was now to be 
patriotic (and vice versa), to be either meant ardently loving both China and the party, 
via a thorough understanding the country’s recent history. Thus “[recent] history has 
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already proved that without the CCP there would be no new China; the historical proof 
is the same, without the CCP there would be no socialist China to modernise.”136  
To sum up, these pre-Tiananmen books on patriotic education were not generally 
designed for children to learn about Japan or the actions of other imperial powers 
during the century of humiliation. Rather they set out the rationale for intensifying the 
teaching of modern Chinese history in schools, with the aim of showing that criticising 
the party is unpatriotic, because of its leading role in fighting off the Japanese 
imperialist invaders and subsequently founding the PRC.    
The way in which the patriotic education campaign developed after June 1989 is 
well documented elsewhere and need not concern us here.
137
 What is important is that 
internal party documents from the period following the Tiananmen incident reflect a 
sense of crisis, with leaders desperately casting around for a means of bolstering 
support for a one-party system of governance, that had virtually vanished overnight in 
the former Soviet Union. The result was a complete rebranding and recalibration of the 
patriotic education campaign in order to support continued CCP rule, with an 
increased emphasis on the actions of Japan during the century of humiliation. In other 
words, under the aegis of the third (Jiang Zemin) and fourth (Hu Jintao) generation 
leaders, there has been a deliberate attempt to bring the war and Japan’s role in it to 
the fore.
138
  
 
How patriotic education developed after Hu Qiaomu’s death 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident China was 
politically ostracised, and most western countries considered it inappropriate to visit 
the PRC at this time. However the Japanese emperor Akihito accepted an invitation to 
visit China in October 1992, the first ever by a Japanese emperor. This trip created a 
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significant amount of goodwill between the two countries, with the result that the 
period following the visit has been described as one of the best in the post-war 
relationship.
139
 Ironically, it took place just weeks after the death of Hu Qiaomu, as if 
he somehow symbolised the blocking of better bilateral ties.   
As it turned out, the drumbeat of the patriotic education campaign continued to 
sound loud and clear throughout the rest of the 1990s, as if there had been no visit by 
the emperor at all. For example, from 1995 onwards, lower middle school history 
textbooks now included a chapter on “why history matters,”140 which explicitly linked 
history of the war to love of the party, by asking students to consider why “if there was 
no CCP there would be no new China” and why “only socialism can save China?”141    
Throughout the 1990s, the Propaganda Department also made sure that students 
were continually reminded of the importance of patriotism and history. For example, on 
November 1, 1996, Deputy Prime Minister Li Lanqing opined that “in support of the 
glorious achievements of modern construction and the magnificent aims [of the party], 
students should study more recent, modern and party history…Patriotism should now 
also concentrate on national defence and the security of the country.”142 By “studying 
more history” he meant studying past attacks by imperialists (including Japan) on 
China, by “modern history” he meant the Anti-Japanese War, and by “party history” he 
meant defeating the Japanese and the GMD. This instruction that patriotic “national 
defence” education should also be strengthened, came immediately after the 1995–96 
Taiwan Straits crisis, which suggests that domestic policy continued to intrude into 
commentary on Japan.
143
  
 In 1997, the year before President Jiang Zemin’s disastrous state visit to Japan— 
where he publicly criticised the Japanese because they had not sufficiently apologised 
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for their wartime actions—the Propaganda Department authorised the naming of 100 
patriotic education sites which young people could visit, as part of its 
ever-strengthening patriotic education campaign. These locations not only included 
ancient monuments, but also recent sites of revolutionary struggle (especially those 
demonstrating the humiliation of Chinese by Japanese and other foreigners, such as 
Unit 731 described in chap. 2). Thus patriotism was no longer an abstract concept 
taught in the classroom or in front of the national flag, but a vision of what China was 
and should be, in the form of patriotic education sites dotted around the country.  
The new millennium ushered in a new low in bilateral relations between the two 
countries, although this downturn was driven by policy disputes, rather than the way 
history and Japan’s role within it was presented to ordinary Chinese people. During 
the tenure of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro (2001–06), tensions rose repeatedly 
over his unofficial visits to the Yasukuni shrine, as well as over trade differences, 
mainland activists landing on the disputed Diaoyu Islands and disagreements over the 
delimitation of the Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) in the East China Sea.
144
 
Unsurprisingly, this downturn in Sino-Japanese relations was accompanied by a 
continuing focus on the patriotic education campaign and wartime atrocities committed 
by the Japanese. For example, in 2004, the Propaganda Department issued a call for 
comments coordinated with 10 other ministries, including those of education, culture 
and finance, recommending that patriotic education work be strengthened by making 
patriotic education sites (e.g. key World War Two battlefield sites) free or half price for 
students.
145
 The idea here was to ensure that all schoolchildren, regardless of their 
parents’ financial situation, would be able to visit patriotic sites in the locality of their 
schools. As many of these bases were former Japanese military installations or sites of 
atrocities committed by Kwantung Army soldiers, the aim was to fix enemy wartime 
deeds in the minds of the nation’s youth.  
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Celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of victory over Japan 
 
Up to this point we have concentrated on the role of Hu Qiaomu and the influence 
of the patriotic education campaign in delineating how the state defines Japan. 
However, our analysis would not be complete without an in-depth examination of how, 
in recent years, party elites have represented Japan during wartime anniversaries. The 
behind the scenes planning or “internal plumbing” for such events, tells us much 
about how the party sees itself and other political actors.
146
  
Central Policy Document (Zhongfa) No. 4 issued by the State Council in April 
2005, entitled “Request for instructions concerning the activities commemorating the 
sixtieth anniversary victory in both the Chinese people’s War of Resistance against the 
Japanese and the global fight against fascism,” (hereafter the anniversary activities) set 
out the rationale for the decennial celebrations.
147
 It argued that they would be “a big 
event, of the greatest political and policy significance, which would be closely watched 
by the whole nation and every [foreign] state.” Cadres should therefore “pay great 
attention to the commemorations and organise them with the greatest care.”148 Many 
other countries planned memorial events to mark the end of the war, including the 
victors in Britain, France and the United States; and the losers in Germany and Japan.
149
 
So in this respect, China was no different to other nations that wanted to collectively 
remember the war in their own way. 
However, China was unusual in that it was the state which insisted on 
micro-managing each and every aspect of the celebrations. This is demonstrated by the 
assertion in Zhongfa (2005) No. 4 that the commemorations must represent the parties 
involved in the fighting (e.g. the CCP and the GMD) in a way which emphasised the 
Communists’ role in winning the war. Simply put, unlike in other countries, in 2005 the 
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Chinese state insisted on adherence to the narrative that the CCP united and led the 
masses to victory in both the Anti-Japanese War (1945) and the Chinese Civil War 
which followed it (1946–49).  
The 2005 commemoration events started in early May (to coincide with the date of 
the defeat of Nazi Germany on May 8, 1945) and ended in early September (marking 
the anniversary of the formal Japanese surrender on September 2, 1945). They were 
seen by the party as a golden opportunity to “strengthen the people’s pride, confidence 
and sense of self-esteem.” Every opportunity was to be used to sing the praises of “how 
good the CCP is, how good socialism is and how good reform and opening up is 
[sic].”150  
 As during previous commemorations marking the end of the war (e.g. 1951–52, 
1965, 1985) “Japanese militarists [but not the Japanese people] should be denounced 
and their heinous crimes exposed,” and “under no circumstances should people be 
allowed to seize the opportunity to beautify the GMD or belittle the CCP.”151 Such 
comments suggest enduring continuity in the way in which PRC elites have portrayed 
Japan, such as extreme sensitivity to claims that the GMD did most of the fighting 
against the Japanese. If the Nationalists in Taiwan were able to prove this, it would 
imply that the GMD (and not the CCP) has a greater claim to rule mainland China.  
 Nothing was left to chance during the celebrations, because were the wrong 
message on the CCP’s role in beating the Japanese to gain wide circulation, then at the 
very least the party would have had to conduct a rapid damage limitation exercise. At 
worst the masses would have started questioning the Communists’ right to rule. In 
other words, memory of the war was used as a vehicle for consolidating and 
promoting continued one-party rule on the mainland: 
 
Special attention is to be paid to small newspapers, small journals and management of the internet; 
the blocking of foreign internet sites with opposing views is to be strengthened; and internet 
comment or articles appearing online are to be immediately scrubbed, should they mock the history 
of our War of Resistance [against Japan]. All media must praise our achievements in the War of 
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Resistance against Japan and our role in the global fight against fascism…those who do not must be 
severely punished.
152
  
 
Such was the importance of these sixtieth anniversary events, that provincial 
Propaganda Yearbooks in 2005 and 2006 devoted around 10 percent of their 
publications to planning for and monitoring feedback from the celebrations. This, of 
course, does not mean that 10 percent of the Propaganda Department’s manpower and 
time was devoted to the commemoration activities. However, it does demonstrate that 
close attention was paid to these events and their associated accrual of propaganda 
benefits at the very apex of government.  
Preparations were not just restricted to planning the commemoration ceremonies 
themselves. To illustrate, the civil affairs, finance and health ministries as well as the 
PLA Central Political Department were ordered to arrange “express sympathy” events 
for war heroes across the country, so as to avoid the charge that China was not looking 
after those who actually fought the Japanese.
153
 Additionally, all provinces were to 
ensure that World War Two veterans were neither suffering financially nor chronically 
ill because of an inability to pay for treatment. Other countries too would have been 
embarrassed were soldiers who risked their lives fighting for their homeland found to 
be living in poverty. The difference with China, is that because the fight against Japan 
was and remains absolutely central to the CCP’s claim to legitimacy over the GMD, it 
could not afford a public relations disaster in the form of photos of neglected war 
veterans being beamed round the world.  
All provinces, regardless of whether they were in CCP, GMD, Japanese, warlord or 
so-called puppet regime hands between 1931 and 1945, were to hold anniversary 
activities commemorating the CCP’s role in the war. In central Hubei Province, for 
example, where CCP forces hardly fought at all, the provincial propaganda bureau still 
argued that the 2005 commemorations would form a “brilliant opportunity for 
propagandising, with obvious propaganda results, [namely] propagandising the 
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glorious achievements of the party in leading the Chinese people through an arduous 
yet magnificent struggle against the Japanese.”154 At the provincial level, just as at the 
national level, it was expressly forbidden to praise the role of “other forces” in beating 
the Japanese. This was the CCP’s moment of glory (in 2005) and the party was to 
ensure that no one else could claim to have defeated the Japanese, not even in Hubei 
Province.
155
   
 
Conclusion 
  
 Since the founding of the PRC in 1949 there has never been one inviolable, 
unchanging image of Japan, even for party elites. This chapter has demonstrated that 
there has been no linear progression or development in the Chinese leadership’s view 
of Japan. Instead, change in the production of verbal and visual imagery of Japan has 
frequently been hijacked by other policy dictates, ranging from the need to show 
support for the Soviet Union, to deflecting attention away from the mistakes of the 
Great Leap Forward.  
 The evidence presented also makes a case for revisiting the influence of Hu 
Qiaomu, in hardening of elite attitudes towards Japan, especially during the decade 
following the 1982 first textbook crisis. I contend that Hu was also a key political 
actor in the formulation of a pre-Tiananmen patriotic education campaign which 
prominently (but not exclusively) focused on Japan’s wartime role. This campaign 
was initially an idea for indoctrinating cadres about history, in order to prevent a 
recurrence of the Cultural Revolution. However, it quickly morphed into a vehicle for 
inculcating young Chinese people on the benefits of socialism and one-party rule.  
 Whilst the long-term drivers of Sino-Japanese bilateral relations are relatively 
well understood—such as normalisation (pre-1972), trade and the cyclical nature of 
the relationship—the processes underpinning the way in which elites view Japan are 
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much less well known. This is precisely because the Japan issue has continually been 
used as a means of pursuing different policy objectives, for example criticising the 
GMD’s contribution to the war effort. The next four chapters examine in more detail 
different “institutions” through which Japan is presented to the masses: museums, 
textbooks, films and newspapers; with the aim of painting a more finely textured 
picture of the way in which Japan has been (mis-)represented.
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Chapter 2  
Anti-Japanese War Museums: Unit 731 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 This chapter explores the dialectic of remembering and forgetting in Chinese war 
museums, as it relates to the memory of Japanese actions in World War Two. In 
particular, I chronicle the chain of events which led to the opening in 1985 of an 
important but understudied war museum, the “Japanese Invading China Army 
Chemical and Biological Warfare Unit 731 Criminal Evidence Museum” at Pingfang 
near Harbin, or Unit 731 for short. From its construction during the late 1930s until 
August 1945, this top secret Japanese military establishment conducted Chemical and 
Biological Warfare (hereafter CBW) experiments on thousands of live human guinea 
pigs, mostly captured Chinese citizens.
1
  
To date the scholarly literature in both English and Chinese has generally 
neglected Unit 731 in favour of three more prominent wartime commemoration halls: 
the Nanjing Massacre Museum (Nanjing, opened 1985), the Museum of the Chinese 
People’s Resistance against Japanese Aggression (Beijing, opened 1987) and the 
September 18 History Museum (Shenyang, opened 1991). Domestic research on these 
three sites in particular, has tended to concentrate on the suffering inflicted on Chinese 
people as a result of Japanese aggression, rather than the museums themselves.
2
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 This neglect is unwarranted, since Unit 731 is anything but a passive repository 
of war memory awaiting visiting tourists. On the contrary, archives relating to the site 
offer a fascinating glimpse of internal party debates on how China’s erstwhile 
adversary (Japan) should be portrayed. For example, during the 1950s and 60s the 
provincial authorities in Harbin endeavoured to demolish the entire Pingfang site, in 
order to erase memory of the war there. However, in attempting to raze this former 
Japanese base to the ground, the Heilongjiang CCP People’s Committee encountered 
fierce opposition from leaders in Beijing. Twenty years later, shortly after the start of 
the reform era, the changing fortunes of Unit 731 caused it to be reclassified as a 
national patriotic education base (1982), and several years after that parts of the site 
were opened to the public (1985). The centrepiece of the Unit 731 site now became a 
criminal evidence museum.  
Subsequently, memory of the site, as well the information presented within its 
walls, has been continually contested by both foreign and domestic political actors.
3
 
This verbal warfare occurred precisely because commemorative structures form 
“political arenas in which definitions of identity and culture are asserted,” and because 
the selection of knowledge there, as well as the presentation of ideas and images is 
“enacted within a power system…This is the power to represent: to reproduce 
structures of belief and experience.”4 The changing ways in which these forces act 
upon Unit 731 make it ideally suited as a lens with which to study how Chinese 
political actors have sought to conceptualise the Anti-Japanese War. 
The competing narratives analysed in this chapter—local versus national 
government, elite PRC versus leading Japanese politicians (such as Koizumi 
Junichiro), and so on—can be thought of as threads, which can be woven together in 
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order to create a tapestry showing the relationship between history and memory as 
they relate to the Unit 731 site. Such insights are important, because sociologists still 
do not know how societies remember, or even why the past is of relevance.
5
 However, 
in recent decades scholars attempting to answer these two questions have started to 
theorise memory, and to conceptualise it in relation to history and collective identity. 
For example, Eric Hobsbawm argues that the way in which people form collective 
memory is linked to the notion of the “invention of a tradition.”6 Jens Bartelson comes 
to a similar conclusion, in that he posits collective memory is a key attribute in the 
process of state formation, because it practically “remembers [a nation] into 
existence.”7 The French sociologist Pierre Nora also provides a useful distinction 
between memory and history, by arguing that “memory attaches itself to sites, whereas 
history attaches itself to events.” 8  In this way, memory becomes distorted and 
unpredictable, not only by censorship and propaganda, but because it is “capable of 
lying dormant for long periods only to be suddenly reawakened.”9  
In this chapter I will track the political processes involved in constructing Unit 731 
as a site of Chinese war memory. I have chosen this methodology because taking a 
holistic approach to theoretically deconstructing a single PRC commemoration 
museum allows us to unpack the complex relationship between war history, war 
memory and identity.  
This chapter is divided into three parts. Part one shows how after the war Unit 731 
became subject to history itself, in that at various stages after 1949 its function and even 
its right to exist was challenged by different political actors. Part two then demonstrates 
how Unit 731 exhibits were used to selectively remember the past, in order to achieve 
sharply-defined political objectives. Finally, part three examines the physical structure 
of the museum.   
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Part I 
 
Unit 731 becomes subject to history 
 
After the First World War the Japanese military looked for “cheap but highly 
destructive” munitions which could assist them in their plans for territorial expansion 
across East Asia.
10
 Chemical and Biological Warfare was seen by the Japanese as just 
another means of helping them achieve this objective. In order to design and produce 
CBW munitions, within months of the Japanese occupation of Harbin in February 1932, 
the “Research Centre for Epidemic Prevention” (a euphemism for the Japanese 
military CBW research centre) moved there from Tokyo.
11
 After changing location 
several times, from 1938 onwards Japanese CBW research was masterminded at 
Pingfang, a five square kilometre cantonment just beyond the southern outskirts of 
Harbin.
12
 Shortly after the move to Pingfang, the complex was renamed Unit 731, and 
testing of chemical and biological agents on live prisoners continued there right up until 
August 1945.
13
  
Early in that month (August 1945) the retreating Japanese took great pains to 
destroy evidence of their CBW activities, which meant killing and disposing of all 
remaining Unit 731 prisoners, detonating experimental laboratories and destroying 
documents.
14
 Documentary evidence relating to Unit 731 at the Kwantung Army 
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headquarters in Xinjing, the one-time capital of Manchukuo (present day Changchun) 
was also destroyed, but as we will see the destruction was not completed thoroughly.
15
  
During the war Unit 731’s real purpose seems to have been kept from the CCP, and 
it was not until after the Chinese Communists took control of Harbin in April 1946 
that they suspected the original function of the site.
16
 However by the time the 
Communists came to power in 1949, the Soviets had already amassed sufficient 
evidence relating to Japanese CBW activities with which to conduct war crimes trials at 
Khabarovsk.
17
 Evidently, some of this material was shared with the Chinese, following 
which they aligned themselves with the Soviet position.  
After the founding of the PRC, one of the first documents to be published on Unit 
731 was a pamphlet written by the Harbin People’s Government Hygiene Bureau.18 It 
might seem rather odd that a hygiene bureau would publish such an overtly political 
tract criticising the Japanese. However, since the end of the war hygiene department 
cadres had had to deal with a number of serious plague outbreaks in Harbin, which were 
probably caused by rats set free from Unit 731 in the closing days of World War Two. 
These officials therefore had the most detailed knowledge of Unit 731, which is why 
they were chosen to write about it.
19
 
The main argument of the pamphlet bore the imprimatur of the CCPCC, as its 
focus was on matters of national rather than local importance, such as arguing that the 
Soviets should place more Japanese militarists on trial and punish them with the utmost 
severity. This was because the Chinese people “want revenge on the biological warfare 
criminals who killed our compatriots.”20 Even harsher opprobrium was reserved for the 
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United States though, as America had allegedly assisted in covering up the crimes of 
the putative war criminals (and Unit 731 commanders) Lieutenant General Ishii Shiro 
and Major General Kitano Masaji:  
 
We…denounce this [act] to all the peoples of the world, we insist that the Japanese biological 
warfare criminals repay their blood debt! We fiercely oppose each and every action by the 
American imperialists in covering up [the crimes of these] Japanese war criminals.
21
 
 
Such denunciations indicate that the new Chinese administration was intent on using 
Unit 731 as a means of pillorying both the Japanese militarists and the American 
imperialists. The pamphlet, which was published on the eve of the outbreak of the 
Korean War, can be viewed in terms of Cold War narratives, which signified that 
American forces occupying Japan were seen as an even bigger threat than the Japanese, 
because of their attempt to encircle the PRC. Interestingly, the publication was released 
just two weeks after American Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s famous January 1950 
press club speech, in which he outlined a policy for containing Communist powers in 
East Asia (e.g. China) by means of erecting a defensive perimeter around them.
22
 
Viewed in this light, the pamphlet’s contents seem more like a riposte to the concept of 
American encirclement than a critique of Japanese war criminals.  
 
Unit 731 papers are unearthed in Changchun (1953) 
  
 Three years later documents relating to Unit 731 were unearthed during building 
work at the site of the former Kwantung Army headquarters in Changchun.
23
 These 
Japanese military papers proved that the Japanese had conducted vivisection 
experiments at Unit 731 on captured Chinese Communists, Russian spies and common 
criminals, to name but a few. Immediately publicising these records would have 
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reinforced the case, outlined above, for criticising the United States. Similarly, sharing 
the dug-up files with the Soviet authorities would have given the Russians additional 
documentary evidence with which to place more Japanese suspects on trial. China’s 
new Soviet allies would have certainly been most interested in the files, since they 
proved beyond reasonable doubt that during the 1930s and 40s captured Russian agents 
had been the subject of vivisection experiments at Unit 731.
24
 
In fact none of the excavated papers were released, instead they were placed in the 
hands of the Manchurian Puppet Archive Office, a branch of the Public Security Bureau 
(PSB). The records then sat untouched until the 1960s, when they were slowly 
catalogued.
25
 There are several possible reasons as to why these reports and fragments 
were not placed in the public domain. Firstly, in 1950s China there was a relative 
paucity of Chinese scholars of Japan, which meant that China lacked the institutional 
capacity with which to properly analyse the documents found in Changchun.
26
 
However were this true, then as the number of trained Japan scholars rose through the 
1950s and 60s, the files would have been quickly analysed and released, which was 
patently not the case.
27
 Moreover, right from the start the authorities seem to have had 
a reasonable grasp of the contents of this find, since over 40 officials were seconded 
from other bureaus and ministries to scrutinise the unearthed documents.
28
    
A second and more plausible reason for the non-release of the Unit 731 papers was 
that at the time the files were found, diplomatic relations with Japan were rapidly 
improving, as evinced by the mass repatriation of 29,000 Japanese expatriates in early 
1953 and a rapid increase in the number of visiting semi-official Japanese delegations. 
As a result, it was now no longer politic to harangue the Japanese over their wartime 
activities, because to have done so would have wrecked Chinese attempts to improve 
bilateral ties.
29
 Even if the Unit 731 papers were dug up in 1955 as opposed to 1953, as 
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some archival sources contend, this reasoning would still hold true, since 
Sino-Japanese relations gradually strengthened between the years 1953–55. In 
summary, during the early years of the new People’s Republic, the fate of Unit 731 and 
unearthed evidence relating to it mirrored the state of Sino-Japanese relations. 
Different branches of the party apparatus sought to present memory of the war 
with Japan in different ways. We know this because during the late 1950s officials 
from the provincial CCP committee in Heilongjiang and the State Council in Beijing 
sharply disagreed over the future role that Unit 731 should play in the nation’s 
consciousness. Throughout the second half of the 1950s, after plague outbreaks 
emanating from Unit 731 had been brought under control, the Heilongjiang authorities 
made repeated requests to the authorities in Beijing for permission to redevelop the 
former Unit 731 site.
30
 Their rationale was that in order to meet centrally imposed 
production quotas, the municipal government was urgently in need of flat land for new 
factory space. To provide that space, it was proposed to build on the ruins of Unit 731.
31
 
Heilongjiang cadres evidently did not consider the ruins worth preserving, and besides, 
much salvageable building material from the Unit 731 ruins (such as bricks) had 
already been taken by local residents, making what remained even less worth keeping.  
This argument is rather disingenuous, considering that Pingfang lies over 20 
kilometres from the centre of Harbin. Furthermore, both Harbin and Pingfang lie on the 
Songhua River floodplain, all of which is eminently suitable for building factories on. 
In other words, had it so wished, the Harbin city government could have easily chosen 
somewhere closer to Harbin to expand production facilities. To be fair, by 1950 aviation 
factory No. 122 had already been established immediately adjacent to the ruins of the 
Unit 731 headquarters, and it was now looking to expand. This work unit had in fact 
been given responsibility for protecting the former 731 site, which it did in a most 
perfunctory manner, by erecting a barbed wire fence around part of the ruins and 
building over the rest!
32
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I contend that the authorities in Harbin knew that this former research centre was in 
some way “different” and more important as a site of war memory, not least because in 
1950 the local hygiene bureau had published a treatise excoriating Japanese CBW 
criminals and their activities at Unit 731.
33
 Moreover, in north-east China generally, 
ruins and physical reminders (administrative buildings, barracks and so on) of the 
Japanese occupation abounded, so in this case the local government must have sensed 
the importance of the Unit 731 ruins, otherwise they would simply have ignored or 
demolished them without seeking higher guidance.  
This raises the intriguing possibility that the real reason for the haste with which 
the Harbin authorities wanted to redevelop Unit 731, was that the ruins were an 
embarrassment or a slur on the entire region. In this sense Heilongjiang cadres saw the 
ruins as signifying a “site of forgetting” (that embarrassment) and not one of 
remembering it.
34
 Another possibility is that at the time of the first request in 1957, the 
PRC had just concluded its own war crimes trials in Shenyang which, in the eyes of the 
Harbin authorities, obviated any need to preserve Unit 731 as proof of Japanese war 
crimes.      
Meanwhile, in Beijing, the subject of preserving the Unit 731 ruins was considered 
so important that Premier Zhou Enlai was asked for his comments on the issue. Writing 
on behalf of Zhou, the State Council’s 1957 official response was that it was necessary 
to preserve the ruins, because “[Unit] 731 forms extremely important proof, not just for 
[the PRC] but also for Soviet war crimes trials of Japanese…all your actions are to 
proceed from this principle.”35  
Taken at face value, this statement could be taken to mean that prior to the 
Sino-Soviet split in 1960, all relations with foreign powers were interpreted in Beijing 
through the lens of perceived Soviet Union foreign policy requirements. This is another 
way of saying that the Chinese leadership thought that the Soviets might want them to 
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preserve the ruins, so preserved they should be.
36
  
Zhou Enlai also reasoned that it was necessary to preserve the ruins for the 
following four reasons: “one, the international situation; two, the state of Sino-Japanese 
relations; three, in order to preserve proof of enemy crimes; and four, so as to expose 
and attack Japanese militarists.”37 As will be shown, in later decades these four guiding 
principles were repeatedly invoked, using “the past [in order to] continuously recreat[e] 
and reformulate…[it] into different pasts from the standpoint of [an] emergent 
present.”38 In other words, even during the 1950s Unit 731 was becoming part of 
history itself, by evolving into an important potential reservoir of memory for gaining 
leverage over Japan, should the state of Sino-Japanese relations deteriorate to such an 
extent as to require it.  
Not content with the 1957 decision from the State Council, the Heilongjiang CCP 
People’s Committee made further requests to demolish the Unit 731 ruins in 1958, 
following which it noted that: 
 
In 1957 and 1958 my province asked for guidance from the State Council, who gave instructions 
that in order to preserve evidence of the enemy’s crimes [emphasis mine], it is necessary to preserve 
a part of the [former Unit 731] ruins…If it is necessary to further demolish the preserved part of the 
ruins, because to do otherwise would [negatively] influence the development of production,…then 
written comments from higher authorities should be sought…The State Council does not agree that 
it is crucial to demolish the ruins.
39
  
 
So despite the best efforts of the local authorities to efface the memory of Pingfang, 
Zhou Enlai himself decreed that the ruins should remain as proof of atrocities 
committed by the Kwantung Army in north-east China. The lack of further archival 
correspondence on the matter suggests that the Heilongjiang government accepted the 
State Council’s ruling, and thereafter made no further requests to build over the ruins. 
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However, this does not mean that officials in Harbin sought to implement the guidance 
from Beijing by carefully preserving the ruins, or even that they agreed with the 
judgement. In fact the opposite seems to have happened, as during the Great Leap 
Forward local Pingfang residents were allowed to cart off hundreds of tonnes of bricks 
from the ruins for building purposes, and steel retrieved from the site was melted down 
in local blast furnaces.
40
 
Further desecration of the former Japanese CBW facility then took place during the 
late 1960s and early 70s, when an estimated 3,000 People’s Volunteers (minbing) and 
middle school students completely levelled many of the remaining structures.
41
 
Actually, during the Cultural Revolution buildings and cultural relics across the nation 
were vandalised or damaged, so in this respect Unit 731 was not unusual. For example, 
the Nanjing Aviation Martyrs’ Museum on the northern outskirts of Nanjing was 
desecrated a second time by Red Guards in 1966, having already been vandalised in 
late 1937 by invading Japanese troops.
42
 Moreover, across much of the country 
government had virtually stopped functioning, so it is quite possible that the authorities 
could not have stopped the destruction at Pingfang, even had they wanted to.  
This insouciance by the local authorities over the fate of Unit 731 is worth 
highlighting for two reasons. It shows that no matter how passionately central 
government cared about the issue, foot-dragging and a blithe lack of interest by local 
government conspired to create an altogether different reality on the ground.
43
 The 
wilful destruction of the Unit 731 site also implies that at various stages of China’s 
recent history domestic politics has overridden all other considerations. In this case, 
allowing Red Guards and People’s Volunteers to wantonly destroy a vital piece of the 
nation’s collective memory in defiance of State Council instructions, shows that China 
has not always accorded top priority to preserving proof of Japanese crimes. During the 
early decades of the People’s Republic the overall picture we have is one of the Unit 
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731 ruins being acted upon by competing domestic political forces (the State Council, 
Red Guards and so on), which affected both its physical structure and the way in which 
it was represented. At the close of the Mao era (1976) the former Unit 731 site was 
virtually destroyed, with its loss seemingly unlamented.   
 
Part II 
 
Hu Qiaomu, Unit 731 and war memory 
 
One of the constantly recurring themes of this study is that Mao’s former secretary 
Hu Qiaomu was frequently involved in behind the scenes decision making on how to 
portray the history of China’s war with Japan. During the Cultural Revolution Chen 
Boda (who like Hu was one of the party’s top theoreticians) attacked the history 
profession with the famous jibe that “history is basically completely useless,” which led 
to historians being persecuted to such an extent that their subject was “smashed to 
pieces by the Gang of Four,” an ultra-left clique which included Mao’s wife Jiang 
Qing.
44
  
From 1980 onwards, Comrade Hu rehabilitated China’s beleaguered historians and 
gave them the green light for using history as a means of solving intractable 
problems—such as how to “correctly” remember wartime Japanese atrocities 
committed at Unit 731. Hu Qiaomu offered reconciliation with historians, by accepting 
that “in order to solve current real, practical problems, you can’t ignore history…it does 
not matter how complex the problem, if you use history’s vision to analyse [problems], 
everything can be understood.”45 These remarks, coming from one of China’s most 
prominent Marxist theorists, removed at a stroke the ideological stigma that had so 
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recently been attached to historians and their work. From the early 1980s onwards then, 
remembering these atrocities allowed the CCP to blot out memory of the Cultural 
Revolution. This plan was executed in two stages.  
During the first stage Deng Xiaoping quickly sought to draw a line under the 
excesses of the Mao era, by apportioning blame for the party inspired catastrophes of 
the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, coupled with a reappraisal of 
post-1949 party policies. Deng achieved this by asking Hu Qiaomu to draft the 
historical questions resolution discussed in the last chapter.”46 In this respect the 
publication of the resolution in June 1981 was spectacularly successful, since it was 
structured in such a way that any future criticism of the CCP elite over its own past 
could be neatly deflected, by always referring back to the party’s own criticism of itself 
in the text of the resolution. This process also seems to have had a cathartic function, 
allowing party leaders to get on with their day-to-day job of running the country, whilst 
at the same time avoiding recriminations for such egregious mistakes as the Great Leap 
Forward man-made famine. Furthermore, the very fact that the historical questions 
resolution was published at all, demonstrated that Deng Xiaoping wanted to 
differentiate himself from the secretive style and personality cult associated with his 
predecessor Mao Zedong.  
However, formally drawing a line under the party’s Mao era mistakes was 
emphatically not the same as forgetting those mistakes. After all, at the time of 
publication of the historical questions resolution (in 1981) the Cultural Revolution was 
still fresh in everyone’s memory, since it had ended only five years previously (in 1976), 
with Mao’s death and the arrest of the Gang of Four. This left something of a vacuum in 
CCP debates on all sorts of recent historical issues, because the resolution, revelatory as 
it was, still papered over many uncomfortable truths which could not be talked about.  
Put differently, although by CCP standards the June 1981 historical questions 
resolution had been unusually open, the CCP still needed to find an effective means of 
forgetting incidents and political campaigns that now, in the post-Mao era, might call 
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into question its right to rule. For example, was the CCP fit to rule if its Great Leap 
Forward policies caused a man-made famine which had killed more Chinese people 
than the Japanese during the war?
47
 Was the CCP fit to rule if it had launched political 
campaigns which killed Chinese “rightists” and landlords in ways just as violent as any 
invading Kwantung Army soldier?  
The second stage of Deng Xiaoping’s master plan, to erase public collective 
memory of policy mistakes committed during the Mao era, involved downplaying 
post-1949 history by highlighting war memory. Before we can assess the evidence for 
this though, it is necessary to contextualise Deng’s thinking in terms of the global rise 
of wartime commemoration from the 1980s onwards. This is required because if the 
Chinese increase in remembrance of World War Two mirrored the rise taking place 
globally, then downplaying memory of Mao-era excesses would not explain the 1980s 
rise in prominence of Chinese wartime commemoration at Unit 731 and elsewhere.           
 
Unit 731 and the explosion of war memory in the 1980s and 90s 
 
 As noted in chapter one the first textbook crisis erupted in July 1982, following the 
publication in Japan of revised history textbooks which downplayed the wartime 
invasion of mainland China by Japanese forces.
48
 It is well documented that this crisis 
provided the initial momentum for the building of a small number of high profile 
Anti-Japanese War museums around the country, such as the Nanjing Massacre 
Museum noted above.
49
 However, it is not clear whether this burst of war museum 
construction was influenced by purely domestic considerations. This doubt exists 
because Barbara Misztal notes that during the 1980s and 90s there was a global 
explosion of “commemorative fever,” in the form of an astonishing burst of interest in 
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collective memory as a historical phenomenon.
50
 It is therefore important to ascertain 
to what extent these global trends influenced the Chinese decision to start building 
museums commemorating the Anti-Japanese War. 
The historian Michael Kammen provides a comprehensive list of causal factors for 
the 1980s and 90s burst of interest in sites of memory, which forms a useful framework 
for analysing the Chinese case. Firstly, during the 1980s and 90s there was a worldwide 
surge of well-organised, well-funded civic commemorations, such as the bicentenary of 
the 1776 revolution in the United States (1975–76) and the quincentennial anniversary 
of Columbus’s first voyage to the New World (1992). Kammen argues that events such 
as these acted as a catalyst for other major global commemorations.
51
 Certainly, after 
the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and China’s reforms got underway, the country was 
much more open to the influences of foreign diplomacy, culture and trade. To 
illustrate with just one example, between the years 1980–2000 the number of Chinese 
students studying abroad increased from 2,124 to 38,989. Returnees also increased, 
from just 162 in 1980 to 9,121 in 2000.
52
 However, during the early 1980s, China had 
only just commenced its reform and opening up to the outside world, and it is unlikely 
that commemoration events such as those mentioned above would have influenced the 
Chinese leadership’s decision to start their own large-scale commemorative activities at 
Unit 731 and elsewhere.  
 Secondly, Kammen talks of “delayed memory syndrome,” which he defines as “a 
period of 15 years of relative neglect or repression following some major historical 
trauma.” 53  This line of reasoning plausibly explains the lack of interest in the 
Holocaust and the Vietnam War until the 1960s and 80s respectively. However, the 
delayed memory syndrome model does not fit the Chinese situation very well either, 
since the post-1982 surge in state-led remembrance at Unit 731 did not commence until 
50 years after the first Japanese biological warfare unit was set up in Manchuria (in 
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1932 at Beiyinhe), and almost 30 years after the retreating Japanese abandoned Unit 
731 in 1945. The 15 year rule might have held were it not for the intervening 
revolutionary upheaval of the Chinese Civil War, the Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution. At the very least, this suggests that the production of war 
memory was delayed by domestic political events.    
Another possibility here is that the sheer scale of the suffering during the Japanese 
occupation meant that after the war the CCP found it exceptionally difficult to deal with 
this humiliation (as did the GMD on Taiwan), and it therefore shunned detailed analysis 
of specific incidents (e.g. biological warfare attacks) or sites (e.g. Unit 731) by 
peremptorily blaming feudalism or fascism instead.
54
 These “scars of war” remained 
buried for so long because they were overlain by the fresh pain of Chinese-versus- 
Chinese conflict following the foundation of the PRC, such as the anti-landlord 
campaigns of the early 1950s.
55
  
 Thirdly, Kammen briefly details a number of other possible causal factors that 
could account for the 1980s and 90s commemoration fever. These include a rise of 
state-sponsored tourism, which packages the past as heritage, and of memory “as an act 
of consciousness,” where war veterans feel the need to confess as their lives draw to a 
close.
56
 He also talks of the role that increasingly “authoritative” war films play in 
stimulating war memory because they “tell it like it really was.”57 Taking each of these 
points in turn, it is unlikely that state-sponsored mass tourism would have been a 
driving force for reviving memory of Unit 731 during the early 1980s, as there was 
nothing for tour groups to see—in 1982 the Pingfang site was not much more than a pile 
of rubble. Even today, the local Harbin government prefers to promote the city as a 
tourist or investment destination, rather than as the scene of grisly biological war 
crimes.
58
  
Kammen’s idea of remembering “as an act of consciousness” applies to former 
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Japanese soldiers posted to Unit 731 rather than to Chinese prisoners who were sent 
there, because not a single Chinese inmate came out alive.
59
 However, during the 
1980s and 90s a number of inmates’ relatives and forced labourers still survived. These 
individuals were interviewed in order to elicit more information about Unit 731.
60
 
However, it is implausible that their testimony provided the initial impetus for opening 
the Unit 731 museum, since the process of interviewing them only gathered momentum 
after the decision to open the museum was taken. What is clear though, is that after the 
1982 textbook crisis erupted in July, staff at Unit 731 moved with considerable alacrity 
to provide “proof” of the atrocities committed there. For example, Mr Zhao Guanxing, 
a Chinese forced labourer at Unit 731 who was 18 years old at the time of the Japanese 
surrender, was interviewed by three newly-hired curators from the virgin Unit 731 
research centre, just weeks after the textbook crisis imbroglio.
61
 These staff must have 
been recruited with great speed, as prior to 1982 Unit 731 neither existed as a separate 
work unit, nor did it employ any staff.        
Finally, with respect to mainland Chinese war movies, as I discuss in chapter four, 
from 1949 to the present day hundreds of feature films and countless television dramas 
have been made about the Anti-Japanese War, but films which “told the war it as it 
really was” did not start appearing until after the release of The Bloody Battle for 
Taierzhuang in 1985. This film thus post-dated the initial surge in commemorative 
activity at Unit 731. It is interesting to note that since 1949 whilst mainland Chinese 
films have been made on many aspects of the 1931–45 war, not a single film or 
entertainment drama has been made about Unit 731, which suggests that the CCP 
wanted to forget rather than remember its history. However, numerous educational 
documentaries have been made about Pingfang, implying that there is a “correct” or at 
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least an “approved” way of interpreting Unit 731 history, focusing on the atrocities 
committed by the Japanese militarists, and the idea of a “museum as ‘proof’ of war 
crimes.”62  
The commentary above suggests that the global explosion of war memory during 
the 1980s shares few similarities with the Chinese case, except for the timing. We 
therefore turn to other possible reasons for the explosion, which brings us back to the 
question of whether the Chinese leadership used memory of World War Two to 
downplay party mistakes committed during the Mao era. Here the evidence shows 
that there was indeed a battle for ownership of the past waged on several fronts, 
fought against the ruling LDP partly in the form of a patriotic education campaign. 
The analysis below adds depth to the arguments provided in the previous chapter, that 
the way memory of the war was presented in mainland China showcased CCP 
achievements whilst at the same time attacking other views on the conflict.  
 
A battle for ownership of the past 
 
 Within a few weeks of the first textbook crisis, retired Japanese Prime Minister 
Kishi Nobusuke stirred controversy afresh by proposing to construct a memorial to the 
Japanese “Manchurian colony” in Shizuoka Prefecture, Japan. 63  The proposed 
construction of this monument had a bearing on the fate of Unit 731 (which was located 
in Manchuria) for two reasons. Firstly, Kishi emphatically stated that the founding of a 
Japanese Manchurian state was “in order to found an ideal country, there was 
absolutely no intention of setting up a colony.”64 The implication here is that if the aim 
of the Japanese was to build a “Manchurian paradise,” then the intentions of the 
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Japanese settlers there must have been honourable too. A logical corollary of this 
statement is that the occupiers never committed war crimes such as those perpetrated at 
Unit 731. Yet if the Japanese never colonised Manchuria, then why was a retired 
Japanese prime minister now proposing to build a “Manchurian colony” monument in 
the first place? It is rather like the Germans offering to build a monument to 
commemorate their “advance” into Poland during the Second World War, whilst 
conveniently forgetting that they had built the Auschwitz concentration camps.  
The second reason that the proposed “Manchurian colony” monument has a 
bearing on Unit 731 relates to official Chinese antipathy towards the monument’s 
sponsor, Kishi Nobusuke. Not only had he served in the Japanese colonial 
administration in Manchuria (after which he was held as a class A war crimes suspect 
but never indicted), but worse, as far as the Chinese were concerned, during his tenure 
as prime minister (1957–60) he denied that the PRC was the legitimate government of 
China.
65
 Seen in this light, by averring that the Japanese never had colonial designs on 
north-east China, Kishi Nobusuke was simply reopening wounds that had never fully 
healed in the first place, which led Deng Xiaoping to retort:  
 
If Kishi Nobusuke wants to build a memorial to the founding of Manchuria, then we have to build 
our own monuments to the invading Japanese militarists. In this way we can educate our people, our 
youth, and our descendants about this very important truth.
66
  
 
The Unit 731 museum director gives this August 1982 statement by Deng as one of the 
main reasons for the establishment of the Unit 731 museum, which shows that during 
this period the emergence of the history problem was not solely related to disputes 
over textbook content.
67
 The main thrust of Deng Xiaoping’s reasoning here, is that if 
Japanese right-wing politicians such as Kishi tried to deny their wartime history, then 
the PRC leadership needed to educate the Chinese masses about Japanese atrocities 
committed in the name of colonialism. In this way, memorials and monuments relating 
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to the war, such as Unit 731, would form part of what I term an “education toolkit,” for 
teaching Chinese people about the contested nature of war memory (e.g. Japanese 
right-wing politicians denying the colonisation of Manchuria). This toolkit was 
predicated on the tradition that “history can serve as a mirror” (yishiweijian), which 
means that correctly interpreted, history can act as a guide to future conduct.
68
 The 
first textbook crisis and the “Manchurian colony” monument dispute had repercussions 
well beyond China and Japan. For example, politicians in South Korea also protested 
vigorously against these 1982 attempts to re-write history, since they had been 
colonised by the Japanese too.
69
  
As a result of the renewed controversy over wartime memory, in September 1982 
the head of the Propaganda Department in Beijing, Deng Liqun (no relation of Deng 
Xiaoping), decided to commission a fresh report into Unit 731 and the war crimes 
committed there during the war. A month later, on seeing the completed paper, minister 
Deng instructed that:  
 
We need to turn this [unmarked] grave for 10,000 [Chinese people], that [unmarked] grave for 
10,000 [Chinese people], the site of the Nanjing massacre and the Japanese militarists’ biological 
warfare factory in Harbin, etc., into national cultural heritage sites.
70
  
 
The alacrity with which Deng Liqun commissioned the report suggests that the central 
government had not forgotten Zhou Enlai’s 1957 dictum that: “the Unit 731 ruins must 
be preserved in case the state of Sino-Japanese relations requires it,” even as the issue’s 
dormancy for 25 years raises the question of why it should have been resurrected 
then.
71
 Zhou Enlai presciently foresaw that this discursive site of war memory might, 
in a potential future dispute with Japan, become a metaphorical stick with which to beat 
it. Minister Deng’s attitude towards the Suzuki Zenko administration could be summed 
up as “do not try to deny your invasion and occupation of China, as we have proof in 
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the form of the ruins at Unit 731.” 
 
The germ of an idea for a patriotic education campaign 
 
It is therefore unsurprising that in October 1982, Deng Liqun forwarded the 
completed report on Unit 731 to Hu Qiaomu, who in response cleverly reasoned that 
this general neglect in preserving relics of the Japanese invasion was detrimental to 
both the Chinese and Japanese peoples. As will be shown in the unfolding argument 
below, in order to drive this argument home, nine months later on June 21, 1983 Hu 
was building a case for linking Unit 731 to the Chinese education system:   
 
Recently a Japanese author wrote a book about Unit 731 called Devil’s Gluttony, which became 
a…best-seller in Japan because most…people in Japan did not know the truth about the invasion of 
China by Japanese militarism [sic], let alone the facts about using Chinese people for live biological 
warfare experiments. Not long ago, this author visited the southern outskirts of Harbin to inspect the 
ruins of that period’s Japanese biological warfare factories, and found that most of the ruins did not 
even exist anymore…Of course, we cannot preserve all of the ruins, but preserving such a small 
proportion of such an important [historical site] is a total lack of responsibility on the part of our 
generation.
72
 
 
Hu Qiaomu was making two important points, namely that it was the responsibility of 
the older generation to preserve ruins of the conflict with Japan before they passed 
away, and also that by abnegating this responsibility they were partly responsible for 
the lack of Japanese awareness about the war. Hu’s implication here was that if there 
was collective war amnesia in Japan, then the Japanese education ministry could freely 
doctor domestic textbooks in any way they wished, because there was no proof (in the 
form of museums or monuments) with which to refute such allegations. Crucially, 
China would be partly to blame for this Japanese amnesia, because the older generation 
had missed the opportunity to convert important mainland Chinese sites of war history 
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into sites of war memory. Hu Qiaomu was firing the opening salvoes in a battle between 
China and Japan for contemporary ownership of wartime memory, as originally played 
out during the 1930s and 40s at Unit 731, Nanjing and elsewhere.  
Put differently, during the 1980s Hu Qiaomu saw Japanese revisionism over war 
memory as a pretext for jump-starting the process of remembering the war in China, by 
moving history (e.g. in the form of Unit 731 atrocities) into the short-term memory of 
the Chinese masses. Comrade Hu brilliantly argued that this “memory deficit” on the 
part of both the Chinese and Japanese people, could be remedied by means of building 
museums and monuments as discursive sites of memory with which to remember the 
war:  
 
Even though the masses have received a comprehensive historical education, there are many 
historical truths about which they are not too clear. The war took place very recently, but today we 
do not have a single commemoration museum to it. Actually, the eight year War of Resistance 
against Japan was an extremely important turning point in China’s history, which ultimately led to 
victory in the revolutionary [civil] war.
73
 
 
Hu Qiaomu also realised that there was no point in building museums or monuments to 
commemorate past atrocities or battles if no one visited them. He therefore suggested 
that the most important sites of remembrance should become patriotic education bases 
(aiguozhuyi jiaoyu jidi), which young people would then visit whilst at school, as part 
of a state-led patriotic education campaign. Interestingly, this speech was made just a 
few weeks after the promulgation of the “Call for comments on strengthening the 
dissemination of a patriotic education” discussed in the last chapter, indicating that 
museums were very much a central plank of the proposed legislation:  
 
Setting up war museums will provide a patriotic education for the masses and our young people, in 
order to let [them] know what sort of country we are, what sort of development and struggle we 
have gone through, and the foundations laid for development in [our] varied undertakings.
74
    
 
Hu Qiaomu does not directly state why young people needed to focus on refashioning 
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memory of the war. However, he hints at a possible reason in his assumption that the 
older generation should reconstruct the past as museums and monuments, because they 
were the ones who actually fought the war. This would imply that the younger 
generation, who did not experience the war, were in greatest danger of forgetting it. If 
young Chinese people were not continually reminded of Japanese atrocities committed 
at Unit 731, Nanjing and elsewhere, then in future they would be in no position to 
protest if any right-wing Japanese politician or bureaucrat attempted to whitewash 
history by denying their invasion of China. What better way to ensure that every 
Chinese citizen is armed with the appropriate “tools” with which to rebut any 
interpretation of the past which obfuscates the Japanese invasion, than by ensuring that 
as schoolchildren they compulsorily attend wartime commemoration sites? In some 
ways this plan mirrored the idea of Jewish interest groups in the United States and 
elsewhere, who focused on memory of their race’s persecution by the Nazis during the 
1930s and 40s, because of concerns that “as those survivors of the Holocaust pass 
away Holocaust deniers will gain traction.”75 However, the Chinese case differs in 
that it was the state (as opposed to interest groups) which acted as the main driver in 
refashioning memory of the war as an ideological weapon, which would in future 
allow China “to cast itself as a ‘victim state.’”76  
Naturally, these sites of contested memory would present the war from the 
Communist Party’s perspective. This would explain why Hu proposed that the 
reconstruction of these sites be funded mainly by the public purse, rather than by 
private donations, as they had been in much of Western Europe after World War One.
77
 
Only by using government funding to pay for the reconstruction, would the Chinese 
state have the final say in this early 1980s bilateral dispute over whether Japanese 
forces advanced into or invaded China. 
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Remembering in order to forget?  
 
As discussed above, the second stage of Deng Xiaoping’s plan to blot out memory 
of the Cultural Revolution and other “party-versus-Chinese” campaigns was to divert 
attention towards atrocities committed by the Japanese during the war. The Soviet 
historian Peter Kenez argues that propaganda states “overwhelm citizens…with official 
interpretations of reality. Initiating political challenges to these states becomes virtually 
unthinkable—which is precisely the goal.”78 His hypothesis neatly fits the evidence 
required to build a prima facie case for Deng Xiaoping’s post-Cultural Revolution 
administration needing to “reinterpret reality,” by forgetting party mistakes and 
remembering Japanese atrocities. This was achieved by apportioning blame for 
previous CCP errors in the form of the historical questions resolution (released in June 
1981); forgetting recent historical events which would cast doubt on the party’s fitness 
to rule (ongoing); and initiating a patriotic education campaign so as to remind today’s 
youth of crimes committed by Japanese and other foreigners in China (February 1982 
onwards).  
The missing link needed to make this new official reinterpretation of reality 
binding, was a version of history which would allow the Chinese people to remember 
the achievements of the party, even as they were required to purposely forget its 
mistakes. The first textbook crisis and the Kishi Manchurian monument debacle helped 
to forge that missing link, by acting as catalysts for an explosion of war memory from 
1982 onwards, through which the CCP could refashion its own wartime role. Thus, 
remembering the war allowed the CCP to construct a new comprehensive version of 
reality, based on its role in beating those very same Japanese militarists in its quest to 
found the PRC. The brilliance of this strategy was that for as long as certain factions of 
Japanese society (LDP politicians, right-wing groups, senior generals from the Japan 
Self-Defence Forces (JSDF)) denied their country’s former activities at Unit 731 and 
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elsewhere, Chinese politicians would have an excuse par excellence for diverting 
attention away from party mistakes towards party achievements, such as the war.               
 Once the political decision was made to move ahead with this strategy for 
re-interpreting history, it was fleshed out in the form of administrative instructions. At 
the end of 1982, a few months before Hu Qiaomu’s musings on the need for war 
museums, the Ministry of Culture issued Order No. [82] 1289 “Instructions on the 
work required to properly protect criminal evidence of the Japanese invasion of 
China.”79 This order instructed that from now on (late 1982) all activities relating to 
the museum’s work should stem from the premise that the ruins should be preserved 
and that young people should be educated about Unit 731’s history.80 To that end, on 
December 1, 1982, Unit 731 was assured continued national attention, by being classed 
as one of the first Chinese patriotic education bases.
81
 This decision has led to the 
restoration of Unit 731 as a criminal evidence museum, such that it currently receives 
200,000 visitors a year.
82
 During this period, over two million characters of evidence 
have been examined and more than 1,000 exhibits have been catalogued. To this day, 
work continues on interviewing ethnic Japanese formerly employed at Unit 731, as well 
as surviving conscripts and close relatives of those killed at the Unit.  
 
Compensation claims using evidence from Unit 731   
 
In 1982, after the impetus of the first textbook crisis and the Manchurian 
monument incident, all surviving Unit 731 documentary evidence seems to have been 
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transferred from the police to provincial archives for analysis.
83
 The provincial 
archivist’s mandate was to provide proof of Japanese crimes, which could then be 
neatly folded into broader state-directed narratives relating to memory of the 
Anti-Japanese War. Of course, during the 1980s and 90s leaders in Beijing could have 
chosen to reconstruct the Japanese invasion of China in any number of ways, by 
authorising research on Kwantung military strategy, economic policy in areas occupied 
by the Japanese, or even attitudes of Japanese settlers living in China. However, none of 
these avenues for research were pursued, because focusing on “Japan as enemy” was 
the most efficacious means of showcasing CCP achievements, forgetting the party’s 
own mistakes, and criticising the Japanese.  
 Seen in this light, research undertaken by state employed archivists and scholars 
after 1982 was not so much “objective representation” as “subjective interpretation” of 
the Unit 731 archives.
84
 By subjective interpretation, I mean choosing or filtering 
material, and then releasing it in stages to a mass audience in order to achieve central 
government aims. By following the train of events which led to the two stage release of 
Unit 731 documentary evidence, it is possible to map out these objectives, which I posit 
were (and remain): fostering a strong sense of Chinese victimhood, proving specific 
acts of Japanese barbarity, demonstrating the complicity of contemporary Japanese 
politicians in covering up criminal acts committed in China before 1945 and finally, 
embarrassing individuals or factions within the LDP who deny the war. This leads us to 
the problem of what caused the evidence to be released into the public domain at certain 
times.  
 
The first major release of Unit 731 records in 1999 
 
After Emperor Akihito’s visit to China in 1992, Sino-Japanese relations improved 
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considerably, with China making only muted, infrequent criticisms about Japan. This 
short post-Tiananmen rapprochement between the two powers came to an abrupt end in 
1995, when Prime Minister Murayama Tomichii failed to pass a “No war” resolution in 
the Japanese Diet.
85
 This failure sparked a blaze of Chinese criticism, signalling that a 
re-emergence of Japanese militarism would not be tolerated.
86
 Interestingly, this 
criticism erupted on the very day that representatives of the world’s seven largest 
industrialised economies (the G7) were meeting in Canada, and was quite possibly 
designed to embarrass Japan in front of other world leaders.  
Within weeks of this spat, in August 1995 one Mrs Gou Lanzhi—the widow of a 
Mr Zhu Zhiying—launched a civil compensation claim in Tokyo, for damages relating 
to the abduction of her husband in Mudanjiang in 1941 and his subsequent murder at 
Unit 731.
87
 Technically the plaintiff could have lodged a war crimes suit, as there is 
currently no statute of limitation for such cases.
88
 However, as the time since a 
putative war crime occurred increases it becomes ever harder to secure a conviction, 
as evidence is lost to posterity, and potential witnesses or suspects die of old age. This 
problem is particularly relevant here, since the case was filed over half a century after 
Zhu Zhiying disappeared. Mrs Jing’s case was quickly followed by an avalanche of 
similar civil compensation claims lodged by “history activists” with no connection to 
the Chinese state, in many cases launched with the support of Japanese lawyers who 
wished to highlight Japan’s wartime conduct.89 The historian James Reilly analyses 
the reasons why Chinese state organs kept themselves at arm’s length from the court 
proceedings, for example because the CCP did not want to lose lucrative trade deals 
with Japan.
90
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What concerns us here though, is not so much the courtroom battles, but Chinese 
official involvement, regardless of whether that involvement was made public at the 
time. Monographs published by Unit 731 admit that the elderly Mrs Jing did not bring 
the above-mentioned lawsuit herself, rather she was invited to lodge a claim by the 
“National executive committee on evidence collection of the Asia-Pacific War victims,” 
which is quite possibly a euphemism for the Chinese government.
91
 If this statement is 
true (and there is no reason to think that the Unit 731 museum would fabricate state 
involvement in the case), then it is highly suggestive that the CCP wished to force the 
Japanese courts to admit war crimes committed by the Kwantung Army as a 
punishment for the failure of the “No war” resolution in 1995.92  
This assertion is lent credence by the fact that, four years later in August 1999, 
several weeks before the Tokyo District Court pronounced on a number of 
compensation cases (including the one brought by Mrs Jing), the Chinese government 
authorised the public release of records relating to Japanese CBW crimes committed at 
Pingfang, because “these archives expose Unit 731 crimes and provide strong legal 
proof for relatives seeking to sue and seek compensation for crimes committed on their 
kin.”93  To demonstrate its empathy with potential or current plaintiffs, the CCP 
provided blanket Chinese media coverage for the release of these exhibits, which it saw 
as proving Japanese war guilt.
94
 Intriguingly, none of the articles specifically 
mentioned which lawsuits this newly released evidence was directed at, instead 
preferring vague generalisations about corroborating Japanese war crimes.  
The archives could, in fact, have been released at any time following their 
discovery in Changchun in 1953. Instead, the authorities ultimately gauged that 
maximum impact would be gained by offering these papers as proof in court cases 
being heard in Japan, which would explain why the Chinese side argued that “we” need 
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to prove the names, the date of birth, the ages and the hometowns of those Chinese 
liquidated at Unit 731.
95
 This strongly suggests political influence in the timing of the 
documents’ release, because the disclosure of archives in China is rarely dictated by 
the pace of contemporary events. Moreover, it is even less common for such a release 
to be accompanied by a press conference. Newspaper and journal articles printed 
accompanying the publication of these papers admitted that the decision to publish 
was taken nationally, although they declined to elaborate further.    
As it turned out, the release of this material failed to achieve a positive outcome for 
the Chinese plaintiffs. The courts in Tokyo argued that neither a case for compensation 
nor a formal apology had been be made, since too much time had elapsed since the 
alleged crimes were committed, the plaintiffs had provided insufficient proof, and the 
court was not a suitable forum for deciding on matters such as apologies or 
compensation.
96
 The Chinese authorities were evidently dealing with a potentially 
explosive situation, in that encouraging Mrs Jing (and maybe others) to lodge claims in 
Tokyo might cause common Chinese people to roundly condemn the party if those 
cases then failed.
97
 My basic argument here is that in order to forestall such criticism, 
the party then produced its most conclusive documentary evidence of Japanese war 
guilt, that is, a second batch of Unit 731 records, so as to prove the cases in its own 
domestic court of public opinion.  
 
The second major release of Unit 731 records in 2001 
 
Just as in the early 1950s Zhou Enlai authorised the repatriation of Japanese POWs 
in batches for maximum publicity, documentary evidence from Unit 731 was also 
released in tranches for PR purposes. Here the similarity ends, however, because 
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whereas in 1953 each group of POWs was released in pursuit of one overriding goal, 
namely normalisation of bilateral relations, in 1999 and 2001 the Chinese government 
publicised Unit 731 records for different reasons on each occasion. In 1999 Unit 731 
archives were published to coincide with the compensation trials held in Tokyo 
described above, whereas the second release of documents two years later was 
primarily designed to berate Prime Minister Koizumi.  
On September 6, 2001, the director of the Jilin Province provincial archive held a 
press conference, detailing the work that his organisation had carried out on records 
relating to Unit 731.
98
 This batch of military papers in Japanese provided proof of 
CBW experiments carried out on 277 people, as well as evidence that high-ranking 
Manchurian officials and military officers knew of Unit 731 and its activities.
99
 A 
quote from the Jilin press conference helps to pinpoint the reason for choosing 
September 2001 as the publication date for this second and final tranche of Unit 731 
exhibits: 
 
Our country’s government has approved [the release of these archives] on the seventieth 
anniversary of the 9.18 incident, so as better to expose the Japanese imperialists “invasionary” 
crimes, to expose the insufferable arrogance of the Japanese extreme right, and to oppose the 
Japanese governmentʼs “oppositionary” attitude and ambivalence to [Unit] 731.100 
 
One point to note from this statement is that, as in the past, it was the central rather than 
local government which took the initiative over Unit 731. This demonstrates that party 
leaders in Beijing saw Unit 731—and documentary proof relating to it—as tools to be 
used in pursuit of national objectives. Were this not the case, then local cadres would 
have been allowed to manage the Unit 731 ruins, archives and exhibits as they saw fit, 
for example by trying to build over the unit after the denouement of the 1956 Shenyang 
war crimes trials.  
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A second point to note is that the CCP seems to have been trying to use Unit 731 
records, in order to fix the past in a certain way. Their method here was to portray the 
Japanese extreme right-wing as Other, not only by roundly condemning them, but also 
by using new archival finds to prove that their “extreme right-wing” forbearers had 
committed atrocities at Unit 731. Of course, as the papers released in 2001 had not been 
publicly scrutinised (they had spent most of the past 50 years in the custody of Chinese 
public security organs), it is impossible to know for sure whether or not other Unit 731 
papers are still being withheld from release, perhaps because they do not fit the 
arguments that the Chinese side is trying to make.    
My intention here is not to suggest that the authorities were being economical with 
the truth, as the Jilin Province archivists had evidently used much badly damaged, 
fragmentary evidence to painstakingly reconstruct the activities of one of Japan’s most 
secretive and heinous wartime military establishments. Rather, my meaning here is that 
just because officials in Beijing authorised the release of Unit 731 papers in 2001, this 
does not indicate that they did not withhold or destroy other papers which told, perhaps, 
a different story. Scant but tantalising evidence for this assertion exists in the form of a 
discussion with a Unit 731 curator, who stated that in post-1982 interviews conducted 
by museum staff, elderly Chinese averred that during the 1930s and 40s many locals 
thought that the Japanese invaders behaved better towards them than their own military 
forces!”101 Such an assertion emphatically does not fit with the picture that the CCP 
was trying to build over 50 years later, namely that the invading Japanese had been 
incorrigibly evil. Evidence pointing to such a conclusion would never be allowed to see 
the light of day.  
 Although the seventieth anniversary of the 9.18 incident was given as the official 
reason for publishing the second batch of Unit 731 evidence, this statement should not 
necessarily be taken at face value. If the anniversary of 9.18 was so important, then why 
did cadres wait until 2001 to release the papers? Could they not have released them on 
                                                 
101
 Interview with Assistant Curator Wang Dongke, Unit 731 Museum, Harbin, 17/7/11. This would 
explain why recently published records of interviews with surviving Unit 731 Chinese conscripts contain 
only highly-negative significations of Japan.  
98 
 
some earlier 9.18 commemoration? On the one hand it could be argued that the papers 
had only recently been catalogued and analysed, and it was therefore not possible to 
present them as evidence at earlier commemorations. On the other hand, as noted above, 
these papers bear Chinese date stamps from the 1960s, which implies that the Chinese 
had catalogued them at that time and therefore knew how important they potentially 
were. A second quote from the press conference offers a possible explanation for the 
decision to wait until September 2001 before releasing the papers, in that it would 
“expose the ridiculous historical perspective of the Japanese extreme right [emphasis 
mine], as well as being of great positive benefit for those investigating the 
responsibility for the Japanese imperialists’ war.”102  
 In light of this last statement, it is plausible that the real reason for this angry 
Chinese outpour was that the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, made his 
first visit to the Yasukuni shrine less than two weeks before the 2001 press 
conference.
103
 Worse, unlike previous prime ministerial visits to the shrine made by 
Nakasone Yasuhiro (1985), Miyazawa Kiichi (1992) and Hashimoto Ryutaro (1996), 
Koizumi’s informal visits were made very publicly. As if to bait those who opposed 
trips to this Shinto shrine in Tokyo, Koizumi taunted them with the slogan “I visit the 
Yasukuni shrine regardless of what happens.”104  
 There is no conclusive proof that the Unit 731 archives were released as a riposte to 
Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit, but the timing is significant. The decision to proceed 
with the release of the archives so soon afterwards can be construed as a either a 
warning from the Chinese, or a signal that they had detailed records of what really 
happened at Unit 731. In this way, the release of the archives so long after they were 
discovered, shows that in Chinese eyes Japanese prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni 
were completely unacceptable. This would explain why the Jilin Province archive press 
conference made such concerted attempts to portray the Koizumi administration as 
extremist, and the views of the Japanese government as ridiculous. Finally, it is worth 
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noting that at this stage of Koizumi’s tenure in office, sources of friction with China 
such as renewed Japanese attempts to gain a UNSC seat (2005) and repeated visits to 
Yasukuni lay in the future, removing them as possible causes of the Chinese anger 
directed at the Japanese government.
105
 Yet politically-charged law suits and the 
rancour associated with them can only tell us so much about the museum itself, and in 
order to gain a more holistic idea of the way Unit 731 is presented and perceived we 
now turn to its physical structure.  
 
Part III 
 
The physical structure and meaning of the Unit 731 museum  
 
 The first thing that strikes visitors to the Unit 731 museum is how difficult it is to 
reach. The site is generally not marked on tourist maps and the only bus that travels 
directly from Harbin to Pingfang is a slow one, making over 20 stops along the way. 
The Unit 731 museum might be a “crucial centre of national memory,” but it seems that 
unless you are part of either a school group (for which attendance is compulsory as part 
of the patriotic education campaign) or a tour group (on my three visits to Unit 731 I 
never saw a single tour bus or group) visiting is not encouraged.
106
 This seems to tie in 
with the post-1949 thinking of the local authorities, who have continually tried to 
ignore or downplay the memory of Unit 731.  
Arriving in Pingfang one passes former Unit 731 buildings, including army 
barracks now turned into shops and apartments (see fig. 2), water towers, railway 
sidings and so on. These repositories of war memory are completely ignored by the 
local inhabitants of Pingfang who, if they are even aware of the previous roles that these 
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structures once performed, now prefer to forget them. Only buildings inside the 
museum complex are labelled or signposted in any way.  
 As soon as the visitor arrives at the entrance to Unit 731, he or she instantly 
realises that this is somehow not a “normal” museum. There are no loudspeakers 
blaring pop music, no stalls selling souvenirs, nor are there touts offering to show one 
round. Instead there is what I would call a “vacuum of activity,” in that the Unit 731 
main entrance is left empty and untended, providing space for the visitor to dwell on 
past atrocities committed by the Japanese (see fig. 3). Again, unlike many museums in 
China, admission to this site is free, which means that the central government wishes to 
encourage visits to patriotic education bases such as this one, even as the local 
authorities wish to downplay its presence by failing to promote it. 
 
   
Figure 2. Two photographs of former Japanese barracks at Pingfang. 
  
Figure 3. The entrance to the Unit 731 museum. 
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Before starting our tour, it is worth considering the assumptions that underpin the 
site, in order to gauge the political claims that Unit 731 makes about Japan. The culture 
scholar Ivan Karp posits that “every museum exhibition, whatever its overt subject, 
inevitably draws on the cultural assumptions and resources of the people who make it. 
Decisions are made to emphasise one element and to downplay others, to assert some 
truths and ignore others.”107 In other words, museums are all about contestations of 
power, the power to present Japan and its wartime relationship with China in a certain 
way. The Chinese literature scholar Kirk Denton expands on this, by arguing that all 
PRC museums are “used as tools by the state to propound officially sanctioned views of 
modern history…[in that they become] pedagogical tools for the teaching of party 
history to the masses.”108 This theoretical perspective affords a conceptual lens for 
decoding empirical evidence, presented in the form of the symbolism suffusing both the 
museum buildings and the exhibits it contains.   
 Five aspects of the Unit 731’s physical bricks-and-mortar presence allow us to 
capture the image of Japan that the museum attempts to impart to visitors. Firstly, as 
already touched upon, Unit 731 as proof of Japanese war crimes is a strong theme 
which comes not just from its formal title (i.e. as a criminal evidence museum), but 
also through the official narratives which the commemorative structures are trying to 
convey. By tracing the history of CBW warfare in Japan from the 1920s right through to 
the Japanese defeat in 1945, the discourse unfolding room-by-room converts loss, 
despair, and anger into victimhood, grief and lastly hope. Loss and despair exude 
almost all of the exhibits as they detail the horrific nature of the crimes committed at 
Unit 731. A newly opened section on the history of chemical warfare in 
twentieth-century Japan for example, cleverly interweaves narratives of loss and 
despair with anger. The former are conveyed by covering corridor walls with detailed 
lists, of instances where the Japanese military used chemical weapons against the 
Chinese. The anger is plainly evident from the captions detailing the inhumanity of 
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these Japanese crimes.  
 Secondly, a sense of victimhood pervades the entire museum, in that China is 
presented as both a past and a present victim. China the past victim is conceptualised by 
means of the CBW warfare experiments carried out on Chinese people. China the 
present victim is characterised in the form of newly refurbished rooms detailing how 
Chinese “today” are still being harmed as a result of Japanese actions, for example 
using graphic footage from the 2003 Qiqihaer incident (where dozens of Chinese 
people were injured after mustard gas seeped from unearthed wartime canisters left by 
the Japanese). The corridors are virtually dark, windows are few and the place is barely 
heated in winter, which further heightens the sense of victimhood. The Unit 731 
museum is not a place to be glad or happy.  
Thirdly, set off against China the victim there is hope for the future, a fervent desire 
that by highlighting Japanese atrocities they can never happen again, and also optimism 
that (for remember this is a state-led narrative) the Japanese will apologise for their 
crimes in a way acceptable to the Chinese people. To emphasise this, shortly before 
exiting the museum are several rooms dedicated to reconciliation and peace, lined with 
emotional pictures of former Unit 731 Japanese staff confessing their past crimes, as 
well as photos of recent visits by Japanese delegations.  
 Another potent symbol of hope is the new “atonement for Japanese crimes” 
memorial, erected in the grounds of the Unit 731 museum, adjacent to pens that many 
years ago were used to breed plague-infested rats. This memorial, unveiled on the 
sixty-fifth anniversary of the Japanese surrender, on August 15, 2010, is one of the first 
of its kind, in that it was erected by Japanese people in the grounds of a Chinese war 
museum (see fig. 4).
109
 The date chosen to unveil the monument was significant in 
itself, in that as we saw in the previous chapter, throughout the history of the PRC this 
date has normally been used by the state to criticise the Japanese political establishment. 
However, even if the monument represents tentative moves by both sides to come to 
terms with memory of the war, the Chinese authorities have tried to ensure that it cannot 
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be attacked or defaced by Chinese nationalists. This is why the shiny new monument 
stands in a guarded, locked compound.     
 
 
Figure 4. The “atonement for Japanese crimes” memorial at Unit 731, unveiled in 2010. 
       
 Fourthly, personal (as opposed to collective) grieving is now increasingly 
permitted at museums such as Unit 731. Unlike in western countries, where Great War 
(1914–18) memorials document the landscape in almost every village, in China 
collective remembrance of the war has traditionally been focused on a small number of 
commemorative sites including, after 1982, Unit 731.
110
 In Christian countries those in 
mourning turned to churches to aid their sorrow, and as a result war memorials located 
in or adjacent to churches have tended to dwell on traditional devotional architecture.
111
 
However, Communist China is officially atheist and during the Mao era temples and 
churches were mostly closed, thereby precluding their use as sites for individuals to 
grieve their loved ones killed by the Japanese.  
It is only very recently that the Chinese authorities have encouraged the use of war 
museums as sites for relatives to grieve or commemorate named individuals. In a 
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similar fashion to the Nanjing Massacre Museum extension (which opened in 2007), 
since 2010 the museum complex at Unit 731 has commemorated individuals who 
perished within its walls, with name plaques mounted along a corridor imitating the 
style of a modern-day Chinese crematorium. Only names of those proved to have been 
killed here are included. Figure five, taken in summer 2011 shortly after the memorial 
wall opened, records the names of the prisoners who met their deaths here. In places 
photos have been attached to the plaques, where the family of the deceased has been 
identified and relatives are now free to pay respects to their former loved ones. This 
form of commemorating the war allows people to grieve personally as they see fit, as 
opposed to collectively as the Chinese state sees fit. Yet even in personal 
commemoration, the state has a role to play, since China has no official war cemeteries 
or war graves commission.
112
 Museum curators that I spoke to all over the country (not 
just at Unit 731) stated that this job of identifying the war dead by name is now forming 
an increasingly important part of their work, allowing families to come and mourn in 
person, albeit in the confines of a museum.  
Finally, it is worth briefly re-emphasising two points relating to the physical 
structure of Unit 731 which have been already given extensive treatment earlier in this 
chapter, namely distortion of the message and how that message changes with time. 
Since the Unit 731 museum opened in 1985, it has maintained a relentless focus on 
Japanese crimes, for example by using archival evidence from the unit as exhibits or 
documentary proof of atrocities committed by Japanese forces at Pingfang. In this 
respect, the main message of the museum, even now, seems to be that the Japanese 
committed unconscionable crimes during the war, they continue to deny them and 
therefore this museum needs to exist in order to remind LDP politicians of their 
responsibility to own up and confess. A number of scholars have written about this need 
to force a confession in order for the Chinese side to gain face, in a contemporary battle 
for political supremacy in East Asia.
113 
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Figure 5. The new commemoration corridor at Unit 731. Individual photos have been attached where 
identified, note also the plaques engraved with Korean names (far right).  
 
Yet by concentrating on war crimes the museum denies visitors the opportunity to 
consider other narratives, such as the activities of the GMD in north-east China, or the 
role played by Japanese military units not involved in CBW. In this respect, the Unit 
731 museum is no different from the commemorations of wars in antiquity, where they 
“reflected the political and religious views of the state…[and the] continuous, 
unremitting and inevitable victory of the ruler.”114 By reflecting the views of the state 
in the museum, the CCP is shaping the discourse unfolding inside for political and 
pedagogic purposes (bashing right-wing Japanese politicians, indoctrinating children), 
simply because the party won the fight against the Japanese and came to power. If this 
were not the case, then the Japanese might never have left Harbin in the first place and 
the Unit 731 museum would not exist today. In other words, the fact that Unit 731 exists 
at all means that the CCP is staking a political claim to power. This is because the CCP 
is able to say anything it wishes (with respect to Japanese atrocities committed in 
north-east China) simply because it faces no organised domestic political opposition to 
doing so.  
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  The other point I wish to reiterate is that the way in which Unit 731 has been 
interpreted has changed with time itself, which is another way of saying that the 
museum is “not exempt from history.”115 For example, immediately after the war locals 
scavenged the site for bricks, steel wire, glass bottles and so forth for recycling. They 
neither knew nor cared that they were despoiling very special ruins, which could tell 
future generations much about the Japanese occupation of China. Twenty years later 
during the Cultural Revolution, the Unit 731 site was razed to the ground, as Red 
Guards sought to remove any memory of the war. Fast forwarding another 20 years to 
the reform era in 1985, the site was “rehabilitated” as a national patriotic education base 
with which to remind younger Chinese about the crimes committed by Japan during the 
century of humiliation. These three snapshots of Unit 731’s history demonstrate that not 
only have representations of the CBW facility (and the eponymous museum which now 
occupies part of the former base) changed drastically since the foundation of the PRC, 
but also that any post-1949 interpretation of what the site signifies must be analysed in 
terms of its history.   
 
Conclusion 
 
After the war Unit 731 became subject to history itself, in that during the Mao era, 
political actors on both the local and national stage clashed over the future of the site. 
To illustrate, immediately after the foundation of the PRC, local cadres allowed 
factories to be built over part of the former military base, effectively erasing its 
presence there. At this time arguments raged back-and-forth between the provincial and 
national government, over whether to preserve or demolish the site, with the State 
Council preferring the former option (so as to preserve proof of enemy crimes) and 
cadres in Harbin repeatedly requesting the latter.  
 During the 1980s and 90s there occurred a global outpouring of remembering, 
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which the historian Michael Kammen posited was caused by factors such as delayed 
memory of conflict, an increase in state-directed tourism and a growing tendency to 
“tell it [history] like it really was.” Whilst all these forms of remembrance are 
applicable to Unit 731, it is also highly likely that the former Japanese CBW 
headquarters was “remembered into existence” following the first textbook crisis and 
the Manchurian monument incident in 1982, because of a perceived need to fight back 
against right-wing LDP politicians who, for example, published textbooks denying the 
invasion of China. This riposte took the form of a battle for ownership of the past as it 
referred to Unit 731, and also a recognised requirement to use the education system to 
indoctrinate Chinese youth about Japan’s past.  
 In part, this indoctrination highlights a continuing leitmotif of this thesis, namely 
Hu Qiaomu’s influence in moulding PRC views of Japan. Hu argued that war memory 
encapsulated in wartime commemoration halls ought to form a central plank of the 
nascent patriotic education campaign. In fact, Hu’s ideas on museums formed part of a 
broader post-Cultural Revolution rehabilitation of history, which sought to change the 
Mao era dogma that “history is useless” to one where history plays an extremely 
important role in the CCP’s rise to power. He did this by demonstrating that the war was 
a turning point in the party’s fortunes which ultimately brought it victory over the GMD. 
At a stroke then, Hu’s thesis changed the way in which Unit 731 was seen, from being a 
blot on the collective Chinese memory that should be forgotten, to a museum that could 
and should be used to re-remember the party’s rise to power. This new remembering 
was selective, in that highlighting wartime atrocities committed by the Japanese, 
allowed the Chinese Communists to downplay memory of post-1949 policy mistakes 
and disasters, such as the Cultural Revolution.  
Exhibits from the Unit 731 museum, in the form of documentary proof, allowed 
elite leaders to construct a new version of war memory. They achieved this by releasing 
archives in 1999 and 2001, almost 50 years after they were unearthed. In 1999, 
publication of Unit 731 archives allowed the authorities to influence domestic Chinese 
and international Japanese audiences in ongoing battles over wartime compensation in 
the Japanese courts. Two years later, the release of a second tranche of archives 
108 
 
coincided with visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Prime Minister Koizumi. In both cases, 
the construction of this filtered version of war memory—that is, the selective release of 
Unit 731 historical records—was used to achieve very concrete objectives, influencing 
court cases and warning Koizumi.  
In contrast, the physical structure of Unit 731 presents a confection of narratives, 
which concentrate on pain, anger and victimhood, accompanied at the same time by 
tentative messages of hope for the future. These messages of hope are transmitted in a 
number of ways, such as by allowing families to grieve named individuals at new 
commemoration walls, and also by the recent unveiling of an “atonement for Japanese 
crimes” memorial. Since the 1980s commemoration of atrocities once committed at 
Unit 731 has enabled the party to prevent history of the war from being swept away. In 
this respect, the Chinese Communists must feel that public funding used to preserve the 
site has been money well spent.        
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Chapter 3  
Education and Textbooks 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In a culture that has traditionally placed great emphasis on education and moral 
cultivation, it is almost impossible to overemphasise the importance of the education 
system as a means of shaping young Chinese people’s views on Japan.1 Therefore, in 
order to analyse how Japan has been portrayed to students, it is crucial to examine 
textbooks, the main means of information transmission in Chinese schools. Both 
Chinese and foreign scholars have written widely on the Chinese education system and 
history’s place within the school curriculum.2 However, as noted by the education 
scholar Michael Apple in 1992:  
 
The school curriculum is not neutral knowledge. Rather what counts as legitimate knowledge is the 
result of complex power relations, struggles and compromises among identifiable class, race, 
gender, and religious groups…[yet] little attention has been paid to that one artefact that plays such 
a major role in defining whose culture is taught—the textbook.
3
  
 
Another pedagogy scholar Graham Down expands on this to explain why textbooks are 
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so important in any culture: 
 
Textbooks, for better or worse, dominate what students learn. They set the curriculum, and often the 
facts learned, in most subjects. For many students, textbooks are their first and sometimes only 
exposure to books and reading. The public regards textbooks as authoritative, accurate, and 
necessary. And teachers rely on them to organise lessons and structure subject matter.
4
   
 
In China textbooks are seen as especially important, because the PRC education system 
emphasises rote learning, with little student interaction or hands-on activities.
5
 
Additionally, reviews of relevant teacher instruction manuals provide further insights 
on how lessons are actually taught, as they inform educators which parts of a text 
students should focus on.
6
 These two assumptions (textbooks form the basic means of 
information transmission in schools, but they do not contain neutral knowledge) 
provide our starting point for a careful examination of how Japan is signified in Chinese 
classrooms.  
This chapter seeks to ground Chinese textbook discourse on Japan, in the wider 
context of the enormous changes that have taken place in the education system since 
1949. It will seek to identify the power relations and contested sites of knowledge on 
Japan, in order to define whose vision of that country is taught. In order to achieve this, 
initially I chart the administrative changes in the PRC education system which have 
critically affected the transmission of information in schools.  
Following this outline of how textbooks are formulated, my argument is then 
developed in four main stages, which form the normative framework for the analysis 
in this chapter. These stages coincide with the four main areas in which the trope of 
“Japan” is developed in Chinese teaching materials: 1) Japanese piracy during the 
Ming dynasty (1368–1644), 2) the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), 3) the Second 
Sino-Japanese War (1937–45), including resistance to Japanese forces from 1931 
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onwards (in history textbooks), and 4) the Second Sino-Japanese War (in language 
textbooks). Ming dynasty piracy and 1894–95 wartime representations of Japan are 
found in history texts only, whereas verbal and visual imagery on the Second 
Sino-Japanese War is found in both history and language textbooks. These periods of 
bilateral conflict and discord have been chosen, because commentary relating to 
peaceful friendly relations in the historical record is virtually absent from post-1949 
pedagogic texts.   
I apply Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and a “social-political indicator” model 
(based on the frequency of occurrence of key terms) to successive editions of mainland 
Chinese teaching materials, in order to identify how portrayals of Japan have evolved 
since the foundation of the PRC. These theoretical techniques are employed to 
investigate a data set which reflects the major revisions to PRC history texts in 1957, 
1965, 1980 and 2000.
7
 Texts from the year 2010 are also included, because they form 
the most recent complete edition at the time of writing (language texts are categorised 
slightly differently as will be explained below).  
 
PRC education policies and history textbooks (1949–2012)  
 
Even before the founding of the PRC, both the CCP and the GMD grasped the fact 
that textbooks played a vital role in inculcating children. This view was based on the 
premise that the two parties viewed society as a “collective body to be known and 
disciplined through…[inter alia] techniques of modern government,” which they took 
to include using textbooks to indoctrinate young people.
8
 As a result, both before and 
immediately after 1949, the CCP moved with great alacrity to remove Nationalist 
textbooks from classrooms in liberated areas, in order to minimise the risk of students 
absorbing politically “incorrect” GMD thought.9 
                                                 
7
 ZJN (1949–81), 503–04. 
8
 Michael Tsang-Woon Tsin, Nation, Governance and Modernity in China: Canton, 1900–1927 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp. 6, 179. 
9
 Robert Culp, “Rethinking Governmentality: Training, Cultivation and Cultural Citizenship in 
112 
 
In keeping with early CCP education policies the new Communist government 
prioritised reducing illiteracy and opening new schools, in order to achieve national 
reconstruction and economic development.
10
 This concept was consistent with 
ideological concerns to reduce class differences and the pragmatic idea of producing a 
skilled labour force.
11
  
  The PRC imported a Leninist state structure, which led to the Chinese education 
system inheriting the same institutional conflicts which had plagued the Soviets since 
the 1920s.
12
 As a result of these conflicts it took fully four years to publish and 
distribute new history teaching materials (1953) based on the Russian model. Over half 
of the new 1953 history course was international (i.e. unrelated to China), because of 
the Soviet Union’s greater engagement with the outside world.13 It was only in the 
years 1956–57, as relations with Russia started to sour ahead of the Sino-Soviet split, 
that Chinese pedagogues published their own complete set of history textbooks, with 
content much more focused on China.
14
 
No sooner had the 1956–57 history teaching materials been published, than 
textbook compilers became embroiled in the anti-rightist campaign (1957–58).  
Teaching and textbook content quickly became prime targets in this ideological fight 
against intellectuals.
15
 In order to make room for the increased political activity 
associated with the campaign, school syllabi were radically changed or cropped.
16
 
Even though modern Chinese history (with its emphasis on the 1931–45 Sino-Japanese 
conflict) was frequently the last period to be cut from history textbooks, the overall 
effect of these changes was to greatly reduce the amount of classroom teaching on 
Japan.  
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Following the disaster of the 1958–60 Great Leap Forward, moderates under 
Comrade Liu Shaoqi gained the political ascendancy, which led to a lull in the 
persecution of intellectuals and moves to reverse previous changes made to the history 
syllabus. However, by the time the Cultural Revolution was launched in 1966, 
left-wing extremists once again gained the upper hand and turned education into a 
political battlefield.
17
 If individual provinces and cities published textbooks at all, they 
invariably conformed to Mao’s idea of class struggle and various political crusades 
such as the “Criticise Lin [Biao] and Confucius!” (pilin pikong yundong!) campaign.18 
In short, between the years 1949–76 teaching took place against a backdrop of almost 
constant political interference in the school system.
19
 This political meddling severely 
affected the ability of children to absorb teaching on Japan as presented in textbooks.  
After the close of the Mao era and the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, there 
was a move away from class struggle, towards goals such as quality, competition, 
nurturing individual talents, and imparting scientific and technological skills.
20
 Deng 
Xiaoping articulated this new zeitgeist in May 1977 when he famously reflected, 
“Where should we start from, in order for our country to reach advanced status in the 
world? I think we should start from science and education.”21 Few people, including 
the education minister, Liu Xiyao, expected the Deng reforms to last without a major 
Maoist backlash, especially as education remained a frontline political issue.
22
  
In 1978 Deng personally ordered the setting up of a “Read and Edit Teaching 
Materials” LSG, under the purview of the vice minister for education, Pu Tongxiu.23 
One of the LSG’s main aims was to reduce the prominence of politics in teaching 
materials, a task of considerable interest to teachers because then, as now, they regarded 
the “textbook as all [sic].”24  
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Two main changes to the teaching of history took place. Firstly study of the subject 
was made compulsory for all schoolchildren and secondly, history teaching materials 
were revised between the years 1978–80, with the latter change responsible for 
removing the most egregious intrusions of Marxist theory into the classroom. Actually, 
much of this rewriting concerned subjects unrelated to how Japan was portrayed, such 
as the rather abstruse problem of why peasant warfare should be represented 
realistically rather than using frontline struggle.
25
 These reforms took place following 
the signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (1978), a period considered by many to 
be a golden age in the two countries’ bilateral relationship. However, as the analysis in 
this chapter will show, rapidly warming relations did not necessarily translate into a 
more sympathetic view towards Japan in history textbooks.  
 This is because, as noted in the last chapter, during the 1980s a patriotic education 
campaign was introduced into schools, which was then further strengthened after the 
1989 Tiananmen Square incident. A new series of patriotic history textbooks was also 
published during this period as part of the campaign. Throughout the last decades of 
the twentieth century then, Chinese history textbooks continued to devote substantial 
amounts of text to World War Two and Japan’s role in it. In spite of this, on March 12, 
2000, after inspecting school textbooks, President Jiang Zemin criticised the People’s 
Education Press in Beijing for not having enough history in its publications!
26
 He 
argued that “we need to strengthen the education of young people in historical 
knowledge, in order to help them understand China’s past and present.”27 Jiang’s 
comments demonstrate that party elites pay attention to textbook content and reserve 
the right to alter it. President Jiang further insisted that students study the century of 
humiliation more closely, a century in which Japan was perceived to have played a 
leading role in shaming China.  
 Individual provinces now have the right (since 2001) not to use education materials 
prepared by the People’s Education Press, with the caveat that any textbook has to 
                                                 
25
 ZJN (1949–81), 504. 
26
 Until the year 2000, the People’s Education Press had responsibility for editing and publishing (but not 
printing) all PRC textbooks.  
27
 For a full text of Jiang’s criticisms see: ZJN (2001), 305. 
115 
 
cover a set syllabus approved by government inspectors. As a result there has been a 
widening of the permissible debate on how history is taught in schools, as textbook 
content is now no longer the sole preserve of Beijing education cadres.
28
  
 
PRC education policies and language textbooks (1949–2012)  
 
Any examination of how the mainland education system portrays Japan would not 
be complete without an examination of Chinese language (yuwen) textbooks, 
containing as they do many stories relating to the Anti-Japanese War.
29
 Since 1949 
language teaching in mainland China has been subject to many of the same political 
influences as those for history textbooks. However, those pressures were not identical, 
for instance the language syllabus was designed from the outset without Soviet 
assistance because of the language barrier, whereas early editions of PRC history 
textbooks were heavily influenced by Russian advisors. Another difference is that 
language teaching lends itself to political interference more naturally than subjects such 
as say, chemistry or maths (which teach hard facts), because language textbook 
compilers can insert material which accords with prevailing elite ideologies.
30
 The 
People’s Education Press Propaganda Office frankly admits that language textbooks are 
based on “listening, speaking, reading and writing…with the task of explicitly inserting 
‘political thought education’ into [Chinese] language study [emphasis mine].” 31 
Furthermore, language textbooks are written using characters, the script of the 
dominant Han majority. As a result ethnic Han cultural codes and views on Japan are 
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transmitted to all Chinese students, even if their first language is not Mandarin.
32
 
During the late 1950s, in much the same way as history teaching, language 
instruction was seriously disrupted during both the anti-rightist campaign and the 
subsequent Great Leap Forward. It was only from 1961 onwards, as political moderates 
gained the upper hand, that language teachers were able to redress the balance, resulting 
in the 1963 slogan that “language teaching is the basic component [of a child’s 
education].”33 As with other subjects, this escape from the influence of extreme politics 
in the classroom was short-lived, since schools were closed following the onset of the 
Cultural Revolution in 1966. When editing of language teaching materials was resumed 
in the late 1970s, the People’s Education Press vowed not to let political interference 
cause language teaching to stagnate (tingzhibuqian) and that in future pedagogic reform 
should not be abandoned halfway (bantuerfei), as it was during Mao era political 
campaigns.
34
 Reforms in 2001 to the way in which textbooks are designed and 
distributed mean that as with history texts, local selection of language teaching 
materials can now be made without reference to the People’s Education Press in Beijing, 
provided that they are approved by Ministry of Education inspectors prior to release.  
 
Theoretical tools 
 
Superficially, Chinese history and language textbooks show little variation 
between subsequent editions. In both syllabi, lessons, stories and their accompanying 
images are often republished with little or no change, such that it is sometimes 
impossible to differentiate between old and new versions (see fig. 6). Therefore, 
theoretical techniques are needed which can tease out any small differences in text. 
Two tools permit scrutiny at this micro-level, CDA (with its emphasis on structures of 
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control) and a social-political indicator model (which examines the occurrence of 
specific verbal criteria within a passage). These methods are briefly discussed below, 
before we turn to the first part of our analysis, namely, presentation of Ming dynasty 
Japanese piracy in post-1949 history textbooks.   
Critical Discourse Analysis focuses on “the role of discourse in the (re)production 
and challenge of dominance,” where dominance is defined as “the exercise of social 
power by elites, institutions or groups, that results in social inequality.”35 CDA 
analyses top-down relations of dominance rather than compliance or resistance from 
the bottom-up.
36
 This theory therefore focuses on social rather than personal power, 
in that: 
  
It is based on privileged access to socially valued resources such as wealth, income, position, 
status, force [and] group membership…[This] power involves control, either by force or “modern” 
and often more effective [means which are] mostly cognitive, and enacted by persuasion, 
dissimulation, or manipulation…to change the mind of others in one’s interests.37  
 
The term control in the above quote is frequently located in specific institutional 
fields, structures, or genres, such as textbooks and newspapers.
38
 One of CDA’s 
prime advantages is its flexibility, in that it has never been, nor has it ever attempted 
to provide a single specific theory or methodology.
39
 This affords the researcher great 
flexibility in terms of the actual tools used to probe a text. These range from analysing 
text schemata and macro-semantic indicators to examining linguistic markers. Both 
here and in chapter five, CDA’s analytical framework is applied to (frequently 
negative) significations of Japan, in order to examine the mechanics of social power 
as wielded by the Chinese state. 
The social-political indicator model also used in this chapter was originally  
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Figure 6. Chinese lower middle school history textbooks showing almost identical images of students 
protesting at the GMD’s refusal to fight the Japanese in 1935. Clockwise from top left: 1957 (vol. 4, p. 
55), 1965 (vol. 4, p. 98), 1980 (vol. 4, p. 43) and 2000 (vol. 4, p. 43). 
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devised by the China education scholar Ronald Price.
40
 Chinese textbooks frequently 
show little variation between successive editions, because of the extreme prevalence of 
highly-formulaic narratives, where “language is predictable in form and idiomatic, and 
seems to be stored in fixed, or semi-fixed chunks [phrases].”41 Price’s robust yet simple 
methodology teases out micro-level variations in text by measuring the number of 
times selected terms feature in a given body of prose (e.g. the word “communism”). He 
uses a total of 74 terms covering a wide range of topics, in order to capture meaning 
embedded in Chinese textbooks. In order to sharpen the efficacy of the model, I have 
sharply reduced the number of indicators, so as to make them more relevant to 
analysing conflict with Japan.  
 
*** 
 
Ming dynasty Japanese pirates (wokou) 
 
In PRC Chinese history texts covering the Ming dynasty, the narrator describes 
the long-term pirate menace from the viewpoint of Chinese humiliation by Japanese 
bandits. Attributes of both sides are portrayed in black and white terms, with positive 
representations attributed to Chinese resistance, and negative imagery applied both to 
the Japanese pirates and to those Chinese who collaborated with them. This creates 
what I term a “double binary opposition,” which favours the Chinese over the 
Japanese, and resistance over collaboration.
42
 In this way, the texts cleverly base the 
case for Othering on the criterion of whether one defends or betrays the motherland, 
rather than that of nationality.
43
 In this way Ming dynasty officials, amongst others, 
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are castigated for not properly defending the motherland, because they neglect to 
maintain Chinese coastal defences against the Japanese invaders. 
 
Text schemata (the plot) 
  
 The genre presented is one of historical conflict, in this case low intensity piracy 
by Japanese pirates (wokou) from the end of the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) to the 
mid-Ming, with the threat eradicated by the end of the sixteenth century.
44
 The 
overall text schemata is presented as shown in table two below.  
 
Table 2. Text schemata for Chinese history textbook lessons on Japanese piracy during the Ming 
dynasty 
Stage Text schemata 
I Japanese pirates are active along the Chinese coast from the late Yuan 
II During the early Ming the government vigorously defends the coast from pirates 
III By the mid-Ming sea defences are relaxed 
III. A The Japanese run amok on the Chinese mainland  
III. B Ming general Qi Jiguang is sent to train the Chinese masses as a fighting force 
III. C Strong leadership, brilliant tactics and harsh discipline gel this fighting force into a 
formidable war machine 
IV The Japanese are annihilated and the pirate menace disappears 
 
The above schema allows the “Japan problem” to be presented as Ming China’s 
finest hour, with social meaning communicated through the lens of Chinese resistance. 
The wokou issue is ultimately solved by the Chinese masses uniting together in order 
to fight and defeat the enemy.  
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Use of semantic processes to establish a political order 
 
Overlain on top of the plot outlined above are semantic processes (topics), and 
articulating them permits a deeper understanding of the actors involved. Here Japan is 
defined as an agent which causes material losses and kills innocent Chinese people 
(see table 3). The wokou take advantage of Chinese weakness by attacking 
defenceless coastal peoples, and they actively seek out traitorous medieval capitalists 
and feudal landowners to help them implement their plans. In contrast to the 
honourable Chinese they are fighting, the pirates are presented as being utterly 
untrustworthy, because it is impossible to differentiate them from legitimate Japanese 
merchants:  
 
They brought weapons and goods with them, if they had the opportunity, they would kill people, 
commit arson and loot goods; if there was no opportunity, they would masquerade as traders, 
plying their wares and doing business.
45
 
   
In sharp contrast China is described in terms of the signifier people (laobaixing) or 
masses (dazhong), who suffer greatly at the hands of the Japanese invaders.
46
 
Undaunted, the Chinese people fight back and repulse the invader under the 
leadership of national heroes such as Qi Jiguang.   
 Textbooks have limited space to put across complex issues, with the result that 
often the plot can seem rather dry and stilted, with characters cast in simple black and 
white, rather than complex shades of grey. However, the texts explaining the wokou 
threat exploit this sharp contrast in order to establish a political order. That order is 
predicated on the assumption that “we” the Chinese people, can mobilise a 
well-armed, strictly-disciplined efficient fighting force in order to repel any invader. 
All that “we” need to do in order to defeat the enemy, is to unite under brilliant 
leadership.  
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Building on this so-called black versus white, Chinese against Japanese (and their 
collaborators) pattern, table three further shows how macro-semantic indicators 
(topics) are used by textbook compilers to reinforce perceptions of the Japanese 
across the centuries. The table graphically illustrates a striking resemblance between 
micro-level discourses relating to fighting the wokou and the CCP’s own 
anti-Japanese resistance between the years 1931–45.47 Whilst the main actors in these 
two conflicts are obviously different, the way the underlying normative values of the 
two opposing sides interact is very similar. 
 
Table 3. Use of macro-semantic indicators in Chinese history textbooks  
Macro-semantics (topics) Sixteenth century Japanese wokou 
piracy 
1931–45 Anti-Japanese resistance 
1) Major actors Chinese people, wokou, Ming 
government 
Chinese people, Kwantung Army, 
CCP, GMD 
2) The threat Japanese invasion  Japanese invasion 
3) Negligence by the state  Ming government fails to 
maintain coastal defences 
Jiang Jieshi fails to defend China 
from the Japanese 
4) Resulting in… wokou continually raiding the 
Chinese coast 
Japanese forces invading and 
occupying China 
5) Harm inflicted on the 
Chinese people 
Killing, looting, rape and massive 
financial loss 
Killing, looting, rape and massive 
financial loss 
6) Exacerbated by…  Chinese traitors Chinese traitors 
7) The people resist by… Uniting under talented Ming 
commanders 
Uniting under talented CCP 
commanders 
8) End result Japanese defeat Japanese defeat 
 
The most obvious similarity is that both the Ming wokou and the 
twentieth-century Imperial Japanese Army invade and occupy Chinese soil, causing 
great loss and hardship to the people. Another analogy is that during both the Ming 
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dynasty and the Republican era, the Chinese government is portrayed as being too 
inept or corrupt to deter the Japanese. Textbooks covering Ming dynasty and 
Republican era history further converge in that they both aver it was a well led, 
disciplined force under the command of able Han Chinese commanders who 
ultimately defeated the Japanese.
48
 These analogies suggest that in both instances 
(PRC mainland textbook coverage of the wokou and the Anti-Japanese War), the CCP 
is sending the same subliminal ideological messages to schoolchildren. The most 
important of these are listed in table four. The idea here is not necessarily that the 
Japanese have always been this way, since history texts do not present them as an 
ever-present invader. However, by painting Japan as continually invading China, the 
aim is to show that the Japanese are an ever-present threat.  
 
Table 4. Ideological messages replicated in both Ming dynasty Japanese piracy 
and Anti-Japanese War history texts 
Ideological message conveyed 
1) Japanese aggression is always punished 
2) Only by uniting can the Chinese people deter threats 
3) If you are weak you will be beaten 
4) Japanese collaborators will forever live in infamy 
5) The Chinese people need to be led 
6) When led properly the Chinese people are undefeatable 
7) Chinese forces will always ultimately prevail over Japanese attackers 
8) The Japanese can never be trusted 
 
Linguistic markers 
 
 Linguists frequently apply markers to text in order to build alternative lexicons, 
which in turn help to construct a definitive ideological position inside a text.
49
 Within 
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the framework of binary opposites noted above, politeness markers are used in history 
texts describing piracy during the mid-Ming, in order to denigrate the Japanese and 
eulogise the Chinese. As a result, the former are referred to either as wokou (a 
derogatory term in itself) or the enemy (diren). Conversely, the Ming general Qi 
Jiguang is feted as a national hero for defeating the Japanese, who is worthy of “an 
everlasting mention in the annals of history.”50  
Within the context of constructing an alternative lexicon of Japan and then 
contrasting it against China so as to achieve complete naturalisation, I offer two 
further macro-semantic devices.
51
 These are “victim” and “victory” markers (see 
words in italics below), which attempt to secure ideological closure by Othering Japan. 
In the context of the Ming pirate menace, an ideological position of victimhood is 
constructed using victim markers, whereby Chinese people are attacked by an enemy, 
which savagely rises up to attack them. These rampant (changjue) pirates then kill 
(sharen) coastal people, burn their homes (shaofang) and loot their property 
(qiangdao). The Japanese continuously harass (cuanrao) “my” country [sic]. 52 
Interestingly, the picture painted of the wokou menace employs the same semantic 
victim markers used to describe the Japanese Kwantung Army 400 years later (see 
tables 3 and 4). This indicates that textbook compilers are using portrayals of Japan in 
different periods to paint the same pen portrait of Japanese people as an enemy.  
 Binary opposites are created by offsetting the wokou with Chinese people who 
are defined by means of victory markers. Peasants and miners enlist in “Qi’s army,” 
they are given strict military training (yange xunlian), they fight courageously 
(zuozhan yonggan) and are subject to harsh discipline (jilü yanming).
53
 To emphasise 
the benefits of this arduous regime, the Chinese are victorious (sheng) in 100 out of 
100 battles, which is code for with proper leadership the Chinese are ever-victorious. 
Conversely, in this victory narrative the Japanese are ridiculed as they are purged 
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(qingchu), annihilated (jianmie), eliminated (suping) and suppressed (saoping). These 
victory markers contained in textbooks provide moral instruction for PRC 
schoolchildren, by praising those Chinese people who, in times past, stood up to the 
Japanese.  
 
Comparison with the historical record 
 
Comparison of PRC textbooks recounting Ming dynasty Japanese piracy with the 
historical record reveals considerable discrepancies. The first gaping hole in the 
wokou textbook commentary is that it conveniently omits to mention Yuan dynasty 
Chinese aggression towards the Japanese. The failure of punitive expeditions during 
the Yuan against Japan greatly contributed to the rise of the pirate problem, which was 
further compounded by Japanese instability at the time.
54
 To mention this in 
present-day Chinese history textbooks, however, would not accord with the 
ideological construct of China as a peaceful nation. As a result the Yuan invasions are 
ignored. 
 The textbooks are equally silent concerning other reasons as to why Japanese 
maritime piracy broke out in the first place. In fact the first Ming emperor, Hongwu 
(reigned 1368–98), was not only hostile to the Japanese but he was also doubtful of 
the Chinese coastal people’s loyalty. To solve both problems at the same time, he 
banned civil maritime commerce in 1372.
55
 An illicit pirate trade then rose to satisfy 
Chinese demand for Japanese products. Whilst certain elements of the ban were 
rescinded by subsequent Ming emperors, it basically stayed in place until 1567, and 
the Cambridge History of Japan posits that this legalisation of private commerce 
removed one of the prime incentives for Japanese piracy at a stroke, namely high 
profits on illegal bilateral trade.
56
 This would suggest that the wokou raids ceased 
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because civil maritime commerce was now legal, and not because (as stated in 
textbooks) the Japanese were defeated by heroic Chinese peasants. 
Equally problematic is the notion that the Ming government was negligent in 
protecting the Chinese population from piracy. In fact, for much of the Ming dynasty 
the coastal regions were in little need of defence, because between 1440 and 1550 
there were only 25 recorded wokou raids. It was only during the 1550s that the pirate 
raids rose exponentially to 467 attacks, before falling again to 75 incidents in the 
1560s.
57
 With such a sudden spike in the number of reported encounters, it is hardly 
surprising that the authorities were unprepared, as prior to 1551 there was no 
perceived requirement to build either shoreline batteries or protective walls around 
inland towns. 
My point here is that the textbook narrative wishes to portray the Ming 
administration as incapable of protecting people from the wokou, because it failed to 
erect sufficient coastal defences. Had the text noted that piracy had spasmodically 
afflicted China’s shores for centuries, and that the frequency of Japanese attacks 
climbed from an average of one attack every four years before 1550, rising to one 
attack per week (between 1551–60) within the short space of a few years, then it 
would be much more difficult to press such a charge. In short, PRC history textbooks 
distort the truth in order to criticise both Japanese pirates and previous rulers of 
China.  
A third problem is that there is no consensus on who the wokou actually were. As 
the Ming Histories famously note, only three out of ten wokou were Japanese, 
whereas the remaining seven out of ten were people who subordinated themselves to 
the pirates.
58
 The picture is further confused by accounts suggesting that the pirates 
were Chinese coastal peoples who turned to banditry, in order to escape the predations 
of Ming troops quartered on them (ironically with the purpose of protecting them 
from the Japanese). Another theory is that provincial officials wanting to mask 
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weakness or corruption labelled all local disturbances as wokou.
59
  
In all textbook editions examined, compilers found it expedient to group big 
landowners and big business interests together, branding them as wokou, spies or 
secret agents (neiying) for the Japanese. In other words, a post-1949 CCP political 
discourse (which denigrates private sector commerce and prohibits individual 
ownership of land) is imprinted on modern textbook narratives detailing the wokou 
piracy, so as to reinforce the cultural beliefs and values of the ruling CCP, such as 
those listed in table four.  
If assumptions on the identity of the pirates (and much else) are manipulated for 
ideological purposes, then it is logical to also question the history textbook adulation 
of Qi Jiguang. This celebrated Ming general indeed scored famous victories over the 
Japanese. However, he was only one of many military figures engaged in fighting off 
the wokou, and I offer that textbook compilers selected him because (unlike other 
generals) he was never disgraced or removed from office. For example, Zhu Wan 
battled the pirates in Fujian Province, but he was sacked in the face of concerted local 
opposition to lucrative illegal trade with Japan.
60
 Similarly, the able general Hu 
Tsung-hsien was recalled because of political infighting in Beijing, and yet another 
commander Chang Ching, was disgraced for incompetence.
61
 Chinese history 
textbook compilers chose Qi Jiguang then, not only for his martial prowess, but also 
because he could serve as an unblemished role model for annihilating Japanese 
invaders.  
In chapter one, I argued that the People’s Daily occasionally uses the positioning 
of articles on a page to express official intentions towards Japan. Similarly, a cursory 
inspection of Chinese textbooks shows that in all editions, lessons on the wokou are 
preceded by teaching on the harmonious [sic] voyages of the Ming dynasty eunuch 
admiral Zheng He (1371–1433) and how Chinese diaspora peacefully colonised 
south-east Asia during this period. Following classes on the wokou, is commentary on 
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the late-sixteenth century Sino-Japanese clashes over Korea. The subtext conveyed 
here is that historically Chinese explorers and settlers have always expanded 
peacefully to the mutual benefit of all parties, in sharp contrast to Japanese invaders.
62
  
    
Unchanging history texts on Ming Japanese piracy? 
 
 During the past 60 years history teaching on the wokou has changed remarkably 
little. In many instances, the exact same wording used in 1950s textbooks can be 
found in 2010 versions over half a century later. This would suggest that successive 
editions of history textbooks on wokou piracy are constructing the same overall 
ideological system (described above), by presenting an unchanging set of sanctioned 
social relations.  
Texts in subsequent editions do not mirror each other exactly, however, and it is 
worth exploring micro-level textual differences for what they can tell us. Firstly, by 
the mid-1960s Ming dynasty history had been elided from school history texts, on the 
basis that study of events during feudal (imperial) times was irrelevant to the needs of 
contemporary proletarian revolution. The subtext here is that in 1965 making 
revolution was considered even more important than bashing Japan or putative 
Japanese collaborators.   
Secondly, compared to both earlier and later editions of mainland history 
textbooks, the 1980 edition devotes double the amount of text space to criticising 
Japanese piracy. This would seem to refute the hypothesis that the content and tone of 
Chinese teaching materials—as they relate to Japan—accurately reflects the state of 
contemporary Sino-Japanese relations. In that year not only were bilateral ties cordial, 
but within the previous decade China had both normalised relations with and signed a 
Peace Treaty with Japan (in 1972 and 1978 respectively). Therefore, if textbook 
representations of Japan (tone, length of commentary, etc.) were solely informed by 
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the contemporary state of Sino-Japanese relations, then it is inconceivable that 1980 
editions of history textbooks would have substantially increased the amount of text 
chastising the Japanese. 
There are a number of possible explanations for this dichotomy, for instance 
post-1949 Chinese textbook portrayals of Japan might bear no relation to the 
contemporary state of Sino-Japanese relations. Alternatively, criticism of Japan 
contained in classroom texts might be “sticky,” in that there is a long, undefined 
time-lag between bilateral relations improving and a watering down of pointed 
criticism of Japan in teaching materials. It is also possible that there was no oversight 
of textbook compilers in 1980 and that they could therefore write whatever they liked 
about Japan. This however is unlikely, especially since education at that time was still 
a frontline issue politically and new texts were bound to receive careful scrutiny.
63
 A 
more plausible explanation is that the ideological system underpinning the wokou 
narrative had not changed, as set out in the Chinese macro-level textbook discourse 
(i.e. all teaching materials). In order to examine whether or not the ideological system 
informing historical representations of Japan in textbooks has in fact altered, we now 
turn to lessons on the First Sino-Japanese War.  
 
Textbook representations of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) 
 
 The First Sino-Japanese War features prominently in all post-1949 Chinese 
history textbooks, since it was the first conflict during the century of humiliation in 
which imperial China was pitted against a former vassal state, namely Japan.
64
 
Following a declaration of hostilities by the Meiji emperor (1868–1912) on August 1, 
1894, fighting lasted just over eight months, and the conflict concluded with a peace 
treaty signed on April 17, 1895.
65
 Land battles were fought in Korea, Manchuria and 
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Shandong, with naval engagements confined to adjacent waters. The causes of the war 
are complex and are still being debated by scholars. Some see chronic instability in 
Korea as a major factor, whereas others posit that “if by dealing with Asia in an 
authoritative, or even authoritarian, manner Japan could win the West’s respect and 
avoid a confrontation, then so be it.”66  
Mainland textbooks pointedly ignore these debates, preferring to concentrate on 
Chinese responses to Japanese aggression rather than the aggression itself. In so far as 
the teaching materials contain any analysis of the conflict’s causes at all, the Qing 
dynasty is entirely to blame because it was corrupt, incompetent and the Chinese 
government committed traitorous crimes.
67
 In all editions the imperial house and its 
senior military commanders are deemed culpable for “maintaining a stance of not 
fighting the Japanese.”68 Such assertions however, do not fully fit the reality on the 
ground. Certainly, there were occasions where the opposing side made territorial gains 
with hardly any resistance from Qing forces, such as when Port Arthur was abandoned 
in the face of invading Japanese divisions in November 1894.  
Generally, however, history texts on the First Sino-Japanese War are economical 
with the truth, in that they continually highlight the “craven capitulation” (i.e. 
unwillingness to fight) by the Chinese military high command. For example, during 
the 1895 battle for Weihaiwei in Shandong Province, children are taught that the naval 
base was “easy to defend and difficult to attack,” but cowardice by Qing commanders 
meant that the ships were afraid to put to sea, with the result that they were sunk in 
harbour by Japanese torpedoes.
69
 This contrasts sharply with eyewitness accounts of 
the battle, which record that the Japanese only took Weihaiwei after fierce fighting 
and even then Chinese frigates continued to shell Japanese positions from adjacent sea 
areas.
70
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There are a number of possible reasons for this obsession with portraying Chinese 
commanders as inept. Firstly, in a very Chinese way textbooks are apportioning blame 
for the Japanese invasion to Qing leaders. The historian Wai-Yee Li argues that all 
“historical writings represent the discourse of authority par excellence in the Chinese 
tradition,” such that even by the Han dynasty (202 BCE–CE 220), the concept of 
apportioning praise and blame was already well established.
71
 Post-1949 textbooks 
follow this long precedent, by meting out praise to ordinary soldiers and sailors who 
defend their country, whilst at the same time heaping blame on the Qing empire, its 
rulers, and the Japanese. This would accord with an essentially Chinese Marxist view 
of the world, that on the one hand the masses are honest, loyal and (in wartime) fight 
hard. On the other hand, China’s imperial rulers are cast as unfit to govern because of 
their incompetence and their unwillingness to take on the enemy. The logic of 
criticising China’s former Qing ruling house bears a very marked similarity to the way 
in which the Nationalists are condemned in textbook commentary on the Second 
Sino-Japanese War in the 1930s and 40s (see next section).  
The text here is highly coded so as to denigrate any former ruler of China in a 
way which presents the CCP as the obvious, natural choice for governing China after 
1949. Whilst it might seem far-fetched to argue that party textbook compilers saw a 
dynasty that collapsed in 1911 as a threat and therefore a target of criticism, it should 
be remembered that even today the CCP is not the only claimant to the mandate to 
rule “all under heaven” (i.e. China), and that every opportunity must be taken to 
inculcate youth that all former rulers of China were unqualified to govern. 
Furthermore, in 1949 it was less than 40 years since the Qing dynasty fell, during 
which time there were several attempts to re-establish a monarchy.
72
 When viewed in 
this light, it is not so bizarre that CCP textbook compilers should attempt to cast 
China’s former Manchu rulers as opponents.  
A second reason for constructing an idealised picture of an aggressive Japan 
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attacking a floundering non-Han Qing government, is the liminal space it provides for 
casting ordinary Chinese as heroes. These heroes are then offset against corrupt 
high-ranking Qing commanders, and the wicked, rapacious opposing Japanese forces. 
Taking the Battle of the Yellow Sea (September 1894) as an example, all editions set 
the scene by emphasising Chinese heroism in attacking a superior Japanese force. 
During the engagement the Japanese flagship Matsushima sustains over one hundred 
casualties, along with four other Japanese warships which are heavily damaged and 
“virtually sink.”73 
Contemporary reports, however, indicate that only three sailors were killed on the 
Matsushima and that no Japanese warship even came close to sinking.
74
 Whilst the 
exact number of casualties and the extent of damage to individual ships is still a 
matter of academic debate, the substantial difference between eyewitness accounts of 
the battle and post-1949 Chinese textbook narratives suggest that figures in the latter 
are embellished. The aim here is to enhance the Chinese contribution to the battle, and 
to disguise the fact that whilst the Japanese side lost not a single warship and 
sustained only 100 casualties in total, China lost a substantial part of its northern fleet, 
including the Zhiyuan, a state-of-the-art armoured cruiser recently purchased from 
Britain.
75
 Here, as with Ming dynasty piracy, textbooks are economical with the truth, 
in order to present the Japanese enemy as ultimately destined to lose.    
Whereas classroom narratives on the battle frame Japanese action only in terms 
of losses sustained, all textbooks contain extended coverage of Capt. Deng Shichang, 
and his heroic deeds as commanding officer of the Zhiyuan. This trope of the hero 
who bravely fights the enemy and then perishes in order to avoid capture, frequently 
recurs in textbooks, films and books (see table 5).
76
   
Drawing on the linguistics scholar Ruqaiya Hasan’s notion of articulating 
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different semantic resources, allows us to draw inferences on the political order 
constructed by means of reifying hero Deng.
77
 Written practices (history lessons on 
the First Sino-Japanese War) are marshalled in order to exhibit Deng Shichang’s 
selfless sacrifice to the Chinese people. Implicit questions presented to schoolchildren 
include: “What is patriotism?” (dying for your country, not abandoning your post), 
and “Who fights the Japanese?” (not Qing leaders or generals, but loyal patriotic 
Chinese people). 
  
Table 5. Patriotic statements made by Capt. Deng Shichang during the Battle of the Yellow Sea in 
lower middle school history textbooks  
Textbook, volume and page number Excerpts from Capt. Deng during the Battle of the Yellow Sea  
ZL (1957), 3:39 “It is honourable for us to die in the North Sea.” 
ZL (1965), 3:78 [as for 1957] 
ZL (1980), 3:25 “Matsushima is the Japanese flagship; if we can sink her, we 
can attack the enemy navy’s morale.” 
ZL (2000), 3:70 [after jumping into the sea and refusing a lifeline] “I promise 
that I would die along with all the sailors on my ship.” 
ZL (2010), 8.1:17 “We are sailors protecting our country, whether we live or die 
was long ago of no consequence. Even though we are 
sacrificed, this [battle] can strengthen our country’s prestige.”  
 
 Another rhetorical question contained in attendant teaching manuals is, “Why 
should we carefully study the patriotic deeds of Deng Shichang?”78 This is a different 
way of asking, “What is the didactic moral of this story?” Deng’s heroic feats are 
fashioned not so much as to tell children what to do, rather they provide role models 
telling them how to think. These daring exploits include encouraging injured gunners 
to remain at their posts, so that they can kill as many Japanese as possible, and 
Captain Deng’s patriotic determination to perish with his ship after it is fatally hit. 
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The subtext to this commentary is that China is not weak but strong, and that with 
determined leadership Japan can be beaten. Whilst Qing admirals and ministers (code 
for any non-Communist ruling class) are nowhere to be seen during the sea battle, 
brave Captain Deng demonstrates courage under fire (code for the party leading the 
masses). As a result of Deng’s heroic attack the Japanese flagship is apparently 
seriously damaged.   
Students in class are taught that squarely facing the Japanese in battle is morally 
correct, even when your vessel is hit and your crew are dying. This example of 
earnestly exhorting one’s men to not run (or in this case steam) away from danger at 
the battlefront, acts as a metaphor for how Communist leaders want the next 
generation of young Chinese to see themselves, namely as heroes willing to take on 
the Japanese in peace or in war.
79
  
A third possibility for vilifying the Qing leadership at the same time as the 
Japanese, is that textbook compilers wish to underscore that negotiating with an 
enemy is futile, or to paraphrase the words of Mao Zedong, “If you are backward you 
will be beaten” (luohou jiu ai da).80 This grammar emerges in the context of lessons 
on the April 1895 peace talks, which resulted in the signing of the humiliating 
Shimonoseki treaty. Teaching manuals accompanying the Chinese history syllabus 
instruct teachers to explicitly request that students pay close attention to the 
Shimonoseki negotiations, so as to expose both the incompetence of the Qing, and 
“the avaricious greed and brutality of the Japanese invaders.”81 As this is the only 
occasion that teachers’ instruction booklets specifically comment on Japan in context 
of the First Sino-Japanese War, it is worth further exploring how both sides in the 
talks are characterised.  
Both the leader of the Qing delegation to Shimonoseki, Li Hongzhang, and his 
Japanese interlocutors are described using pejorative terms which imply that they are 
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both enemies of China. The lesson first emphasises how the punitive terms of the final 
treaty caused great suffering to the Chinese people. The Japanese are then portrayed 
as being superior to the Qing, for instance when Li Hongzhang cravenly accepts 
Japanese Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi’s demand that China cedes Taiwan:  
 
When faced with the invader’s threats, the contemptible Li Hongzhang shamelessly said “Taiwan 
is already in Japan’s mouth, there is no need to be impatient!” Ito Hirobumi treacherously replied 
“[We] have not swallowed it yet, and we are very hungry!” This single question and its reply, 
exposed the thoroughly unrestrained faces of the avaricious invader and the traitorous-sell-the- 
country-criminal-slave [Li Hongzhang].
82
 
 
The discourse here attempts to achieve full naturalisation, by signifying both Minister 
Li and Prime Minister Ito as completely beyond the pale of acceptable behaviour. The 
opposites constructed here show the Japanese state as strong/superior/aggressive/the 
victor, and Qing China as weak/inferior/humiliated/the victim. However, both Japan 
(as signified by Ito) and the Qing dynasty (Li) are both cast as ignoble, disloyal and 
criminal, in that they connive to force unequal treaties on China.  
The underlying norms and values outlined above and transmitted to students in 
class, are a gross subversion of the true course of the negotiations and the main parties 
involved. Firstly, the textbooks neglect to mention that Li Hongzhang was one of 
China’s leading statesmen at the time, a man who was widely respected for, amongst 
other things, recovering Jiangsu Province during the Taiping Rebellion (1850–64).83 
Secondly, there is no mention that Li Hongzhang was shot and seriously injured by an 
assailant shorting after commencing the peace talks, no wonder he was weak and had 
to negotiate from his bedside! Thirdly, in using an extremely harsh lexicon to present 
Li as a Chinese traitor, teaching materials naturally overlook his positive attributes, 
such as the fact that he continuously “denounced all aspects of the Japanese 
position.”84  
In doing so Li was consistently bargaining hard in order to achieve the best 
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possible deal for China, albeit from a very weak negotiating position. For example, he 
repudiated demands that Japanese forces be allowed to build military positions in 
Tianjin, since this would leave Beijing vulnerable to attack.
85
 My point here is that 
textbook compilers are attempting to establish the conviction amongst their young 
readers that negotiating with the Japanese enemy—or indeed any foe—is pointless, 
within a larger picture of Qing leaders unfit to either rule or govern. To ram this point 
home, compilers find it necessary to omit inconvenient features of the historical 
record which do not accord with this view.  
Another way of identifying who compilers are criticising and why is to analyse 
the precise location of text on the First Sino-Japanese War, as it relates to other 
lessons describing historical events of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
As already noted, classes narrating the Ming dynasty wokou threat are both preceded 
and followed by essays extolling the virtues of the peace-loving Chinese admiral 
Zheng He and non-threatening medieval Chinese settlers.  
History texts bringing to life the First Sino-Japanese War are flanked by stories 
which depict late Qing China as being surrounded by hostile foreign enemies and 
ruled by weak leaders too ineffectual to combat them. Seen in this light, Japan is the 
principle but not the only foreign enemy. Adjacent to the First Sino-Japanese War 
narrative is commentary on Japan attacking Korea from the 1870s onwards, forcing 
that country both to sign unequal treaties and to put up with the ignominy of Japanese 
soldiers stationed on Korean soil.
86
 Frequent mention is also made of incursions by 
other foreign powers, such as the two Opium Wars fought against the British, and the 
Sino-French War of 1883–85. 87  Texts describing the aftermath of the First 
Sino-Japanese War relate how China’s imperialist enemies, including Japan, later 
sought to carve up China like a melon.
88
 Unlike history teaching on the wokou 
however, texts flanking classes on the First Sino-Japanese War set a weak Qing in 
binary opposition to encroaching foreign imperialists, of which Japan is the most 
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rapacious but not the only colonial power (the first binary opposition). In turn, this is 
complemented by comparing Chinese heroism with Japanese aggression (the second 
binary opposition).        
On the one hand, it might be argued that during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, Chinese territory was indeed frequently subject to incursions by 
foreign powers and that it is therefore correct that teaching materials should reflect 
this. However, this argument flies in the face of the Chinese historian Paul Cohen’s 
assertion that during the late Qing domestic issues were far more important than 
conflicts with foreign barbarians.
89
 Put differently, if foreign affairs (including the 
First Sino-Japanese War) were of relatively minor consequence to late Qing politics, 
then modern day textbooks ought not to exclusively dwell on them.  
Yet this is patently not the case, as PRC textbooks devote considerable print space 
to the First Sino-Japanese War, which is both preceded and followed by lessons 
describing colonial aggression by other foreign powers (including Japan). This means 
that either Cohen is wrong, or post-1949 textbook compilers have some other reason 
for laying out teaching materials in this way. The most plausible explanation for this is 
to stress the notion that the Qing is too feeble to stand up to foreign enemies and that 
China should not be ruled by an imperial house. This conveniently dovetails with the 
ideological position constructed throughout the syllabus, namely that history textbook 
discourse on Japan attempts to bolster CCP rule. With the aim of further unpacking 
that ideological position, we now turn to analysis of mainland history texts on the 
Second Sino-Japanese War.         
 
History textbook representations of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1931–45) 
 
The texts in this section examine coverage of the Second Sino-Japanese War as 
presented in PRC history textbooks (including armed resistance between the 9.18 
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incident in September 1931 and the outbreak of full-scale war following the July 1937 
Marco Polo bridge incident). These textbooks were published up to half a century apart 
(in the case of the 1957 and 2010 editions) yet they cover much the same events, the 
lessons are recognisably the same and there is often a marked similarity in the text too. 
Critical Discourse Analysis is a powerful tool with which to analyse short passages, but 
for large bodies of text, such as here, it is useful to complement CDA with other 
theoretical tools, such as Ronald Price’s use of “social-political indicators.”90  As 
discussed earlier, I have adjusted Price’s model in such a way that it becomes a more 
efficacious model for analysing lessons on the 1931–45 conflict, principally by sharply 
reducing the number of indicators, so as to concentrate on variables specific to the 
Second Sino-Japanese War. For ease of reference, the analysis below is divided into 
four sub-sections, depending on whether the frequency with which a particular 
indicator occurs is constant, decreasing, increasing or fluctuating (see table 6). 
 
 Constant frequency of indicator 
 
 Table six shows that since 1949, there has been no substantial change in the 
frequency of references to either the Japanese occupation or the Nationalist leader 
Jiang Jieshi. Bearing in mind that since 1949 the PRC has been through wrenching 
economic and social change, it might be expected that substantial rewrites of history 
syllabi during this period would alter the weighting accorded to these indicators, so as 
to reflect the rapidly evolving political mores of the day and the views of different 
paramount leaders.
91
 Instead, in many important respects, history lessons on the 
Anti-Japanese War today are virtually unaltered from their 1950s predecessors. The 
most plausible explanation for this is that the ideologically informed picture of World 
War Two that the CCP is trying to create has not changed since the 1950s either. By 
inspecting our metaphorical painting more closely, it is possible to gain a more nuanced 
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view of the canvas. 
In all textbook narratives since 1949, the speaker communicates the war situation 
by activating attitudes which portray Japan as an implacable opponent. This might 
seem unsurprising in light of the fact that the two countries fought on opposite sides in 
World War Two. Yet other countries that fought each other in this conflict have 
managed to reconcile their pasts to the extent that animosity does not spill over into 
textbooks.
92
 This obsession with presenting Japan as an incorrigible enemy, intent on 
occupying and colonising China, manifests itself on almost every page of Chinese 
history lessons about the war, to such an extent that in one edition (2000) a whole 
chapter is devoted to “brutal Japanese rule,” containing numerous instances of harming 
(shanghai), injuring (shang), killing (sha), raping (qiangjian) and gassing (duqi) 
Chinese people, whilst burning (shaohui) and looting (qiangjie).
93
 At the same time 
there is no mention of the possibility that atrocities might have been committed against 
the Japanese, the enemy simply had to be expelled or annihilated by any means 
whatsoever. 
The high frequency of indicators positioning Japan in opposition to China (through 
use of markers such as enemy (diren), invaders (qinlüezhe), occupation (zhanyong), 
“mop-up” operations (dasaodang) by the Japanese, etc.) suggests that there has been 
little change in the way in which the CCP wishes to portray Japan to children. This is 
another way of saying that compared to other genres, such as media and film, the rate of 
change of significations of Japan in history textbooks is slow or “sticky,” in that certain 
social-political indicators are insensitive to changes in the bilateral relationship. Were 
this not the case, then the rate of change of significations of Japan embedded in history 
teaching materials would be much more volatile.  
 Another important point to note is that Jiang Jieshi appears extremely prominently 
in all history textbooks recounting the Anti-Japanese War, so prominently in fact, that 
he is cited more often than Mao Zedong! This is because in PRC classrooms Jiang 
Jieshi is, and always has been, depicted as either incompetent, a punchbag, or a pathetic  
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Table 6. Social-political indicators in Chinese lower middle school history textbooks covering the 
1931–45 Sino-Japanese conflict (selected years)   
Social-political indicator 1957 1965 1980 2000 2010 
Constant frequency of indicator 
Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) 34 48 42 34 55 
Japan as enemy 72 135 90 51 52 
Japan as invaders and colonisers; puppet governments 116 71 36 104 111 
Japanese occupation or colony 31 13 16 31 41 
Japanese attacks or “mop-up” operations 36 36 17 49 52 
Victory 28 31 24 22 52 
Decreasing frequency of indicator 
Traitors 41 26 40 25 … 
Resistance…under the leadership of the CCP 79 72 43 33 41 
…by the CCP or CCP forces  98 55 84 68 52 
…by the masses 69 64 68 33 33 
…from CCP base areas  52 44 18 51 26 
CCP guerrilla attacks on Japanese forces 69 44 44 37 22 
Japanese forces as imperialists 62 50 27 28 4 
Patriotism 28 17 11 11 … 
Revolution 39 17 17 8 4 
GMD not resisting/GMD surrendering to the Japanese  48 65 45 38 11 
GMD attacks on CCP forces 71 55 49 23 11 
Increasing frequency of indicator 
GMD politicians and military officers 11 3 3 22 55 
Joint anti-Japanese resistance by GMD and CCP forces 23 26 22 27 41 
Warlords 8 8 … 12 26 
Resistance by “China” or “Chinese armies” 59 5 25 45 133 
Japanese politicians/military officers or military units … … … 21 18 
Japanese army 5 16 10 77 140 
Sacrifice 7 8 5 21 18 
Fluctuating frequency of indicator 
Mao Zedong 16 26 36 7 7 
Named CCP leaders 38 15 51 35 18 
Named Chinese patriots or foreigners  5 … 3 62 15 
Note: Data for all years has been adjusted by a multiple in order to permit comparisons based on the 
total number of pages. The multipliers used are: 1957=1.0, 1965=1.0, 1980=0.9, 2000=1.4, 2010=3.6. 
 
figure of fun (for example by making jokes about his false teeth) for allowing the 
Japanese to invade in the first place. Someone had to get the blame for not defending 
China and the intense criticism of Jiang suggests that textbook approval committees 
still, to this day, pin much of that blame on him.  
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Table 7. Quotes from lower middle school history textbooks showing how Jiang Jieshi lost north-east 
China (selected years) 
Textbook, volume 
and page number 
How Jiang lost north-east China 
ZL (1957), 4:39  Jiang Jieshi gave the order to “absolutely not resist [the enemy]” to Chinese armies 
in the north–east and ordered the armies to retreat…Thanks to Jiang Jieshi’s 
ignominious policies of non-resistance…by the beginning of 1932 the stunningly 
beautiful territory and countless treasures of the 3 north–eastern provinces had been 
completely lost to the enemy.  
ZL (1980), 4:23 In less than half a year, the 3 provinces of north–eastern China had been lost. 
Thanks to Jiang Jieshi’s traitorous policies of surrendering by not resisting [the 
enemy], more than 100,000 square kilometres of stunningly beautiful territory and 
countless treasures were completely lost.  
ZL (2000), 4:33  In less than half a year, more than 100,000 square kilometres of the stunningly 
beautiful 3 provinces of north–east China had completely fallen into enemy hands.  
ZL (2010), 8.1:70 In just over 4 months, more than 100,000 square kilometres of the stunningly 
beautiful north–eastern Chinese [territory] had completely fallen into enemy hands.  
 
To name just one example in this blame game, great emphasis is placed on the 
December 1936 Xian incident where the warlord Zhang Xueliang and the GMD 
commander Yang Hucheng abducted Jiang, because of the latter’s insistence that the 
primary enemy was the CCP and not the Japanese. The implication here is that Jiang 
Jieshi obviously had his strategy back-to-front, and that he should have been fighting 
the Japanese and not the Communists.
94
 It is therefore no surprise that as recently as the 
year 2000, history textbooks devote a whole chapter to explaining why Jiang’s 
Nationalist forces half-heartedly repulsed the Japanese, yet at the same time 
aggressively attacked Communist guerrillas.
95
  
However, it would be wrong to assume that just because Jiang Jieshi plays a 
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starring role in PRC history textbooks that significations of his persona are static. This 
is because since the 1980s there has been a grudging acceptance of the role that 
Nationalist forces commanded by Jiang played in facing the Japanese during the war, as 
noted in previous chapters.
96
 As teaching materials on the Anti-Japanese War often 
read more like a critique of Jiang Jieshi than a rational account of Japanese actions or 
strategy, it is useful to compare the manner in which the vitriol towards Jiang has 
lessened with successive editions of history texts. To illustrate, table seven clearly 
shows that earlier editions of textbooks attribute the rapid loss of north-eastern China in 
early 1932 to Jiang Jieshi’s ignominious policies and his traitorous behaviour. However, 
by the year 2000, history texts omit all reference to him in conjunction with the fall of 
Manchuria to the Japanese.  
This is more historically accurate, since during the late 1920s and the 1930s most 
of this region was under the sway of warlords with only nominal loyalty to the GMD 
government. Therefore, if textbooks deem it necessary to apportion blame for the loss 
of north-east China, then it would be more appropriate to direct criticism towards 
warlords such as Zhang Xueliang. The excerpts shown in table seven do not go this far 
though, instead recent editions merely note in a rather terse fashion that the territory 
was lost.    
 
Decreasing frequency of indicator 
 
Chinese traitors and Japanese collaborators  
 
 In imperial times official histories invariably heaped opprobrium on any Chinese 
who collaborated with China’s enemies. This pattern continued into the twentieth 
century. For example, in describing Manchurian resistance during the 1930s and 40s, 
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Rana Mitter argues that “constructing a resistancialism [sic] that sets up China in 
opposition to Japan and thereby necessarily posits Japan as Other, the propagandists 
had to erase memories of the multiple examples of previous Chinese interaction with 
the Japanese.”97 In other words, during the Republican era, any current or former 
contact with the Japanese ran the risk of being seen as traitorous. This was despite the 
fact that in other parts of the country away from Manchuria, Chinese forces continually 
negotiated or collaborated with the Japanese when expedient to do so.
98
  
After the founding of the PRC, textbook compilers continued building this myth of 
resistancialism, in order to present collaboration as an aberration in the face of united 
resistance to the Japanese. As a result, wartime leaders who publicly espoused 
non-resistance or cooperation with the enemy, such as Jiang Jieshi and Wang Jingwei, 
were branded traitors (hanjian) in textbooks. Incidentally, during the Mao era, political 
opponents of Chairman Mao, such as Wang Ming, were also denounced as hanjian in 
the classroom, the ultimate Chinese insult.
99
  
 The gradual rehabilitation of Jiang Jieshi during the 1980s certainly goes some way 
to explaining why the term traitor appears less frequently, since textbooks published in 
the new millennium decline to describe him as one. It is also plausible that reform era 
propagandists increasingly wished to play down separatist sentiment within Greater 
China by (what they continue to term) “splittists,” such as the Nationalists on Taiwan 
and the Uighurs in Xinjiang. They aimed to achieve this by removing references to 
Chinese wartime collaboration with the Japanese. This is because in a culture that sets 
such store on historical precedent, recounting instances of wartime treachery (i.e. 
collaboration) might set a dangerous example which could be seized on by 
independence-minded groups.       
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Resistance to the Japanese under the leadership of the CCP 
 
In successive versions of history textbooks, the CCP plays a still prominent but 
declining role in beating the Japanese, as measured by the number of times that the 
indicator under the leadership of the party (zai dangde lingdao xia) is cited. 
Communist Party leadership is presented in the context of leading the masses to victory 
in a holy or sacred war, which ties in with the traditional Chinese belief that rulers have 
a divine right to rule and the more modern Leninist doctrine that the people should be 
led.
100
  
Taking each of these concepts in turn, the question of whether or not communism is 
a religion (with its implication of a divine right to rule) is beyond the scope of this study 
and in any case is well documented elsewhere.
101
 However, it is possible that the 
Anti-Japanese War is slowly being transformed into a holy crusade by using religious 
lexicography with the “aim of legitimis[ing] or even sacralization of the present 
political structure,” which is code for continued CCP rule. 102  Here politically 
influential ideologues (textbook compilers) are packaging and distributing official 
ideology (the CCP’s right to rule) through the medium of textbooks to a politically 
powerless group of consumers (Chinese schoolchildren).
103
          
 Moving on to the question of leadership, history texts on the Anti-Japanese War 
exhibit a strong and active (but lessening) involvement of CCP armies (ba lu jun, xin si 
jun), volunteer militias (minbing) and the masses in history lessons about the war. All 
of these actors unquestioningly obey the party, a strategy encapsulated in the oft-quoted 
idiom “the party is the mainstay of the people” (zhongliudizhu).104  The political 
scientist Tony Saich convincingly argues why the masses should be led: 
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While Marx saw the proletariat as the universalising force that would bring unity through the 
destruction of bourgeois civil society, it was Lenin who later substituted the party as the 
universalising agent. The model of the party-state structure that was offered to China was thus elitist 
in nature, and this gelled well with China’s own imperial tradition…Commitment was crucial no 
matter how personalised the leadership…[The CCP] claimed a higher truth and demanded 
devotional conduct.
105
 
 
In the context of PRC textbook narratives on the Anti-Japanese War, Saich’s point is 
that the realisation of this higher truth was achieved through quasi-religious devotion 
by the masses to the party, which manifested itself (in textbooks and elsewhere) in the 
form of collective action to defeat the Japanese under the leadership of the party.  
 However, this explanation is perhaps a little too tidy, in that if the CCP (and only 
the CCP) led the Chinese to victory in the fighting against Japan, then it is 
inconceivable that textbook compilers would give rising prominence to roles played by 
other political actors in beating the Japanese. Yet this is exactly what happened, and to 
explain why it is necessary to examine joint CCP-GMD resistance, as well as the role 
that Nationalist forces played in beating the Japanese.    
  
Rising frequency of indicator 
 
GMD resistance against the Japanese 
 
During the Mao era textbooks painted Nationalist resistance against the Japanese 
between the years 1931–45 as pathetic and inconsequential, so much so that the text 
often reads more like a polemic, full of barbs and implied criticisms. Taking 1965 
lessons as an example, the GMD is described as an “opposing-the-CCP-surrendering- 
to-the-Japanese-reactionary-clique,” its policies are presented as being ridiculous and 
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its leader Jiang Jieshi is branded as an enemy.
106
 This excerpt, and others like it, use 
asymmetric power relations to construct narratives in such a way as to portray the war 
in a way other than it really was, because “to serve the ideology, representations must 
be made to appear to be other than what they are. Above all, they must appear to lack 
these very contradictions that informed their production.”107  
It is for this reason that textbook compilers felt it necessary to contrast the GMD 
(surrendering to the enemy) against the CCP (fully committed to taking on the 
Japanese), because in reality in much of the country it was the Nationalists who were 
fighting Japan and not the Communists. If asymmetric power relations were the sole 
reason for lambasting the GMD, then it would be expected that reform era textbooks 
would continue to attack them with equal ferocity. This is because even today part of 
the myth of the CCP’s rise to power is the prominent role it played in beating the 
Japanese, even as the party reluctantly accepts that the GMD also played a vital part in 
winning the Anti-Japanese War. 
Instead, editions published after the political rehabilitation of the Nationalists 
during the early to mid-1980s, are much less fervent in their criticism of Jiang Jieshi’s 
party. In the 2000 and 2010 editions for example, not only is the GMD contribution to 
fighting the Japanese more balanced (by removing epithets such as surrendering 
(touxiang) and reactionary (fandong)), but the deeds of illustrious Nationalist generals 
such as Zhang Zizhong are recounted in detail too. Embedded within this reform era 
textbook narrative is further tacit acknowledgement that the Nationalists played a 
bigger role than the Communists in the war. This can be seen in the form of a much 
higher ratio of citations of GMD to CCP leaders (see table 6).  
 
Joint GMD-CCP resistance against the Japanese 
 
 With respect to the Nationalist’s role in the war, a few further points are worthy of 
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note. Firstly, during the Mao era joint GMD-CCP cooperation was used almost 
exclusively in a pejorative sense, in that it referred to Nationalist leaders repeatedly 
spurning Communist proposals to jointly resist the Japanese. After the GMD were 
politically rehabilitated (see above), references to joint cooperation usually signified 
rapprochement between the two parties instead.
108
 Secondly, this recent highlighting of 
GMD resistance is reinforced by a rising frequency of reference to involvement by 
Chinese (zhongguo ren) or Chinese armies (zhongguo jun) in the war, which is code for 
non-Communists fighting the Japanese.  
Yet textbook compilers only cede so much ground in this respect, in that Jiang 
Jieshi and the party he led are, even today, presented as being unfit to rule China, based 
on their conduct during the war. This is why textbooks devote whole chapters to 
eulogising life in Communist base areas (such as Yenan), immediately followed by 
lessons which explain in graphic detail the travails of life under GMD rule 
(hyperinflation, corruption, arbitrary arrest).
109
 It is as if the textbooks are saying 
indirectly, “we now accept that it was mainly the Nationalists and not the Communists 
who opposed the Japanese wartime occupation, but we refuse to accept that this equates 
to a right to rule China.” Were this not the case, fully 60 years after the end of the war, 
there would be no need to present life for the masses under Jiang Jieshi as so harsh and 
desperate.  
 
Japanese politicians and generals 
  
 As noted above the way Japan is conceptualised in history textbooks remains 
broadly unchanged between 1957 and 2010, in that references to Japan as an enemy and 
an invader are relatively constant. Interestingly, this trait is accompanied by a relatively 
recent rise in the appearance of named Japanese officials, politicians and generals. 
Likewise, Japanese military formations are increasingly called by their proper title 
(Group Army X or Regiment Y), as opposed to more generic terms such as imperialist 
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invader (diguozhuyi qinlüezhe).  
Superficially, this would seem to indicate that the Japanese invasion of China from 
1931 onwards is being presented in more balanced terms, a sort of de-Othering of that 
country’s armed forces in representations of the Second Sino-Japanese War. On the 
other hand, a cursory inspection of reform era textbooks reveals a marked increase of 
commentary on alleged Japanese atrocities committed during that conflict.
110
 Teaching 
manuals accompanying lessons about the Nanjing massacre, for example, instruct 
students to memorise that the pogrom was carried out after Japanese forces took the 
capital, and that the massacre was conducted against unarmed civilians and Chinese 
forces who had already laid down their weapons.
111
 This increasing insistence on 
re-remembering atrocities committed by the Japanese, decades after they were 
allegedly perpetrated mirrors narratives in war museums, where these events are “being 
remembered back into existence” in order to construct a victim narrative.112     
 
Fluctuating frequency of indicator 
 
If the cult of Mao as it appears in Chinese history textbooks were a piece a music, 
then it would grow in volume in the decades after 1949, rising to fever pitch in the years 
immediately after the chairman’s death as a mark of respect to the late leader. The 
volume in our song would then fade to the point where it is now virtually inaudible. 
This pattern of a prolonged rise followed by a dramatic decline in references to Mao 
Zedong is repeated for indicators of other CCP leaders too. The rationale for such 
changes only becomes apparent when these figures are compared to the sharp rise in 
mentions of GMD politicians and generals, which as noted above implies that textbook 
compilers increasingly accept that it was the GMD and not the CCP that bore the brunt 
of the fighting against the Japanese.
113
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The lessons drawn from post-1949 textbooks analysed so far in this chapter have, 
like the texts themselves, focused exclusively on episodes of historical Sino-Japanese 
conflict. However, at first glance the lower middle school history textbook (2010 
edition) appears to be an exception to this rule, in that it recounts the story of Liu 
Changchun, the first mainland Chinese athlete to take part in an Olympiad, the 1932 
Los Angeles Olympics.
114
  
However, on closer inspection the story accurately reflects the attitudes of textbook 
compilers towards the major actors in the Anti-Japanese War. Japan is seen as cunning 
(jiaohua) for trying to send its own athletes to represent the so-called puppet 
Manchukuo State instead of Liu Changchun; the GMD is portrayed as weak (ruo) for 
not trying to stop them; and the Chinese people are shown as displaying correct 
tendencies (zhengquede qingxiang) for protesting against the pusillanimity of the 
Nationalists. China is humiliated (chiru) at the Los Angeles Olympics because 
Liu—who attends the event after all—is knocked out in the first round. The moral of 
this story, is that the People’s Republic under the leadership of the CCP is the real hero, 
owing to the success of the 2008 Beijing Olympiad almost 80 years later. 
 
*** 
 
Language (yuwen) textbooks 
 
 Unlike most other mainland school syllabi, language teaching materials are edited 
very frequently. As a result of this continual editing the positioning of specific lessons 
within the language textbook series varies enormously, such that a text might arbitrarily 
appear in elementary school curricula one year and then in middle school assigned 
readings the next. For this reason, rather than using random sampling to pick relevant 
texts (which might miss important Japan-related tales because of their seemingly 
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unplanned distribution in language teaching materials) I have selected three stories 
which frequently appear in the language syllabus. I have also included the well-known 
Mao era short song “I’m a soldier” (wo shi yige bing), for its polemical views on 
wartime Japan and the Nationalists.  
For ease of comparison with extracts analysed elsewhere in this chapter, the 
lessons examined below are mostly chosen using the same baseline years: 1957, 1965, 
1980, 2000 and 2010. As with history teaching materials, the relatively static 
presentation of Japan as a wartime enemy, implies long-term continuity in the 
ideological messages which language textbook compilers wish children to internalise.  
With 2,000 years of shared Sino-Japanese history, much of it peaceful, there are 
many uncontentious areas of bilateral contact that could have been chosen for inclusion 
in language textbooks, such as Japanese absorption of Chinese culture during the Tang 
dynasty, or the technological prowess of modern Japanese factories located in China. 
Yet these and other subjects which might portray Japan in a positive light are ignored, 
because language textbook compilers instead concentrate on building a discourse 
which paints the Japanese state in a negative light.
115
 In this respect one theme 
dominates all others, the Communist-led resistance to the Japanese between the years 
1931–45. This is because the Anti-Japanese War has special significance for the 
Chinese, as it was the first war during the century of humiliation which they actually 
won. It is therefore unsurprising that the theme of the stories described below is one of 
ultimate victory over the Japanese. Even the one story where a victim narrative 
predominates, that of the young hero Yu Lai, victory is assured because of his defiant 
resistance to the better armed, more numerous Kwantung Army soldiers.  
The subtext to these language lessons encapsulates the CCP’s enduring philosophy 
towards the Anti-Japanese War. The war enables the Communist Party to portray itself 
as the prime defender of China against the Japanese, a herculean fight over many years 
which now undergirds its right to rule.
116
 As a result, the course of the conflict is 
painted as closely paralleling the CCP’s rise to power. Deftly weaving these two 
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narratives together (the conflict and the CCP’s rise) allows the party to characterise its 
coming to power as inevitable. Moreover, the inability of the Nationalists (nominally 
the ruling power in China at the time) to resist encroachment by Japan enables the CCP 
to portray them as unfit to govern.
117
 The short song translated below, “I’m a soldier,” 
articulates these pillars of party rule, by providing us with a Maoist picture of how the 
CCP depicted the war, singing about it from the viewpoint of a common soldier. 
 
I’m a soldier (1965)   
 
I’m a common soldier 
Defeat the thieving Japanese dogs and exterminate the Jiang bandit army 
I’m a soldier, I love my country, I love my people 
The revolutionary war tests me, and hardens my views 
I firmly grasp my gun, my eyes see clearly 
Whoever dares make war, I will resolutely attack them without mercy.
118
  
 
The song is not educational in the sense that it teaches children facts about the 
Anti-Japanese War, instead it teaches them how to think emotively about the hostilities. 
The Japanese are described using pejorative terms such as thieves (qiangdao) and dogs 
(gou). Jiang Jieshi is criticised by failing to use his formal title which denies him face. 
This is because calling a leader only by his surname in Chinese is an implied insult 
(President Hu Jintao is never, ever referred to as “Hu” in the Chinese media). In 
contrast, when wartime CCP leaders are mentioned, they are always referred to either 
by their full name or their surname and their title. Worse, calling the Nationalist armed 
forces bandits (jiang fei jun) is a direct snub, which attempts to brand the GMD under 
Jiang Jieshi as incapable of ruling China.   
Love for one’s motherland is another theme in this song which frequently occurs in 
other language textbook passages too.
119
 There is never any indication that the Chinese 
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people are divided by class (landlord/peasant), government (CCP/puppet governments 
loyal to Japan/warlords/GMD) or nationality (Han majority/ethnic minorities). The 
lessons gloss over such divisions with the implication that “we” are all one people 
together, who all ardently love our motherland and wish to see the Japanese annihilated. 
Published in 1965, this song might also have been meant as an indirect warning to the 
United States and Japan not to attack China, as it was published at a time of rising 
Japanese involvement in supplying American forces in Vietnam.
120
  
Grammar drills accompanying “I’m a soldier” divide new vocabulary into two 
types, with the aim of creating naturalisation in the same way as the wokou history texts. 
Words associated with Japan are purely negative, such as enemy and invade, whereas 
those linked with the Chinese are positive adjectives such as courage (yonggan) and 
daring (danzi), or active verbs exterminate (pumie).  
 
“A little Eighth Route Army soldier” and “Five soldiers on Wolf Tooth Mountain” 
 
A number of war stories have appeared so often in language textbooks that they 
have become ingrained in the nation’s consciousness. Arguably the two most famous of 
these tales are “A little Eighth Route Army soldier” (xiao ba lu), which is a short ditty 
about a young boy who has joined the eponymous army, and “Five soldiers on Wolf 
Tooth Mountain” (langya shan wu zhuangshi), about a quintet of Communist fighters 
who throw themselves off Wolf Tooth Mountain in order to avoid enemy capture.
121
 
The continual appearance of these passages over the past 60 years suggests that their 
embedded political messages are still valid, otherwise the stories would have been 
withdrawn long ago, in the same way that Nationalist language textbooks were 
removed from circulation after 1949.  
The story of “A little Eighth Route Army soldier” describes a healthy young 
Communist who fights alongside the Eighth Route Army, the CCP’s most successful 
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wartime fighting force. Despite the fact that the boy is a fighter, his simple uniform is 
clean and in good repair (see fig. 7). He is alert, intelligent and he maintains his studies 
whilst on the battlefield. This story paints the picture of youths as the CCP would like 
them to be.
122
 The virtuous morals imparted here map out the ideal of hard-working, 
diligent, studious, hygienic children-cum-anti-Japanese-fighters ready to serve their 
country. Class is an unstated issue in that the little soldier is obviously not rich, as 
typified by the fact that he is only wearing straw sandals. By signifying the young hero 
as a peasant, the story sanctions and encourages working class relations. The cultural 
logic here tries to engender distrust of the Nationalist ruling class, by eulogising the 
common boy who goes off to fight for his country whilst the GMD, landlords and rich 
merchants are nowhere to be seen.  
 
 
Figure 7. “A little Eighth Route Army soldier” (xiao ba lu) Elementary School Language Textbook, 2000, 
vol. 2, p. 34. 
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The concept of praising positive morals and transmitting them to students is 
embodied in the list of new characters listed at the end of the text. Although most 
Chinese characters have multiple meanings, the new ones introduced in this story all 
have positive connotations, such as zhuan and xin, which used together mean 
concentrate (zhuanxin), or jie and shi which combined mean reliable (jieshi).  
Sometimes the words and phrases found in accompanying grammar drills at the 
end of each lesson, tell us as much about the intentions of the textbook compiler as the 
text itself. The “Five soldiers on Wolf Tooth Mountain” like the young hero in “A little 
Eighth Route Army soldier” are ordinary folk fighting the Japanese. They protect their 
own people first by ambushing the Japanese so that “enemy corpses litter the ground,” 
and then by “luring the invaders” up on to Wolf Tooth Peak itself. When the five are 
cornered on the mountain, they fling themselves off the summit to their heroic deaths 
rather than surrendering to the Japanese, shouting “Beat the Japanese imperialists!” and 
“Long live the Chinese Communist Party!”123  After reading the text children are 
required to learn words which positively associate with the five soldiers, such as hate 
(hen), revenge (baochou) and duty (zeren). Here both revenge against the Japanese and 
hating the invaders are considered virtuous attributes by the textbook compilers. In this 
respect, righteous revenge against an enemy has long been seen as a morally justified 
attribute of an upstanding Chinese person.
124
 Conversely, negative characters or words 
associated with the Japanese include enemy and corpse (shiti).  
All editions of “Five soldiers on Wolf Tooth Mountain” require that students learn 
four character idioms (chengyu) that appear in the text.
125
 For example, in the 1980 
version the comprehension exercises following the passage list positive association 
idioms for Chinese deeds, such as magnificent (qizhuangshanhe); whilst using negative 
association idioms for actions relating to the Japanese, such as smash their bodies and 
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grind their bones to pieces (fenshensuigu) and disorderly (hengqishuba). Binary 
opposition is constructed by contrasting efficient Communist volunteers with a 
disorganised Japanese enemy, and the 1980 comprehension exercises virtually put 
words into the students’ mouths, by asking them to explain the meaning of longer 
phrases such as “lure the enemy to the mountain summit, and then heroically annihilate 
him.”  
 Thirty years later in the 2010 edition, the way in which questions are asked is 
different, but the construct of Chinese superiority remains the same. Students are now 
asked to explain the meaning of italicised phrases drawn from the text, for example 
“suddenly rocks rained down like hailstones [on the enemy]…representing the hatred 
of the Chinese people.” In short, this story represents Japan as an implacable enemy, 
who can only be beaten at the hands of CCP guerrillas who bravely sacrifice themselves 
for their motherland.
126
 Under the guise of building vocabulary, textbook compilers 
are reinforcing the ideological position constructed in history textbooks, with the aim 
of influencing a whole generation of students. This position is that Japan is an 
ever-present threat and potential enemy, who committed unconscionable atrocities 
during the Anti-Japanese War. Offset against the enemy’s deeds is the outstanding 
contribution by CCP forces, selflessly fighting the invaders in order to rid China of 
foreign troops.   
 
Images of Yu Lai 
 
“Little hero Yu Lai” (xiao yingxiong yulai) is a famous story that appeared in 
textbooks before the PRC was even founded. This wartime tale written by Guan Hua, is 
about a young hero who becomes famous for thwarting the Japanese invaders at every 
turn, and even telling them to their face, “I am Chinese, I love my motherland!”127 In 
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the language textbook (2010) edition, the accompanying picture tells us almost as much 
about the Japanese as the story itself (see fig. 8). Firstly, Yu Lai is at the centre of the 
picture, angrily rubbing his face after having received a beating from the Japanese 
surrounding him. Despite the fact that he is spattered in blood and unarmed, he appears 
unafraid, and refuses to respond to the Japanese officer interrogating him (referred to in 
the text as flat-nose (bian bizi)). Yu Lai appears as a healthy, upright and vigorous 
youth, even though his patched clothes and the state of the shed he is being questioned 
in suggest that he is very poor. In stark contrast to the way modern-day thriving China is 
portrayed, the dilapidated shed is a metaphor for the country during the war, fought 
over and looted by the invading Japanese. The picture also implies that Yu Lai is a 
conscientious student, as the blood-stained textbook on the floor and the overturned 
chair by the table hint that he was studying up to the moment when the Japanese 
ambushed his home.  
 
Figure 8. Yu Lai is interrogated by Japanese soldiers. Elementary School Language Textbook, 2010, vol. 
4.2, p. 66. 
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The Kwantung Army soldiers (referred to as devils or the enemy) completely 
outnumber Yu Lai. They are brandishing weapons such as rifles and a sword, whereas 
Yu Lai has nothing with which to defend himself. The Japanese are all grotesquely ugly, 
unshaven, and have hands shaped like eagle talons. Their bodies are distorted to such an 
extent that their spindly legs can barely support their obese torsos, which are clad in 
crumpled, moth-eaten uniforms.  
This picture seems to embody textbook compilers’ thinking on Japan fully 65 years 
after the end of the war. The implication here is that Yu Lai is an innocent China, 
surrounded and attacked by inhumane torturing Japanese. Yet despite the 
overwhelming odds, China (Yu Lai) refuses to give in, submit, capitulate or confess to 
an enemy occupying the Chinese motherland. The picture does not show, however, that 
Yu Lai uses his intelligence to escape the Japanese and to keep fighting on until victory 
is finally won.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has argued that with respect to Japan content of Chinese textbooks has 
shown remarkably little change over the past 60 years. To be sure, some of the most 
egregious revolutionary rhetoric has been elided, but other than that classes taught to 
children in 2012 bear a marked similarity to those taught to their forbearers during the 
1950s. As the Chinese Ministry of Education is part of the Propaganda Department 
empire, this suggests that the messages imparted by the state through its control of 
textbooks are broadly unchanged too.  
 The text schema (plots) in both history and language textbooks mostly relate to 
periods of Sino-Japanese discord, such as the Ming dynasty wokou piracy and the 
1931–45 Anti-Japanese War. Lessons depicting the Japanese as peaceful, friendly or 
even normal are almost completely absent, since the ideological position that texts are 
constructing is that Japan is an incorrigible enemy. The idea of focusing exclusively 
on periods of conflict paints the Japanese side, and the so-called traitorous Chinese 
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who support them, as an ever-present threat.    
 Embedded within this overall narrative are a number of messages, which can be 
divided into three categories. First, the Chinese masses are good, strong, courageous 
and unite to repulse the Japanese invaders. Secondly, powerful leaders (e.g. Mao) are 
presented as vanquishing the Japanese, winning the right to rule China in the process. 
Thirdly, Chinese who fail to resist the Japanese (e.g. big business, Wang Jingwei) are 
traitors to China. Interwoven with these messages are social-political indicators, which 
by means of subtle use of lexicography bolster other claims, ranging from China is 
peaceful and the Qing dynasty is weak, to Jiang Jieshi is unfit to rule. A final point to 
note is that little change in Chinese textbooks should not be equated with no change. 
This chapter has explored some of the possible reasons as to why, for example, in 
recent decades the role played by the Nationalists in facing the Japanese enemy has 
gradually become more prominent. In the next chapter, we turn to a transmission 
medium which—unlike the textbook—has the potential to reach those who are 
illiterate and never attended school, namely film.  
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Chapter 4 
Anti-Japanese War Films 
 
Introduction 
 
 
It is not an exaggeration to say that since the founding of the PRC, Anti-Japanese 
War films have remained an incredibly popular form of mass entertainment. To give 
an indication of the enduring fascination with this genre, the 1965 film Underground 
War (Didao zhan, 1965) is purportedly one of the most-watched movies ever, with 
over 1.8 billion viewings since it was made.
1
 Similarly, the recently released 
blockbuster film about the Nanjing massacre City of Life and Death (Nanjng! Nanjing!, 
2009), grossed a record 65 million RMB within five days of its release.
2
 
 Chinese people wanting to watch motion pictures about other (non-war related) 
aspects of Japan have been consistently disappointed. This is because the war is still, 
even today, virtually the only acceptable subject for a Chinese film about Japan, 
although there are rare exceptions such as The Go Masters (Yi pan meiyou xiawande qi, 
1982).
3
 To be fair, during the 1980s and 90s a number of highly popular, long- 
running Japanese television series were shown on CCTV (such as A Xin (A xin) about 
the hard life of a prostitute). More recently, China has been awash with pirated 
Japanese DVDs; and during the past few years, those with broadband can now stream 
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selected Japanese movies online, such as the blockbuster teen pulp movie Confessions 
(Gaobai, 2010). Notwithstanding this latter development, however, films made by 
Japanese studios are almost never shown in mainland cinemas. Moreover, PRC 
motion pictures about the war vastly outnumber those which focus on other areas of 
Japanese life. Analysing war movies is therefore an excellent means of critically 
examining evolving Chinese images of Japan, as generated by mainland film studios 
and then screened to domestic audiences.   
The films discussed in this chapter are considered from a historical perspective, not 
just for their relentless focus on twentieth-century conflict with Japan, but also for 
how representations of that country inform Chinese ideology. The film scholar Marc 
Ferro explains this link between representations and ideology, by analysing history in 
Soviet film. His comments offer lessons for the Chinese case, because after 1949 the 
Chinese film industry emulated many aspects of Russian filmmaking:  
 
It is easy to think that film is not suited to represent past reality and that at its best its testimony is 
valuable only for the present; or that, aside from documents and newsreels, the reality it offers is 
no more real than the novels….Paradoxically, the only films that do not manage to surpass film’s 
testimony concerning the present are films about the past: historical reconstructions.
4
 
 
Ferro’s contention is that the authorities in the “here and now” bring the past back to 
life by constructing history, and then repackaging it to serve ideological ends. As that 
here and now becomes the past, the movie itself becomes history. The historian Pierre 
Sorlin comes to a similar conclusion, in that he sees film as a “document of social 
history that…aims primarily at illuminating the way in which individuals and groups 
of people understand their time.”5  
The core aim of this chapter therefore, is to show how history is constructed in 
order to justify the present, through the medium of post-1949 mainland Anti-Japanese 
War films. The research below focuses on imagery of wartime Japan (generals, officers, 
soldiers, tactics and strategy) as presented on celluloid, for what it can tell us about the 
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underlying ideology of Chinese movie makers. In order to achieve this I present 
thematic analysis of five different aspects of Japan, based on the categorisation used by 
the film scholar Richard Dyer in his book Stars, namely: 1) location, 2) clothing, 3) 
racism, 4) character and stereotypes, and 5) ideology.
6
 Dyer’s classification is useful 
for analysing a particular trope (in this case the Japanese soldier) because of its efficacy 
in breaking down what the audience sees on the screen into conceptual components. I 
have also added a sixth category, reform era changes in film imagery of Japan, which 
allows us to chart the way in which cinematic Chinese representations of the Japanese 
enemy have evolved over the past three decades. First though, it is necessary to 
provide a brief overview of film-making in the PRC, in order to situate mainland war 
films within the historical context in which they were made.  
 
The making of films in Communist China 
       
 After the founding of the PRC, propaganda bureaucrats considered film a choice 
mass communications channel because by the early 1950s film, in urban areas at least, 
had come to rival opera as a means of entertainment. Whereas the content of opera was 
fixed (emperors, corrupt officials, ghosts, etc.), film not only had the flexibility to make 
social and political commentary, it also had the ability to reach a mass audience.
7
  
Moreover, unlike printed matter, film could be understood by the 80 percent of the 
population that was illiterate at this time, since comprehending the gist of a movie was 
not dependent on the ability to read and, in any case, subtitles were not commonplace 
until the 1970s.
8
 Furthermore, films were technically complex and celluloid was 
difficult to tamper with, making film a more reliable format for disseminating party 
doctrine than pamphlets or newspapers.
9
 This was an important consideration for a 
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new government that was trying to exert authority over former Guomindang 
strongholds potentially full of Nationalist spies. Films also promoted Mandarin 
Chinese—the newly designated standard speech (putonghua)—as a means of helping 
to unify the war-torn country and promoting Communist ideals. In order to avoid 
“splittism” and regionalism it was forbidden for films to be made in either minority 
languages or regional dialects, with the result that wartime revolutionaries depicted on 
celluloid always spoke putonghua, even if in reality they frequently did not.
10
  
 The state was able to send political messages via films through its control of the 
movie industry, which was completely nationalised by 1953.
11
 In 1950 a Film Bureau 
was established under the direction of the Ministry of Culture (MOC), followed in 
rapid succession by MOC provincial cultural affairs departments, each with their own 
film offices. It was to these offices that film studios made requests to make movies.
12
 
All filmmakers worked for the state, and all production, censorship and distribution 
was controlled by state organisations. Filmmakers were even required by law to submit 
scripts, completed productions and all rough cuts.
13
 Culture studies theorist Jerome 
Silbergeld provides one of the best accounts of how the censorship system worked in 
practice. He shows that state control over the film industry was largely “do-it-yourself” 
(i.e. self-enforced), because “the entire system [was] conceived as benign and couched 
in terms of education, helping artists to understand what [was] expected of them so that 
they might avoid anything that could cause…forcible intervention.”14     
 As in other spheres of society, film-making during the 1950s and 60s was subject to 
the whims of factional politics. For example, during the hundred flowers movement, 
movie directors were encouraged to offer critiques of the industry, which resulted in 
their subsequent persecution during the anti-rightist backlash. A rapid increase in the 
quantity of films accompanied the Great Leap Forward, but many of these productions 
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were of appalling quality.
15
 In turn the mania of the Great Leap Forward led to a 
political thaw during the early 1960s, which lasted until the run up to the Cultural 
Revolution, during which time film-making almost ceased.  
One of the first films to be released after the Cultural Revolution was The Great 
River Flows On (Dahe benliu, 1978). This film tells the story of floods which forced 
millions of peasants to abandon their homes, following Jiang Jieshi’s blasting of the 
Yellow River’s protective dykes in order to slow the Japanese advance. The Great River 
Flows On was made in very much the same style as Mao-era movies, and it was panned 
by cinema-goers who disliked the dull plot and exaggerated acting.
16
 This strong 
reaction suggested that post-Cultural Revolution films about the war would have to 
change with the times. However, reform era film-making was still subject to intense 
party scrutiny, as shown in December 1981 when Hu Yaobang personally lectured film 
workers for allowing “the political mood to become unhealthy…and thought to become 
ignoble…[Instead] novels, plays and films should be about improving one’s spiritual 
health, by exhorting and encouraging [the people] to devote themselves to the cause of 
socialist modernisation.”17 Hu was indirectly making the point that if politics was 
removed from war (and other) films, then the CCP would lose a key means of 
transmitting ideological messages to the masses.  
 The film industry’s riposte to this thinking came in the form of fifth generation 
filmmakers, whose formative years had been shaped by the Cultural Revolution. Much 
has been written about the way that this group of individuals revolutionised the Chinese 
movie industry during the 1980s and 90s, so only a brief mention is necessary here.
18
 
Important war films of this genre include The One and the Eight (Yige he bage, 1984) 
and Red Sorghum (Hong gaoliang, 1987). Red Sorghum, a romance set before and 
during the war, was wildly popular for its sexual innuendo, but the film director Zhang 
Yimou’s real message was “inviting audiences to compare the independence of the 
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main characters with their own cautious and closely monitored existences.”19 Like 
other fifth generation filmmakers, Zhang was testing the limits of censorship by 
making films which commented on contemporary social and political issues, rather 
than just the Japanese enemy. Sometimes these limits were exceeded, with the result 
that the offending film was banned. For example The Towering Kunlun Mountains II 
(Weiwei kunlun II, 1988) was never released, because of its overly enthusiastic 
portrayal of the Nationalists in the immediate aftermath of World War Two.  
 The rapid and extensive social changes wrought by the reform era always meant 
that there was going to be a “wider political space” for comment on the Anti-Japanese 
War and, indeed, the way that Japanese forces were represented within that dynamic.
20
 
This changing movie commentary has taken many forms, ranging from a grudging 
acceptance of the role that the GMD played in repulsing the Japanese in The Bloody 
Battle for Taierzhuang (hereafter Taierzhuang) (Xuezhan taierzhuang, 1985) to 
rehabilitation of warlords in The Lu Gou Qiao Incident (Qiqi shibian, 1995). 
Additionally, during the last 20 years Chinese cinema has been rapidly repositioning 
itself to meet the burgeoning demands of consumers, and there is now a small but 
growing body of secondary literature mapping out the shifting dynamics of the 
mainland film industry.
21
 Rather than hypothesising where these shifting dynamics 
might potentially lead, the main body of this chapter now turns to a study of location, 
the first of John Dyer’s categorisations for unpacking ideology in film. 
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Location 
 
The French film scholar Paul Virilio argues that battlefield location is crucial in 
war films, because it forms the key paradigm where the action of the movie takes 
place. He speaks of cinema as a continuation of war, which by using repeating images 
of the scene of conflict, turns “the battlefield [into]…the environment which is 
constantly targeted, intercepted by an optical arsenal going from the ‘line of sight’ of 
the firearm…to cameras…projecting an image.”22 The American film critic Leo 
Braudy agrees with Virilio on the importance of location, because like a painting, it 
expands our ability to interpret the world of visible things, for example by 
emphasising in a visually powerful way this or that place.
23
 Chinese war films 
interpret “this or that place” from a privileged viewpoint, in that the genre explicitly 
focuses on our nation (China) versus theirs (Japan), our land versus their invasion of it, 
and our culture versus their superstition.
24
 Put differently, Chinese war films only 
view the conflict as it is waged on Chinese soil, and by doing so they deny the 
Japanese invaders the ability to speak for themselves.  
 Like American westerns, PRC war films use special standards, traditions and 
conventions which enable audiences to quickly place the scene of the action. Whereas 
westerns are frequently located in empty desert, Chinese war movies are almost 
exclusively set in what is now the People’s Republic of China. Until relatively 
recently, most or all of the action in these motion pictures took place in Communist 
held areas. The simplest means of pinpointing location in Chinese war films is to 
divide it into three categories: 1) Communist held hills or mountains, 2) Communist 
held plains, and 3) all other areas.  
 A substantial number of war movies are set in Communist held hills and 
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mountains (category one), because for the duration of the war the CCP leadership 
located their headquarters in Yenan, Shaanxi Province.
25
 This was (and remains today) 
a mountainous region well protected from potential attack by its remoteness and lack 
of transport links. In such difficult terrain, movies such as Letter with Feathers (Ji 
maoxin, 1953) and Two Young Eighth Route Army Soldiers (Liangge xiao ba lu, 1977) 
show how Japanese forces can be easily outmanoeuvred in deep valleys, where they 
lay vulnerable to attack by Communist snipers.  
 Many war films are also set on the north China plains, stretching from Beijing in 
the north to the Yangtze River in the south (category two). This is because the plains 
were the scene of some of the Communists’ greatest victories after the outbreak of 
full-scale war in 1937. Famous examples include Underground War, a movie about 
fighting the Japanese using networks of subterranean tunnels (see fig. 9), and 
Guerrilla War on the Plains (Pingyuan youji zhan, 1955), where CCP revolutionaries 
target Japanese blockhouse forts. 
 Fighting in large cities, coastal regions, and aerial combat (category three) do not 
feature prominently in films about the war. This is because these were theatres where 
the CCP conducted few military operations between the years 1931–45. Taking each 
of these three theatres in turn, it was only during the Chinese Civil War (immediately 
following World War Two) that Communist forces were able to capture and hold on to 
major urban centres such as Harbin.
26
 Consequently, PRC war films largely ignored 
fighting in built-up areas so as to draw attention away from this fact. As a result, until 
the mid-1980s one of the few motion pictures about the war set wholly in an urban 
landscape was The Eternal Wave (Yong bu xiaoshide dianbo, 1958), about the 
Communist spy Li Jiashen’s activities in Shanghai. Similarly, not a single film has 
been made about the war in the air, meaning that a whole dimension of the conflict 
(i.e. aerial combat) is missing from this genre of movie. At no point during World War 
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Two did the Communists possess significant air assets, and even the Nationalist air 
force had largely been neutralised by 1938, which placed much of Chinese territory 
dangerously open to bombardment from enemy planes.
27
 This weakness is ignored in 
PRC war films by locating the conflict on terra firma. 
As for the final theatre (coastal regions), as early as 1971 the China 
anthropologist John Weakland noted that in PRC war films “the actual onset of the 
invasion is conspicuous by its absence.”28 Instead, the Japanese are generally shown 
“established and settled in Chinese territory.”29 Although Weakland is unable to offer 
reasons for this omission, it is plausible that had directors depicted Japanese forces 
physically invading Chinese soil, then audiences would have asked why the CCP did 
not halt their advance. Put differently, if the Communists swear that they had the 
wherewithal to defeat the Japanese, then why did they not repel the enemy invasion in 
the first place?            
 
 
Figure 9. A scene from the film Underground War (Didao zhan, 1965) showing Japanese troops 
cowering in the face of a Communist guerrilla.  
                                                 
27
 Arthur N. Young, China and the Helping Hand: 1937–1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1963), 55. 
28
 Weakland, “Chinese Film Images of Invasion and Resistance,” 443. 
29
 Ibid., 444.  
168 
 
   
 In addition to describing the three main types of location in Anti-Japanese War 
films (Communist held mountains, Communist held plains and areas outside CCP 
control), it is also useful to quantify their relative proportions. As no comprehensive 
list of PRC motion pictures about the war exists, I have used the official collector’s 
edition of 32 famous Anti-Japanese War films (1949–2000) as a sample, which 
provides a baseline from which a more authoritative study might be conducted at a 
later date.
30
  
Analysis of film location in the collector’s edition (n=32) suggests that 88 percent 
of war movies were set either in Communist held areas or locales where CCP 
guerrillas were active. In reality, however, the total amount of territory held by the 
Communists fluctuated widely during the war and probably never exceeded 20 
percent.
31
 If we assume that Japanese armies attacked or occupied areas controlled by 
the Communists with the same frequency, intensity and duration as those held by 
non-CCP Chinese forces, then post-1949 PRC films about the war overestimate CCP 
involvement by a factor of four to one. This was obviously part of an attempt to 
persuade audiences that most action against the Japanese took place in areas held by 
the CCP. In turn, if filmgoers were convinced, then this would reinforce the party’s 
claim that they beat the Japanese and won the war, thus winning the right to rule, 
encapsulated in the slogan “the party is the mainstay of the people.”    
After 1978 the choice of film location gradually expanded to include areas 
formerly held by non-CCP forces. The corollary of this change was that it was no 
longer taboo to portray GMD and warlord forces fighting the Japanese on film. This 
formed part of a broader trend of reassessing the significant contribution that Jiang 
Jieshi and his Nationalist forces made to defeating Japan (as discussed in chaps. 1–3). 
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Early examples of films which emphasised GMD resistance to the Japanese include 
Taierzhuang and The Lu Gou Qiao Incident.  
If we further subdivide the collector’s edition, by classifying its movies both by 
location and by date of release, we can compare where war films are set both before 
and during the reform era (1949–78 and 1979 onwards respectively). In turn this 
allows an approximate calculation of the extent to which non-Communist forces are 
rehabilitated in reform era war films, by depicting combat outside CCP controlled 
areas. During the Mao era 90 percent of PRC war movies released between the years 
1949–78 (n=25) are set in Communist held areas (categories one and two above), 
whereas only 10 percent are located in other areas (category three above). After 1978 
(n=7), this ratio is substantially altered with 29 percent of films set outside CCP 
wartime strongholds. So on the basis of location alone, there is a 20 percent increase 
in the number of reform era films set in areas nominally under the control of either 
GMD or warlord forces. To be sure, during the 1980s and 90s many films still 
highlighted Communist led resistance, such as White Mountain Black Water (Baishan 
heishui, 1997) which describes 1930s guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in 
Manchuria. However, the figures above suggest that during the reform era there has 
been a perceptible shift in the battleground site (as defined by Virilio) from 
Communist to Nationalist held positions.   
 A final point to consider with respect to the scene of the conflict is that although 
Chinese war films might be classed as action movies, the genre is not “action-packed” 
in terms of movement of Japanese forces. This is because a high proportion of films 
are geo-referenced on a very specific location, such as a particular village or mountain 
redoubt. For example in Fate of the Southern Island (Naodao fengyun, 1955), the 
Communist guerrillas never leave their Hainan jungle hideout until they are relieved 
by their own side at the close of the film. Similarly, films such as Inextinguishable 
Flame (Pu bumie huoyan, 1956) and Rabe’s Diary (Labei riji, 2009) are set 
exclusively in one place, in this case a rural village and Nanjing respectively. This 
contrasts with many Hollywood motion pictures about World War Two, where allied 
forces frequently cover huge distances during the course of the film. For instance, in 
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Pearl Harbour (2001) American forces actively seek out the Japanese by taking the 
battle from Hawaii to Tokyo, and in Patton (1970) allied troops cover thousands of 
miles in pursuit of the German enemy.   
 In this respect while the plots of Chinese films about the war move inexorably 
forward, the location does not, with the implication that the Japanese are bogged 
down or stuck. In many ways this reflects the actual fate of the majority of Japanese 
forces in China during the war, where they are seemingly trapped in the very land that 
they have invaded.
32
 Conversely, the Chinese revel in their intricate knowledge of 
what is, after all, their home turf. The Communist guerrillas do not seek to transit their 
own territory, they merely aim to expel the Japanese and claim China for communism.    
 
Clothing 
 
Clothing, the second of Richard Dyer’s categories for analysing film, is one of the 
most obvious means of differentiating Japanese and Chinese military forces. Whilst 
clothing can be defined as “anything applied to or put upon any portion of the body 
for any purpose,” many scholars writing about apparel see it as having a 
communicative function as well.
33
 They argue that like speech, clothing not only 
satisfies the practical needs and personal tastes of the wearer, but it also indicates the 
environment and satisfies the norms of that environment.
34
  
In early PRC war films, Japanese soldiers wear shoddy ill-fitting clothes and they 
frequently walk around half-dressed. To illustrate, the lone Japanese officer in Three 
Trips to a Mountain Town (Sanjin shancheng, 1965) wears scruffy unbuttoned clothes, 
he is pervaded by an aura of filth and dirtiness, and he even shoves his hands down 
his trousers when talking!  
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 Another layer of meaning can be uncovered by using the Soviet ethnographer 
Petr Bogatyrev’s clear (if slightly odd) analogy of comparing clothing to stones. He 
posits that if a rock is painted with lime and then placed mid-way between two farms 
to form a boundary, it takes on a certain meaning, in that it is not just a stone, rather 
“it will refer to something that is beyond itself. It will become a signal, a sign of 
definite and constant meaning, i.e. of the boundary between two portions of land.”35 
This deeper layer of meaning, beyond that implied by dishevelled clothing anywhere 
(signifying poverty or an inability to look after oneself), is that Japan is both an 
unworthy opponent and also a lesser foe which deserves to be beaten. In short, the 
way in which Japanese soldiers are clad seeks to naturalise them as a poorly led, badly 
disciplined, ineffectual fighting force. This subliminal message is one that ties in with 
the portrayal of Japan as an enemy, a running dog, or an American lackey in both 
textbooks and the media (as discussed in chaps. 3 and 5).  
 It is also worth considering for a moment the CCP dress code, for what it tells us 
about how film directors wished to compare the two sides. Communist forces dressed 
in a way that showed society had changed from the bottom-up and not the top-down. 
The peasant and the artisan were now putatively the most important actors in society 
and therefore everyone had to dress like them. This “sexless regimentation of style 
and shapelessness symbolised the liberation of a new national spirit.”36 In other 
words, Chinese guerrillas on celluloid were dressed in utilitarian, sexless battle 
fatigues, in order to demonstrate their commitment to communism.  
Unfortunately, this explanation is rather too tidy as a means of differentiating 
Chinese and Japanese troops, in that it neglects films where mainland peasants are 
dressed in rags, such as the villagers in Zhao Yiman (Zhao yiman, 1950). There are 
three possible explanations for this type-casting. Firstly, the propaganda aim of war 
films was to site them in a socially specific setting, namely that of the proletariat or 
rural peasant, in order to achieve maximum political impact.
37
 To achieve this, the 
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films constituted their images and narratives from the perspective of villagers and 
workers, so that film audiences (from the same social background) might better 
empathise with the cast and the messages they were trying to convey about Japan. A 
second possibility is that film directors wanted to emphasise the poverty of pre- 
liberation China. However, this explanation is unlikely, since there is considerable 
variation between films in how ordinary people are dressed. This leaves a third 
possibility, that farmers are depicted as being poorly dressed during the war because 
for the most part they were.  
 Most sociologists who theorise clothing pay scant attention to the performative 
function of military uniform, preferring instead to think of vestments in terms of 
either fashion, or the integral (postmodern) relationship with the bodies they clothe.
38
 
An alternative way of thinking about uniform is to argue that it embodies power (e.g. 
of the state), it establishes an esprit de corps amongst wearers of uniform, and it 
distinguishes friend from foe. From this perspective uniform in films such as Mine 
Warfare (Dilei zhan, 1962) is used to signify a disorganised opponent, by virtue of the 
fact that each and every Japanese soldier (and officer) is dressed differently. 
 As late as 1978, in films such as Story of the Sword (Dadao ji, 1978) Japanese 
battalions and their commanders were portrayed as shoddily dressed, with 
implications for their fighting prowess as described above. However, films released 
after 1985 seem to show a transformation in the way Japanese armies are clothed, in 
that they are seen to be wearing clean, well-fitting uniforms. In the movie Escape 
from Death Camp (Chongchu siwang ying, 1993) for example, Chinese prisoners are 
dressed in rags, whereas their Japanese guards are clad in smart, spotless, identical 
uniforms. In this film the jailors eat off starched white tablecloths, further 
emphasising the contrast between them and their Chinese captives.  
A confluence of several factors explains this change in Japanese apparel. The 
poor reception to films such as The Great River Flows On discussed earlier implies 
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that film-making was stuck in a time warp, and that highly-caricatured stereotypes of 
Japan needed to become more realistic and less stylised. This change occurred sooner 
than anyone expected, since in 1978 the Beijing Film Academy reopened, admitting a 
new class of cinematographers who came to be known as the fifth generation 
filmmakers.
39
  
Film directors Zhang Yimou, Chen Kaige and other members of this class helped 
to mould the reform era Chinese film industry, essentially by divorcing their films 
from previous political codes, such that “everything is political and nothing is 
political at one and the same time.”40  It is therefore no coincidence that fifth 
generation films such as The One and the Eight, showed Japanese soldiers dressed in 
a way that conformed much more to historians’ perceptions of how the invading 
armies might have looked during the 1930s.  
Another factor to consider is that during the early to mid-1980s relations with 
Japan (notwithstanding the first textbook crisis in 1982) were improving, as evinced 
by Hu Yaobang extending an invitation to Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone 
Yasuhiro in 1984.
41
 Improved bilateral relations cannot have been the sole driver of 
changing perceptions of Japan on celluloid, however, because even though the two 
sides normalised relations in 1972 and signed a Peace Treaty six years later, war films 
made during the 1970s continued to caricature the enemy by clothing him (it is always 
a “him”) in ill-fitting, dirty clothes. It is therefore necessary to consider alternative 
possibilities for these shifting views, such as racism, the third of our five categories 
for analysing Japan on film. 
 
Racism 
 
 Racism is “a way of thinking that considers a group’s unchangeable physical 
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characteristics to be linked in a direct causal way to psychological or intellectual 
characteristics, and which on this basis distinguishes between ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ 
racial groups.”42 An alternative but related definition posits that race, and therefore 
racism, can be thought of as a “cultural construct with no relation to objective 
reality…[such that] races do not exist, they are imagined.”43 Whichever definition is 
used, skin colour is a primary means of defining race, in a way which permits ready 
distinction between groups. The Chinese have long recognised distinctions between 
skin colour, for example in ancient times they often referred to themselves as having 
white skin.
44
 However, as the Japanese have virtually identical skin colour to the 
Chinese, it is impractical for PRC film producers to “imagine” Japanese invaders as 
being different on this basis alone.  
 During the Mao era clothing (see above) and stereotypes (see below) were 
frequently used to exclude the Japanese in war films. Doctoring speech, by using 
Chinese actors who spoke Mandarin with a strong Japanese accent, was often used to 
belittle the invader as well. Denigrating the occupiers was only permeable in one 
direction though, in that whilst Chinese actors mimicked Japanese soldiers on 
celluloid, the reverse was never permitted. In this way CCP forces and the masses 
systematically privileged themselves over the Japanese enemy, by defining normality 
on Chinese terms. Had mainland film studios wanted to, they could have hired 
Japanese who stayed on in China after 1949 to play these roles.
45
 However, they 
declined to do so, because using Chinese actors to mock the Japanese helped to 
establish rigid boundaries between defender and invader.  
 During the reform era the Japanese continue to be portrayed in racist derogatory 
terms, including: devils (guizi), little Japanese (xiao riben) and Japanese devils (riben 
guizi), even in recent movies such as Flowers of War (Jinling shisan chai, 2011) about 
the siege of Nanjing. The reform era trope of the Japanese soldier in mainland 
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Chinese cinema has never been totally fixed, however. On the contrary, since the early 
1980s it has been gradually reworked so as to elide the most overtly racist 
stereotyping. For example, as already noted scruffily dressed Japanese soldiers make 
an abrupt exit from films made after 1985.  
War movies released during the reform era increasingly show Japanese invaders 
as speaking outstanding Mandarin when negotiating with the Chinese, and conversing 
in flawless Japanese with their own troops. In Black Skin, White Masks, Frantz Fanon 
brilliantly unpacks racist sentiment in terms of the languages spoken by both 
colonised and coloniser, and his thinking can be used to understand why, after the 
1980s, Japanese invaders trying to conquer China suddenly start speaking in their own 
language.    
Fanon argues that “[T]he Negro of the Antilles will be proportionately 
whiter—that is, he will come closer to being a real human being—in direct ratio to his 
mastery of the French language…Mastery of the [coloniser’s] language affords 
remarkable power.”46 In other words, by aping the French the Antilles’ Negro 
becomes more human and more European at the same time. However, in the case of 
Chinese war films, the analogy is not quite the exact reverse. This is because whilst 
the Japanese coloniser is becoming more human, as it were, by speaking better 
Mandarin, after the 1980s his persona is normalised by permitting him to converse in 
his native language as well.  
Another way of looking at this problem is to consider racism in terms of the way 
it relates to the Hegelian dialectic, which posits that “self-consciousness exists in 
itself and for itself, in that by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that 
is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or recognised.”47 Fanon’s emphasising of 
Hegel in Black Skin, White Masks is to make the point that there is an absolute 
reciprocity in being, by apprehending the existence of the Other.  
Some scholars see the reciprocity between the two sides (in our case the Chinese 
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defenders and the Japanese occupiers) as a “game,” namely the universal fraternity of 
men.
48
 On this reading of Fanon’s conceptualisation of racism, the Chinese film 
bureaucracy is playing the “game” as its sees fit, filtering war movies through the 
censorship and distribution apparatus. It is still not clear, however, that the war film 
genre is racist in itself. This is because, especially since 1980, motion pictures have 
gradually presented a less pejorative image of the Japanese imperial soldier, who can 
freely converse in both Chinese and Japanese. As racism does not allow us to build up 
a complete picture of how Japanese tropes are represented in PRC film, it is necessary 
to turn to the fourth of our five categories for examining Japan on film, character.  
 
Character 
 
 All actors in motion pictures are produced images, by virtue of the fact that they 
are constructed personalities in the form of characters. This construction is necessary 
because films are not reality itself, but a representation of it.
49
 Obviously an audience 
watching a film about the Anti-Japanese War is not transported back in time to the 
1930s or 40s. On the contrary, they are viewing a filtered, manufactured interpretation 
of that conflict. Another reason why characters are “man-made” as opposed to 
naturally formed, is that a great deal of information has to be compressed into several 
hours, which almost forces film directors to present characters in a stylised manner. In 
real life, as opposed to life on film, it is hardly possible to get to know someone in 
several hours (the maximum normal length of a motion picture), with the result that 
directors need to restrict and shape the reality of characters.
50
  
 With respect to how people are presented as images in motion pictures, the film 
theorist Richard Dyer has frequently set the tenor of the debate, and he powerfully 
argues that “there is no such thing as unmediated access to reality, instead there are 
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only representations of reality through text, images [etc.].”51 Dyer goes on to state 
that this does not mean one never sees reality at all, even if it is partial, selective or 
incomplete. From this follows three consequences for representations. First, reality 
sets limits to what humans can make it mean (i.e. to mistake a cow for a hat is not just 
an error in logic). Secondly, representations do not equal reality, which is why we try 
so hard to get authenticity. Thirdly, “representations…have real consequences for real 
people…in terms of the way [they] delimit and enable what people can be in any 
given society.”52  
 
Table 8. Character types in post-1949 Anti-Japanese War films 
Role Frequently characterised as: 
Japanese officer The enemy, isolated, inept, bumbling 
Japanese soldier Aggressive, inhumane 
Nationalist leaders, officers and men The enemy, spineless, unable to fight the Japanese 
Spies The GMD, fawning and toadying to the Japanese 
Traitors Cowardly, selfish, not “real” Chinese people 
CCP cadres Heroes, courageous, overcoming difficulties against all odds 
CCP guerrillas Indefatigable, trustworthy, implacable opponents of the 
Japanese and the GMD 
Villagers Loyal to the CCP, protecting Communist forces 
 
 Mainland films about the War of Resistance against Japan purposefully present a 
relatively small number of recurring character types, shown in table eight. In this 
section, analysis of the three consequences posited above concentrates on the first two 
tropes listed in the table (Japanese army officers and soldiers), because to deconstruct 
the implied meanings of all the main character types would require a much more 
extensive study.     
The first thing to notice about these two tropes is that they are rarely rounded 
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characters. Neither Japanese officers nor soldiers are given personalities of their own, 
in that their individual personas do not develop in any specific way (for example 
chronologically) throughout the course of the film. This is because rather than being 
rounded characters, they are “flat,” which means that they are constructed round a 
single idea or quality.
53
 The novelist E.M. Forster explains:  
 
One of the greatest advantages of flat characters is that they are easily recognised whenever they 
come in…It is a convenience for an author when he can strike with his full force at once, and flat 
characters are very useful…since they never need reintroducing, never run away, have not to be 
watched for development, and provide their own atmosphere—little luminous disks of a 
pre-arranged size, pushed hither and thither like counters across the void or between stars; most 
satisfactory.
54
  
 
For fully half a century, from 1949 through to the year 2000, almost all Japanese 
presented in war films fell into this “flat” category. For example, in Depot No. 51 
(Wushiyi hao bingzhan, 1962), about how to transport military supplies through 
enemy territory, the Japanese commander is never shown in the barracks with his men 
or out on the street in Shanghai. Instead, he appears trapped in a closely guarded 
headquarters, surrounded by toadying Shanghainese businessmen (who are denounced 
as capitalists for not resisting the enemy). Later in the film, when the same officer 
goes to the port to intercept weapons disguised as machine tools, he is reduced to 
watching the searching of vessels barricaded in a watch tower, instead of proceeding 
to the jetty himself, further emphasising his isolation from real life.  
 Japanese fighting men rarely have an independent existence outside Chinese war 
films, in that the audience is intentionally not privileged to their thoughts, ideas or 
strategy. Chinese movie goers are never privy to any stream of consciousness or inner 
thoughts of Japanese commanders or infantrymen.
55
 The audience rarely hear 
anything of the enemy’s wives, sweethearts, families or children either, let alone 
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where they came from in Japan, how rich (or poor) they were, and so on. They simply 
exist to perform the role of a stereotype.    
 
Stereotypes 
 
 The American intellectual and public commentator Walter Lippmann once 
famously wrote that stereotypes are, “The projection upon the world of our own sense 
of our own value, our own position and our own rights…Stereotypes are therefore 
highly charged with…feeling[s]…attached to them. 56  Highly charged these 
stereotypes certainly are, since they try to reduce character to a value laden norm, 
such as “dumb blonde,” “queer,” or in the case of Japanese in mainland war films 
“devils.” The culture theorist T. E. Perkins lists six assumptions relating to how 
stereotypes are ideologically constructed, namely that they are: 1) always erroneous, 2) 
pejorative concepts, 3) about groups with whom we have little or no social contact, 4) 
minority groups, 5) simple and 6) do not change.
57
 Drilling down into each of these 
assumptions sheds light on the extent to which Chinese film directors have sought to 
stereotype the Japanese enemy.  
Firstly, as shown above members of the Japanese armed forces are frequently 
erroneously shown on film as being shoddily turned out, so as to represent the very 
epitome of an undisciplined army destined to lose the war. In reality, first-hand 
accounts of the fighting described the invading imperial Japanese armies as 
exceptionally well-ordered and a highly-disciplined fighting force.
58
 However, even 
in the 1950s, 60s and 70s, some films depicted Japanese soldiers in a manner which 
matched these eyewitness accounts of the war much more closely. To illustrate, in 
Fate of a Southern Island the Japanese soldiers patrolling the jungle are smartly 
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dressed in tropical fatigues, they are well-drilled and they do not flee or dive for cover 
at the sound of gunfire. Whilst the Japanese still ultimately lose, in that their 
installations on Hainan Island are destroyed by CCP forces at the end of the film, it 
would be difficult to argue that they are depicted erroneously. Similarly, in both 
Winter Korea Flower (Bingxue jindacai, 1963) and White Mountain Black Water, 
movies about resisting Japan in Korea and north-east China respectively, imperial 
troops are presented as highly-effective combatants. 
 The second classic feature of a stereotype is that it is pejorative. Richard Dyer 
suggests that this trait is necessary, because “the role of stereotypes is to make the 
invisible the visible, so that there is no danger of it creeping up on us unawares; and to 
make fast, firm and separate what is in reality fluid and much closer to the norm than 
the dominant value system cares to admit.”59  
 One of the quickest and most effective means of achieving this is to use insulting 
epithets when referring to the enemy, such as “Japanese bastards” (riben wangbadan). 
These terms are in fact extra textual signs, or direct authorial assertions “logically 
prior to anything the characters themselves say or do…[which form a] shorthand 
method of epitomising the character’s nature, function, or both.”60 Even in war films 
which hardly feature shots of the enemy, such as Battle for Leopard Bend (Baozi wan 
zhanzheng, 1978), a rather dull motion picture about Communist agrarian policies, the 
Japanese are constantly recalled to mind through the use of pejorative terms. In this 
particular movie, whilst Japanese soldiers appear only once in a three second 
flashback (burying a Chinese family alive), the audience is constantly reminded of the 
enemy by the insistent repetition of oaths sworn against the invaders.       
Another pejorative means of stereotyping the Japanese is to cast them as 
incorrigible villains. In Battle for Poxi (Poxi zhan, 1986), for instance, the audience 
recognises Japan as an enemy not just because of its military occupation of Chinese 
territory, but also because of the gratuitous violence its warriors inflict on defenceless 
Chinese people. The implicit message in this film is that the demonical nature of the 
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enemy is defined by its outrageous, indefensible conduct. A simple but rigid 
conceptual system is therefore produced through unconscionable Japanese actions 
such as soldiers seizing a teenage Chinese girl and throwing her screaming into a 
burning inferno (her own home which has just been torched by Kwantung Army 
troops), so that her house also becomes her tomb. In the same film Japanese troops 
rape attractive Chinese women in shops for something to do, and zero fighters even 
strafe unarmed peasants fleeing from their villages. Japanese aggression is structured 
in this way, with the aim that cinema-goers are left in no doubt as to the barbarity of 
the Japanese.  
Of course, it is hardly unusual for wartime adversaries to be depicted as demons 
in film. During World War One Sir Norman Angell noted that British people 
seemingly went mad, suddenly depicting Germans in the media and on film as 
obscene animals who were not human beings at all.
61
 Also, for decades after the 
Korean War armistice the enemy, in films made on both sides of the thirty-eighth 
parallel, was depicted as a sub-human monster.
62
 
Thirdly, it would be reasonable to say that before reform and opening up 
commenced in 1978, there was little social contact between Chinese and Japanese 
citizens. Exact figures for the number of Japanese nationals remaining on Chinese 
territory after 1949 are difficult to come by, although it is known that there were at 
least 29,000 POWs and a further 1,000 war criminals, because this number were 
repatriated in stages during the 1950s.
63
 Provincial archival records also attest that a 
number of Japanese technicians, engineers and former settlers remained in China after 
this period.
64
 However, in a country whose population swelled from 540 million to 
930 million between 1949 and Mao’s death in 1976, most ordinary Chinese people 
never set eyes on a real Japanese person.
65
 During the reform era, the numbers of 
Chinese visiting, working or studying abroad has risen sharply, from 1,600 students in 
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49 countries in 1976 to 39,000 students in 2000.
66
 The above data suggests that a 
stereotype based on lack of bilateral social contact would be much harder to maintain 
after 1978, due to rapidly increasing Sino-Japanese interaction, which as we will see 
is broadly what happened.  
Fourthly, it would be hard to classify the Japanese as an oppressed minority, since 
Anti-Japanese War movies are set during a period when Japanese forces occupied 
large tracts of Chinese territory. To be sure, when the films were made (i.e. post-1949) 
the Japanese remaining in China were, as just noted, few in number, but for the most 
part surviving records suggest that they were treated rather well.
67
   
 The fifth and sixth features of the Perkin’s stereotype are that they are simple and 
rigid. Here we are on much firmer ground, since numerous PRC film directors 
caricature the Japanese military in such a way that the audience “find[s] [them] 
wanting, hence inadequate, inferior, sick or grotesque and hence reinforcing the 
dominant group’s own sense of the legitimacy of their domination. 68  This is 
operationalised by painting the Japanese as monsters or villains, as well as by 
mocking their accents, actions, appearance, mannerisms and clothing.  
Taking appearance and mannerisms as examples, figure 10 shows a still from the 
film Guerrilla War on the Plains, showing an unnamed Japanese commander. He is 
perhaps 70 years old, hardly an ideal fighting age. He is shorter than almost everyone 
he talks to, he sports a slight stoop, and he speaks Chinese so poorly that he needs an 
interpreter. He is unshaven, contrary to regulations in most regular land armies which 
prohibit beards, so as to prevent hair follicles infecting combat face wounds.
69
 
Moreover, his unshaven appearance makes him look as if he has just woken up, a 
feature emphasised by his dishevelled clothing. Finally, his poor military bearing is 
emphasised by his tendency to panic whenever he receives news of a Communist 
assault or ambush, for example by accidentally knocking over plant pots or 
gratuitously smashing up tables.  
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Figure 10. The Japanese commander in Guerrilla War on the Plains (Pingyuan youji dui, 1955).  
 
 
Figure 11. The Japanese officer (left) and the Chinese Communist leader (right) in the movie Letter 
with Feathers (Ji maoxin, 1953). 
 
Many films of this genre cast Japanese officers as “flat” characters (to use E.M. 
Forster’s term) with demeaning traits, such that they are portrayed in a simple but 
rigid way. The Japanese commander in Letter with Feathers shown in figure 11 (left 
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hand still) is typical of this kind of film, in that he invariably glowers at the camera, 
he has false buck teeth and an over-exuberant moustache. The comparison is perhaps 
more obvious when compared to a CCP guerrilla leader (fig. 11 right hand still), who 
by comparison appears upright, alert and exudes confidence.   
 Like their superiors, in the majority of films released before the year 2000 
Japanese soldiers are also “flat.” They hardly speak, except to either acknowledge 
orders from their superiors, or to harass the Chinese citizenry. The audience is never 
told of their specialisation (gunnery, engineering, logistics and so on), for the simple 
reason that Japanese soldiers hardly make a sound, except for the occasional grunt as 
they are shot dead, strafed or blown to smithereens by CCP militias. One of the first 
films to depict Japanese soldiers as human beings with their own thoughts was Devils 
on the Doorstep (Guizi laile, 2000), which was banned for doing so. 
Up to this point the overall picture we have is a rather complex one. In some 
films the tropes of Japanese officers and soldiers are racist, yet in others it would be 
hard to argue this. Similarly, using Perkin’s six features of a classic stereotype, many 
early films caricature the enemy, but during the reform era this is not always the case. 
As the case for stereotyping Japan is not clear-cut, we now examine the fifth of 
Dyer’s categories for discussing film, ideology.  
  
Ideology in film 
 
 Despite assertions to the contrary by Andre Bazin, Dziga Vertov and other early 
titans of the movie industry,
70
 films rarely reflect real life.
71
 Motion pictures about 
war are even less accurate representations of reality, in that they are highly coded, and 
unpacking their meaning can tell us a great deal about the thinking of the directors, 
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producers, studios and censors behind a film. In this section, analysis of how PRC 
films about the war inflect Chinese elite thinking, follows from Marx’s famous dictum 
that “for any society, the ideas of the ruling class are the ruling ideas.”72 Coding of 
these “ruling ideas” (i.e. ideology) in Chinese war films is a vast topic, so treatment 
here is limited mainly to tackling three problems: who are the real enemies in 
Anti-Japanese War films, what is omitted from these movies, and what implied 
messages are embedded within them?     
 
Who are the real enemies?  
 
 In mainland Chinese films about the war there is not one enemy but five: the 
Japanese, the Nationalists under Jiang Jieshi, religion, traitors and landlords. Starting 
with the first enemy on the list (the Japanese), the cultural logic of almost all films 
made about the war is that they are wrong to invade China and therefore must be 
defeated. This is not to say that the Japanese lose every battle though. In Daughters of 
China (Zhonghua nü’er, 1949) for example, Japanese forces gradually close in on a 
platoon of female Chinese guerrillas in the wilds of north-eastern China. When faced 
with defeat, rather than surrendering to the enemy, the girls jointly march into a 
nearby lake instead, thereby sacrificing themselves for the party and the motherland. 
Here, of course, the propaganda aim of the film is not to dwell on Japanese victory, 
but rather to show that women were equal to men in defending “new” China. Sixty 
years later in Death and Glory in Changde (Diexie gucheng, 2010), Japanese success 
in crushing Chinese resistance is similarly not designed to highlight the enemy’s 
prowess. On the contrary, the film’s code is that the Nationalist garrison defending 
Changde is determined to fight to the very last man.  
 In most war films, however, the Japanese lose all military engagements with 
Chinese forces, even if in reality it was frequently the other way round. The idea here 
is to show that the Japanese fail in China and that they deserve to lose. Plots vary 
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considerably, but generally unfold in three stages. The movie opens with the Japanese 
military committing some heinous atrocity, and almost no crime is too repulsive to 
show on celluloid (stage one).
73
 For example in Winter Korea Flower, the heroine’s 
elderly mother is punched in the stomach by Japanese soldiers when she tries to 
intervene in their abduction of her daughter. The heavily pregnant daughter suffers an 
even worse fate, in that she miscarries her child following torture in prison at the 
hands of enemy.
 
  
In stage two peasants then coalesce around a party cadre, who exhorts them to 
join the CCP in fighting the enemy. This course of action is never easy, since there are 
invariably setbacks to contend with, such as betrayal by Nationalist spies. As an 
illustration of this second stage, in The Flying Tigers (Feihu dui, 1995) about the 
Japanese operated Tianjin to Shanghai railway, the CCP mount a series of increasingly 
daring attacks on a small unnamed railway station. In this movie the screen is 
gradually cleansed of Japanese troops and submerged with Chinese guerrillas under 
the wartime leadership of the party. Unfortunately for the CCP guerrillas (called The 
Flying Tigers hence the film’s name), GMD turncoats spare no effort in attempting to 
infiltrate their number and betray them to the Japanese.  
  In stage three, the Communists ultimately prevail over the Japanese and drive 
them out. For instance in Breaking through the Darkness before Dawn (Chongpo 
liming qiande hei’an, 1956), the movie ends with Chinese peasants and soldiers 
charging towards Japanese blockhouses abandoned by an enemy retreating in disarray. 
In this motion picture, the closing shots show detonated blockhouses collapsing 
towards the camera in slow motion. Planted on top of these crumbling forts are 
battered Japanese flags riddled with bullet holes, signifying the ultimate failure of 
Japan’s plan to colonise China.   
Some films labelled as Anti-Japanese War movies, such as Battle for Yellow 
Bridge (Huangqiao juezhan, 1985) do not contain a single shot of the enemy. Instead, 
film directors rely on audience foreknowledge of the War of Resistance against Japan, 
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and the “expectations, values, beliefs, ideas, prejudices and emotions” which the 
genre generates (for example, by studying textbooks (see chap. 3) or by learning 
about the war through reading newspapers (see chap. 5)) in order to brand the 
Japanese as an enemy.
74
 In other words, even in films where Japanese armies are 
largely absent, the audience knows that they are the main enemy. This effect is 
enhanced by frequent use of short documentary clips at the start of many war movies. 
These excerpts, lasting several minutes, consist of wartime footage accompanied by a 
voiceover, which reminds the audience that the Japanese invaded China and inflicted 
untold atrocities on the Chinese people. 
 The second real enemy in Chinese war films is the Guomindang. Both in real life 
and on celluloid, the CCP (even today) aver that the GMD is not fit to rule, because it 
failed to resist the Japanese.
75
 As if to underscore this message, the documentary 
clips noted above hold Jiang Jieshi as personably culpable for the Japanese invasion, 
by not resisting it in the first place. For example, in Daughters of China, the narrator 
at the start of the film states that had Jiang properly resisted the Japanese, then 30 
million Chinese would not have been lost to the enemy (i.e. killed).  
 In many early PRC war films the Nationalist enemy is portrayed as synonymous 
with the Japanese one. For example, in Wild Spring Wind Sparks Battle for an Old 
City (Yehuo chunfeng dou gucheng, 1963) CCP spies infiltrate a town on the northern 
plains, in order to try and prevent the GMD from cooperating with the Japanese. 
Inside the town walls not only do GMD commanders dine with their Japanese 
counterparts, but they also torture Communist agents together. To highlight the 
closeness of the two enemies (the GMD and the Japanese) the town’s streets are filled 
with big character posters showing two hands shaking, draped in a Nationalist ensign 
and the Japanese flag respectively, with the words “peaceful coexistence” (gongrong 
gongcun) underneath.  
Another means of branding the GMD as an enemy is to portray them as being 
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physically indistinguishable from the Japanese. This is achieved either by cladding 
Nationalist officials in the same uniform as the Japanese, as in Eternal Wave, or by 
calling them “the enemy.” As an instance of the latter, in Railway Guerrillas (Tiedao 
youji dui, 1956) the word enemy is used interchangeably to describe the Nationalists 
and the Japanese, with the result that when Communist guerrillas warn that, “The 
enemy is coming!” the audience subconsciously conflates the two.        
 A third enemy is the traitor. Most PRC war movies, especially ones released 
before 1980, make little attempt to differentiate non-CCP forces (Nationalists, 
warlords, puppet forces, Japanese). Any Chinese person who does not wholeheartedly 
support the CCP is depicted as supporting the Japanese. In numerous films 
Communist cadres confront these so-called traitors with the comment, “How dare you 
call yourself Chinese!” Most repent, but the usual prescription for those who continue 
to support the Japanese after being warned is a bullet through the back of the head. 
This is code for the CCP giving non-Communists a single opportunity to “see the light” 
and convert to communism, or else suffer the consequences. To illustrate, in the film 
Inextinguishable Flame two Chinese brothers support different parties, in that one is a 
CCP cadre and the other is a GMD officer. The remaining family members 
predictably support the brother who is a Communist, to the extent that their mother 
calls her GMD officer son unfilial and spits in his face.         
 A fourth enemy in Chinese war movies is religion, with Buddhist temples and 
family shrines used as target practice by both sides. One film must be singled out for 
its virulently anti-religious sentiment, The Bell Rings from an Old Temple (Gucha 
zhongsheng, 1958). This motion picture was released during the midst of the 
anti-rightist campaign following the hundred flowers movement, and so it is perhaps 
not so surprising that religion was harshly criticised on screen at this time, as it was in 
real life.
76
 In The Bell Rings from an Old Temple the monastery abbot turns out to be 
a Japanese spy, who pours acid down the throat of one of his monks to stop him 
talking! At the end of the film the temple is revealed as a Japanese hideout and 
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liberated by CCP forces. Here the aim is to portray religious institutions as opponents 
which need to be defeated and rooted out. 
 The fifth and final enemy is the landlord class, which represents old feudal China. 
The landed gentry are always shown as bowing and scraping to the Japanese, and 
giving them presents too. Worse, while villagers frequently worry about having 
enough food to eat, landlords either gloat over hoarded grain or donate it to Japanese 
commanders. In Story of the Sword, landowners burn alive villagers who refuse to 
hand over grain to the Japanese. In this film peasants extract revenge on one landlord 
by killing him with a sword forged during the Taiping Rebellion, whose use is highly 
symbolic in that Chairman Mao saw this nineteenth-century uprising as a precursor to 
the Communists rise to power.
77
  
These five “celluloid enemies” tell us much about how the Communist Party sees 
its role in the war. Three main points emerge. First and most obviously, the CCP won 
the fight against the Japanese and therefore has the right to rule the PRC. With 
obsessive regularity films depict the party as China’s sole saviour, and guerrilla 
leaders keep reminding audiences that they are the only military force that 
consistently resists the Japanese invasion. Furthermore, as many war films 
intentionally fail to distinguish between the Anti-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil 
War which immediately followed it, for example Railway Guerrillas, victory by the 
CCP in either is equated to victory in both.  
 The second point is that the party’s main base of power is the countryside, and 
peasants are shown on film as being at one with the thinking of the party. Communist 
guerrillas invariably hail from rural areas, rather than the more politically suspect 
towns and cities. When cadres return to the countryside they frequently help villagers 
to sow or harvest crops, mend clothes or repair buildings damaged by the Japanese, as 
in The Battle for Leopard Bend. The logic carried to the end of many war films is that 
the countryside is mother China, which is where CCP forces are logically based. As a 
result the overwhelming majority of war films are set in rural areas (see location 
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above).
78
  
The final point is that the GMD and its leadership are traitors to China, in that 
they fail to correctly resist the Japanese. By extension, anyone who cooperated with 
the Japanese in any way, such as puppet troops under the command of Wang Jingwei’s 
government, are not real Chinese because they betrayed China and therefore deserve 
to be shot.
79
 The logical corollary of this last point is that if instant death is the price 
to be paid for not joining the ranks of the Communist Party, then the party’s way is the 
only true way. Therefore evicting foreign enemies from China is a duty which should 
be carried out at any price, even sacrificing one’s own life. In films such as Depot No. 
51 and The Last Eight (Zuihou bage, 1980), this link is made explicit by CCP fighters 
vowing to fight to the death in order to beat the Japanese. 
  
Omissions 
 
 In attempting to construct a typology of mainland Chinese war films, omissions 
are important for what they can tell us about party ideology. The political scientist 
William Gamson argues that “frames which are present in social movement discourse 
but are invisible in mass media commentary rarely find their way into conversations. 
Systematic omissions make certain ways of framing issues extremely unlikely.”80 
Gamson’s point, which is just as applicable to motion pictures as it is to mass media, 
is that omitting certain sensitive topics from war films enables the CCP to stifle 
debate on them. These topics are listed below.  
  Firstly, as noted by John Weakland, no mention is ever made of the Japanese 
invasion, in all films enemy forces are depicted as already well ensconced in Chinese 
territory. As discussed above, this is possibly because the CCP did not wish to draw 
attention to its inability to hold or defend territory along the coastal littoral. A second 
glaring omission is that no comment is ever made as to why the war happened in the 
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first place? Was the war a battle of ideals, such as those espoused by General Araki (a 
Japanese minister for war during the 1930s), who claimed that “the true mission” of 
Japan is “to spread and glorify the imperial way to the end of the Four Seas?”81 Or 
was the war purely a clash over territory instead? In fact, it is not just on film that 
contemplation of the causes of the war is missing, even in academia it is only 
relatively recently that mainland scholars have been permitted to ruminate at length as 
to why Japan invaded China in the first place.
82
 
Secondly, no comment is ever made as to why Japan is militarily superior to 
Chinese armies, even as films frequently admit that this is so. For instance in The 
Battle for Leopard Bend Communist troops are forced to train with wooden weapons 
because they can’t procure real ones. In Don’t Cry, Nanking (Nanjing 1937, 1998), the 
Japanese use tanks and Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) to launch military 
assaults, yet the Chinese lack the military assets needed to repel such attacks. In this 
film, frequently the only way in which soldiers can halt the Japanese advance is to 
sacrifice themselves, commonly by strapping explosives to their bodies and then 
climbing onto a Japanese tank before pulling the detonation cord. In Taierzhuang 
entire battalions of Guomindang troops are sacrificed in this way, in order to repulse 
the Japanese enemy. Depicting such heroism on celluloid might make audiences feel 
proud of their countrymen’s valorous defence of the homeland, but it sidesteps the 
question of why the defending forces lacked guns, tanks and APCs in the first place.  
 Thirdly, unlike in neighbouring South Korea where movies such as Frontline 
(2010) increasingly emphasise the futility of civil war, Chinese motion pictures about 
the Anti-Japanese War are silent as to the morality of conflict. Of the most commonly 
watched 100 or so war films, only two ruminate on the rights and wrongs of battle. In 
The Flying Tigers during a rare unguarded moment, a Japanese officer tries to illicitly 
seduce a pregnant Chinese woman, by telling her that he personally dislikes war. 
However, before the conversation has an opportunity to develop further, the officer 
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makes an advance on her and receives a slap in the face as a riposte, as if to say “we 
[the Chinese] have to fight an enemy that behaves like this.” The other movie to make 
an overtly political statement on the morality of war is City of Life and Death (see 
next section), where the Japanese narrator commits suicide at the end of the film 
because he is overwhelmed with guilt at having killed civilians in Nanjing.  
 Additionally, no analysis is made of the Japanese war effort or the imperial 
fighting machine, an absence which is also noticeably absent from Chinese textbooks 
discussed in the last chapter. A plausible reason for this is that little effort is made to 
show Japanese soldiers as normal people like Us, they are simply “the enemy” who 
are to be beaten and evicted from Chinese soil at all costs.  
A fifth and final omission from PRC war films is the grief and mourning of those 
killed in combat. To be sure, many Chinese fighters are killed in the line of duty on 
film, nevertheless, the grief of their wives, sweethearts and parents is usually ignored 
or played down. In Wild Spring Wind Sparks Battle for an Old City two Communist 
agents, a mother and her dashing son, are apprehended by the GMD for questioning. 
In order to make the son confess, Nationalist soldiers threaten to torture the mother in 
his presence, but she outwits them by jumping out of a window (!) to her death. Yet 
her son hardly notices, which is especially surprising given the deep respect for 
parents in Chinese culture. Rather than grieving for his mother, instead the son adopts 
a “stiff upper lip” approach and carries on resisting the Japanese as if nothing had 
happened. 
In the book The Scars of War, Diana Lary posits that both the GMD and the CCP 
found it difficult to deal with the sheer scale of the war; preferring instead to blame 
each other, feudalism and fascism—whilst at the same time shunning detailed analysis 
of the conflict.
83
 This could explain why the whole subject of grief is glaringly absent 
from Chinese cinematic discourse. On this reading of World War Two, the actual grief 
felt by the Chinese populace was so intense and widespread, that movie directors 
either felt the need to, or were instructed to omit the subject from films.  
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Up to this point we have considered the ideological implications of five enemies 
and five omissions. However, in order to tease out other more finely graded 
ideological messages in film, it is useful to briefly identify the most important of them 
and what they signify.  
 
Implied messages in Chinese war films     
  
One of the most important messages transmitted in war films is that party orders 
must be obeyed at all times. The dual implication here is that obedience is required in 
order to win the war against Japan, and that disobeying orders results in failure. Two 
films illustrate this point. In Two Young Eighth Route Army Soldiers the young heroes 
are severely reprimanded for taking the initiative to destroy Japanese grain stocks, 
even though the grain was stolen from Chinese peasants. The duo are told that, like in 
any military, they must obey orders from above, for no other reason than “the party 
knows best.” In Railway Guerrillas, countermanding orders is not even permitted 
when it results in the deaths of more Japanese.
84
 Here a Communist militiaman is 
extremely reluctant to obey an order to retreat from the frontline during a Japanese 
assault, simply because he wants to kill as many enemy soldiers as possible. This 
delay results in a party political commissar (whose order to retreat he disobeyed) 
being hit by enemy snipers. The message for audiences here is that had the soldier 
followed orders to the letter, then the commissar would not have been injured in the 
first place.  
 A second implied message in war films is that all Chinese people, not just Han 
Chinese, resist the Japanese enemy. In numerous motion pictures, prominence is given 
to doughty minority fighters, from smiling, laughing, Korean nationality female 
guerrillas in Daughters of China, to plucky Miao soldiers in Death and Glory in 
Changde. Other movies such as Hui Minority Detachment (Huimin zhidui, 1959) are 
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set wholly in minority areas, in order to show that it is not just the Han majority that 
resisted the Japanese. This demonstration of all Chinese people vociferously resisting 
the enemy (regardless of their ethnicity), reinforces the myth that Chinese minorities 
are perfectly assimilated with the Han. It also allows the party to conveniently gloss 
over the fact that, during the war, large swathes of minority areas (such as Tibet) were 
nominally independent.  
A third subliminal message is that many films about the war are obsessed with 
food, which is hardly surprising since during the war feeding armies was a prime 
concern for commanders on both sides.
85
 In Letter with Feathers villagers outwit the 
Japanese by hiding their newly reaped grain in the mountains before it can be 
confiscated. In other movies though, such as Story of the Sword, it is landlords who 
are roundly criticised, because they force peasants to hand over grain to the Japanese.  
Interestingly, cooked food (as opposed to grain) features prominently in films 
made during or immediately after the man-made famine caused by Mao’s Great Leap 
Forward policies. This could even be perceived as an implicit rebuke by film directors 
to the party’s agricultural agenda. In Hui Minority Detachment the Japanese officer 
abducts the mother of the hero (Ma Benzhai), and tries to extract a confession by 
offering her a groaning table of food. As the camera pans lovingly across this 
enormous spread of dishes laid on by the Japanese, the Hui minority guerrillas 
fighting for the CCP meanwhile, have absolutely nothing to eat. Ma’s mother refuses 
to eat the epicurean delights offered by the enemy and instead starves to death in 
captivity.   
Chinese film, like art, has always been heavily laden with symbolism, and it is 
highly likely that audiences would have drawn the parallel between Mrs Ma starving 
for her country, and the millions of Chinese who were hungry as a result of party 
policies at the time the film was released. This idea is reinforced by the fact that when 
the official media reviewed the film, no mention whatsoever was made of the fact that 
most of the Hui minority guerrillas were without food during the course of the 
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movie.
86
  
A final message implicit in many war movies is that they could double as basic 
military training films. This training component was of prime concern during periods 
where the PRC leadership perceived China to be under threat of attack, such as during 
the Korean War (1950–53) and the Taiwan Straits Crises (1954–55, 1958). To 
illustrate, one of the most popular Anti-Japanese War movies, Underground War, 
appears more like a basic military training film than a movie about the Japanese in 
World War Two, because it was a PLA training film! As a result, all humour, jokes, 
romance and “flavouring” had to be removed from the film, because they “diluted its 
educational message.”87 In August 1964, the year before the film was released, the 
United States (with logistics support from Japan) launched aerial attacks on North 
Vietnam, right on China’s doorstep.88 These actions opened up the possibility of China 
being invaded by American forces. This was therefore an ideal time to release a training 
film, “How to defend your village against American or Japanese attack,” in the guise of 
a war film entitled Underground War. 
 
Reform era (1978-present) changes in film imagery of Japan   
 
 In the same way that Chinese society altered radically during the reform era, the 
film industry and its representations of Japan changed rapidly too.
89
 In considering 
the diachronic changes in reform era Chinese war film, possibly the biggest 
development has been a movement towards realism. As discussed in chapter two, 
Michael Kammen posits that during the 1980s and 90s there was a growing tendency 
for many countries to produce “authoritative” war films, which stimulated memory of 
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former conflict because they “[told] it like it really was.”90 As China was in a sense 
opening its doors to the world at this time, it is hardly surprising that global trends 
gradually drove Chinese film directors away from stilted acting and bland predictable 
plots, towards a more realistic portrayal of events during the Second World War. 
 Certainly, from the early 1980s onwards there was a major change in the way in 
which the body was portrayed. From the foundation of the PRC up until this time, 
death had been presented in a very formulaic fashion, in that Japanese soldiers were 
either mown down in swathes by heavy Communist fire, or shot dead instantly by 
guerrilla snipers. Japanese were rarely shown as wounded, suffering or grieving. 
Crudely put, Japanese imperial forces provided cannon fodder for Communist fighters 
to kill in as large numbers as possible, as quickly as possible. In many respects, this 
early approach reflected Mao Zedong’s thinking on war, which argued that the most 
effective way of wearing down the enemy was to keep killing Japanese soldiers.
91
 
One of the first movies to develop a new-style fascination for ripping apart the body 
was the 1984 film The One and the Eight, directed by the fifth generation film director 
Zhang Junzhao.
92
     
 This is not to say, however, that former stereotypes of Japan were instantly 
recalibrated according to this new “realist” paradigm. In some films, the stereotyped 
Japanese officer replete with short moustache, goofy teeth and poor command of 
Chinese remained (e.g. The Last Eight), whereas in other movies Japanese with funny 
accents and spectacles with lenses half-an-inch thick fought alongside tough, warlike 
imperial army officers (e.g. The Flying Tigers). On the one hand, this might indicate 
confusion by film directors as to how they ought to conceptualise Japanese military 
tropes on film. On the other hand, it might also show that film directors were now 
being given freer rein as to how to depict China’s former adversary. 
The second major change in reform era war films was that from the mid-1980s 
onwards, film directors frequently used subtler, more indirect means to criticise Japan. 
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This can be illustrated using four types of a posteriori evidence.  
One subtle means of criticising Japan has been the increasing use of big character 
posters to expose the “lie” of Japanese rule. At the start of Battle for Poxi for instance, 
the phrase “May Sino-Japanese relations be harmonious, good and successful” 
(rizhong jianshan) is painted calligraphy style on to a poster adorning the Japanese 
commandant’s wall. However, in this montage shot of the enemy leader, his head bobs 
up and down (we do not see his body), floating beneath this huge poster as he plots 
how to exterminate the Chinese Communists. So right at the start of the movie, the 
implication is that what the Japanese say and what they do are not one and the same. 
Put differently, the invaders cannot be trusted. This notion is given further credence in 
that whenever Japanese troops are stealing grain, burning and looting Chinese 
peasants’ homes, or chasing innocent Chinese girls in order to rape them, they always 
seem to charge past the same four characters painted on nearby walls rizhong 
jianshan. The message here is that bilateral relations cannot be harmonious if the 
Japanese commit such unconscionable crimes. Interestingly, this film was released 
just before the ousting of Hu Yaobang for being overly friendly with the Japanese, and 
the ubiquitous posters in the film might have been meant as a warning that China’s 
former enemy should not be trusted in the here and now.
93
  
Another means of criticising the Japanese in recent war films is by demonstrating 
that their actions are morally beyond the pale. Whilst Anti-Japanese War movies 
implicitly accept that fighting is a necessary form of political violence, they repudiate 
both the use of CBW and mass slaughter of civilians, which is amply demonstrated in 
a number of films.
94
 For example, in Death and Glory in Changde Japanese use of 
mustard gas results in burns so severe that any exposed skin of defending garrison 
soldiers simply dissolves away. Yet the GMD officers commanding the defence of 
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Changde make great play of the fact that the Chinese never use CBW themselves, for 
to do so would be barbaric.  
Thirdly, whilst crude stereotyping of Japanese roles is gradually phased out, small 
“put-downs” and barbs are threaded through the screenplay in reform era war films. In 
The Flying Tigers, the railway station manager (and Communist guerrilla) is 
introduced to a Japanese regimental commander whose predecessor was assassinated 
by the CCP. In Japanese culture, when people of different status are seated together, 
the one of higher rank (in this case the Japanese colonel) should be seated higher than 
the one of lower rank (the Chinese station manager).
95
 However, here the roles are 
reversed, with the station manager placed higher than his putative superior, an implied 
rebuke to the Japanese, by seemingly saying, “No matter what uniform you wear, no 
matter what your status in your own society, you will never out-rank me, because you 
are an invader.”  
A final example of subtle criticism of the Japanese comes from Taierzhuang, 
where the two sides fight for cultural supremacy as well as the obvious territorial gain. 
This is because by attacking Shandong Province in early 1938, the invading forces 
threaten the city of Qufu, the home town of Confucius, forcing an evacuation of the 
great sage’s descendants.96 In the opening scenes of the film the Nationalist general 
Li Zongren is shown arriving for a press conference where he meets a senior 
representative of the Confucius clan, promising to protect him from the Japanese.
97
 
This is important because both China and Japan claim to be heirs of Confucian culture. 
However, in this motion picture at the very start of the film, the enemy are vilified as 
“little” Japanese (i.e. morally small or inferior), because they are attacking both the 
birthplace and the descendants of the very culture which they say they represent.  
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Better relations, better films?  
 
 If the state of contemporary Sino-Japanese relations inflects the way in which 
wartime Japan is portrayed on film, then during periods of warm bilateral ties there 
ought to be either a toning down, or a complete cessation, of anti-Japanese rhetoric in 
PRC war films. However, as I hope the analysis above has shown, from 1949 right 
through to the present day Chinese audiences have been fed a continual diet of war 
movies which frequently portray Japan in a very harsh light. This unrelenting focus on 
the Japanese wartime invasion of China makes mainland Chinese cinema a social, 
political and historically specific project in the construction of Chinese national 
agency. The China film scholar Chris Berry argues that it is not so much China that 
makes movies but movies that help to make China.
98
 The point that Berry is making 
(albeit in a different context), is that the endless Communist Party obsession with 
criticising wartime Japan on celluloid has helped to shape Chinese identity.  
 There is a solitary war film however, which is uncritical of Japan’s conduct 
between the years 1931–45, Far East Espionage War (Yuandong jianjie zhan, 1992). 
This is the exception which proves the rule (of Chinese obsession with criticising 
wartime Japan on film) and it is therefore worth analysing in some detail. The movie 
is set in occupied Manchuria after the Soviet Union’s entry into World War Two, and 
revolves around a fictitious Soviet general who defects to Japan. He is captured by 
Kwantung Army forces in northern Manchuria and then interrogated by senior 
Japanese officers throughout the film. At the end of Far East Espionage War the 
general is parachuted back into Soviet territory with instructions to assassinate Stalin, 
but this never happens because he is double-crossed, apprehended and shot by 
unknown assailants. Throughout the course of the film Chinese forces hardly appear, 
except for the odd Communist spy in Harbin. In short, this is a motion picture about 
the war rather than Japan’s conduct in that conflict.  
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 The timing of the movie’s release in 1992 is also significant, coming as it did in 
the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen incident, which resulted in many nations ostracising 
China. Japan was one of the first countries to rescind sanctions against the PRC after 
1989, and this might account for the absence of anti-Japanese rhetoric in the film. 
Furthermore, the release of Far East Espionage War coincided with the first visit by a 
reigning Japanese emperor to the People’s Republic.99 It is therefore plausible that the 
release of the film was a form of what I term “cinema diplomacy,” which was 
designed to play down former Chinese demands for a war apology, and to play up the 
idea of Sino-Japanese friendship.
100
  
This possibility is lent support by the fact that few other war films were released 
between the Tiananmen incident and the subsequent sharp downturn in bilateral 
relations six years later in 1995. However, it would be wrong to apply this notion of 
cinema diplomacy to all Anti-Japanese War films, simply because Far Eastern 
Espionage War is unique in its casting of wartime Japan a non-judgemental light. For 
a theory of “cinema-as-foreign-policy-tool” to hold water, then the tide of 
anti-Japanese rhetoric in PRC film would rise and fall with the state of Sino-Japanese 
relations, which is not the case. What is proven though, is that as bilateral ties started 
to rapidly deteriorate three years later in 1995, a slew of new mainland movies 
lambasted Japan for provoking all-out war (e.g. The Lu Gou Qiao Incident, The 
Flying Tigers). In other words, it was back to business as usual.  
 A major theme of this study is the idea that since 1949, the Anti-Japanese War has 
been used as a vehicle for transmitting official views on domestic political issues 
through institutions such as film, the education system and the media. This chapter 
concludes then, by analysing three popular reform era war films for the coded 
messages they are sending not just on foreign policy issues (i.e. Japan), but domestic 
ones too. These three movies have been chosen because they provide tantalising 
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glimpses of the direction in which mainland cinema might develop in future.  
 
The Bloody Battle for Taierzhuang (1985) 
 
Taierzhuang is a film about the fierce clash between GMD and Japanese forces for 
control of Taierzhuang in early 1938.
101
 This movie is important for two related 
reasons; one, it was the first mainland production in nearly 40 years to focus on the 
Nationalists’ contribution in defeating the Japanese. Two, Taierzhuang depicted the 
first major defeat that Chinese forces inflicted on Japan during the War of Resistance. 
Indeed it was arguably the first time during the entire century of humiliation that the 
Chinese had decisively beaten a foreign invader.
102
 Unfortunately for the CCP, the 
battle had no involvement of Communist forces whatsoever, which was highly 
problematic for a party that had always prided itself on its right to rule by defeating the 
Japanese. 
 Yang Guangyuan—who directed the motion picture—had decades of experience 
making movies for the PLA, and he argued that “we should not be afraid of the 
formidable power of film” to challenge cinema goers; after all, this is the reform era 
and “we should give audiences a new experience of war…accompanied by a script with 
modernised speech.”103 He might have added that the censors did not exactly agree 
with him, since they revised the film script no less than 17 times!
104
 In marked contrast 
to Mao era war films, Taierzhuang was to be historically accurate.  
Despite this legitimisation of the Nationalist war effort—by filming it—the way 
in which the enemy was represented remained basically unaltered. In fact, Japanese 
forces hardly appear in the movie, except as the usual “enemy” or “devils” to be killed 
as quickly as possible. Taierzhuang was already highly controversial because of its 
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focus on the GMD, and it would have simply been too contentious to consider the 
engagement from the Japanese side at the same time. Ultimately, whilst Taierzhuang 
was approved for release by party censors, the idea that whole battles might have won 
without CCP involvement proved so sensitive, that not a single film eulogising the 
Nationalist war effort was approved until Death & Glory in Changde 23 years later.  
 News of the sensation caused by the release of Taierzhuang soon spread to Taiwan. 
Film scenes such as Jiang Jieshi bravely ignoring a Japanese air raid in order to lead the 
funeral of a general (who had been killed during the fighting at Taierzhuang) made such 
a deep impression on Jiang’s son, Jiang Jingguo, that the movie was made required 
viewing for the GMD leadership.
105
 Jiang the younger averred:  
 
From this film it can be seen that the mainland now admits that we resisted the Japanese [during the 
war]. This film does not blacken the name of my father. It appears that the mainland is adjusting its 
policy towards Taiwan. We ought to make some adjustments too.
106
  
 
The lesson we can draw from this is that although Taierzhuang sent powerful messages 
about rehabilitating the GMD, in 1985 there was seemingly still no place for a 
reassessment of the Japanese war effort. This reassessment did not come until Devils 
on the Doorstep, which was never authorised for release in Chinese cinemas. No 
formal explanation has ever been given as to why Devils was banned, likely reasons 
include the motion picture’s overly sympathetic depiction of Japanese soldiers and the 
lack of a prominent role for the Chinese Communists.
107
 Path-breaking in its 
thoughtful depiction of Kwantung Army conscripts the film might have been, but 
representative of a sea-change in official thinking on Japan it certainly was not, since 
Devils has never (legally) been shown in a Chinese movie theatre. Despite this 
brouhaha, mainland film directors are now, fully 60 years after the end of the war, 
gradually being allowed to experiment in how they represent Japan on film. The 
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Beijing film scholar Xu Hailong explains the rationale for this change:  
 
Firstly, during the reform era things have become much more open, so it is possible to say and do 
things that were not possible before. Secondly, it is not that film directors have all suddenly changed 
their attitudes towards Japan. They are a creative lot and they like to push the limits of what is 
permissible in order to give play to that creativity...So directors are thinking along the lines of 
“Japanese soldiers gain no benefit from the war, except pay and being shot at, all the benefits of 
fighting accrue to the government or the generals back home in Japan. So what is their psychology, 
what is driving them on? What are they thinking, why are they fighting us? Is it the Samurai, with 
its concept of no surrender?”108    
 
The war from a Japanese viewpoint: City of Life and Death (2009) 
  
The film City of Life and Death has certainly sought to push the limits 
(adumbrated by Xu Hailong above) in its depiction of the Nanjing massacre, which 
took place in late 1937 and early 1938, after Jiang Jieshi abandoned the capital to 
advancing Japanese troops.
109
 City of Life and Death views the Japanese occupation of 
the city and the subsequent massacre through the eyes of the Japanese soldier 
Kadokawa Masao. Kadokawa might have been the narrator, but he was not the star of 
the film in the conventional sense of the word. This is because there were no starring 
roles as such, the lead actor was history itself.
110
 Even survivors of the massacre 
thought that film’s portrayal of history was extremely realistic, because the director, Lu 
Chuan, paid meticulous attention to detail during filming. For example, Japanese troops 
were shown shooting people dead on the street “for fun,” as they are alleged to have 
done during the real massacre. Lu even visited a firing range before he started filming, 
in order to better gauge the sound that 1930s Japanese rifles would have made.
111
 
The most debated aspect of the film was the decision to narrate the massacre 
through the eyes of Kadokawa Masao. One critic praised this decision as creating an 
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“amazing artistic effect,” because firstly, Kadokawa was testimony to the violence in 
that he witnessed the massacre from a non-Chinese viewpoint. Secondly, he committed 
violence himself, by killing innocent prisoners of war; thirdly, he showed himself to be 
human, by releasing prisoners in the closing stages of the film and then committing 
suicide. This final act of “self-sacrifice,” with Kadokawa unable to bear the mental 
pressure of the pogrom, demonstrated that during the war Japanese soldiers were 
victims too. 
 
 
Figure 12. A scene from City of Life and Death (Nanjing! Nanjing!, 2009) where Nanjing residents are 
being buried alive by Japanese soldiers after the fall of the capital.  
 
 However, not everyone was convinced that City of Life and Death should be 
judged on its artistic merits alone, with some commentators so incensed by the film that 
they branded the director a “traitor to China” (hanjian) and his film as “traitorous.” One 
journal editor tried to make sense of this clash:  
 
The hubbub over the film has died down but the problem still cuts across intellectual 
circles…between making films either from a “viewpoint” or based on “facts”…City of Life and 
Death has hit a raw nerve for the Chinese people, by reopening a historical wound…The key 
problem is that the director, Professor Lu Chuan, said that Kadokawa Masao’s viewpoint is also his 
viewpoint. By facing nature’s relationship with war and battle, here Lu means Japan as well as the 
Chinese people…This film has exposed China’s embarrassment and suffering towards “history.”112 
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The prominent Japan history scholar Liu Jianping was probably the most extreme in his 
views, arguing that “this fabrication of ‘pretend facts’ was merely to bewitch people at 
the box office, to beautify the massacre, and to romanticise the rape of innocent 
women.”113 Liu continued that it was “not only the Japanese mainstream media that 
was now trying grasp the opportunity to use the film for political purposes,” but that in 
Japanese eyes the film would also “teach all those Chinese people who see the Japanese 
as ‘devils,’ [by] devaluing Chinese propaganda and wrapping up the war 
beautifully.”114 Another Japan scholar, Zhang Huiyu, agreed with Liu, averring that 
narrating the film from the Japanese military point of view played into the hands of 
Japanese right-wing extremists, by allowing them to “beautify Japan” and to “repudiate 
responsibility for the war.”115 
The fact that City of Life and Death was approved for release at all suggests that 
China might be gradually starting to come to terms with the war. Certainly, the film 
provoked a strong reaction in some quarters (such as from Liu Jianping), which was 
almost to be expected in a country that had spent much of the past 60 years making 
movies where Japan was simply “the enemy.” However, much of the comment on the 
motion picture was not critical at all, with many critics praising the film as we have 
seen. In this respect, perhaps the “hate”—a word that so frequently crops up when 
Chinese people of all ages discuss Japan—is starting to lessen, 65 years after the 
Japanese surrender in 1945. Yet many film critics interviewed for this research said that 
it will take 200 years for Chinese people to forget the war, not 65. When considered 
from this perspective, City of Life and Death appears less like the last word in the 
matter and more like a tentative first step towards reconciliation.  
 
Flowers of War (2011) 
 
                                                 
113
 Liu Jianping, “Nanjing! nanjing! yu zhanzheng jiyi chonggou—houzhimin wenhuade guoji 
chuanboxue fenxi,” Zhongguo tushu pingjia 11 (2009): 6. Liu has just completed an acclaimed study on 
Sino-Japanese relations prior to normalisation.  
114
 Ibid.  
115
 Zhang Huiyu, “Weihe xuanze jiaochuan shijiao?” Zhongguo tushu pingjia 11 (2009): 15. 
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 Flowers of War is a high budget, blockbuster movie made by the fifth generation 
filmmaker, Zhang Yimou. The motion picture cost 600 million RMB to produce and 
was the highest grossing film of 2011, even though it was only released a few weeks 
before the end of that year.
116
 The film is based on a book of the same name written 
by Yan Geling in 2007, and is set in a school chapel blockaded by the Japanese after 
the fall of Nanjing.
117
 The plot revolves around an alcoholic American posing as a 
priest, who protects a group of schoolgirls from the predations of the Japanese, by 
persuading Nanjing prostitutes (who have also taken refuge in the church) to take the 
schoolchildren’s place at a forthcoming concert for the Japanese.  
 The film was well received, not so much for its ultra-realistic portrayal of the 
Japanese assault on Nanjing, but for the prominence it gave to women. As a result, 
review after review highlighted the fact that the Chinese prostitutes in the movie gave 
their lives, so that innocent young girls could escape occupied Nanjing. In doing so 
the “whores” cleansed themselves of their former shame, whilst helping to defend 
their motherland at the same time.
118
 In contrast, film critics make almost no 
comment on the fight between Japanese and Nationalist forces screened in the first 
part of the movie. This is because, like so many of the motion pictures discussed in 
this chapter, the real message of Flowers of War concerns contemporary rather than 
wartime China.  
 One commentary on the film by the critic He Dao argues that had it not been for 
the special situation of the Nanjing massacre, then no one would have ever thought to 
make a film about the Japanese attacking a few girls stranded in a church.
119
 
Professor He continues that it is no coincidence that the book of the film was released 
to coincide with the death of Lei Guiying (on April 25, 2007), one of the few local 
residents ever to admit serving as a Japanese comfort woman after the fall of Nanjing. 
                                                 
116
 Yin Hong and Cheng Wen, “2011 nian zhongguo dianying chanye beiwang,” Yishu pinglun 2 (2012): 
7. 
117
 Yan Geling, Jinling shisan chai (Beijing: Zhongguo gongren chubanshe, 2007). 
118
 Ye Yulou, “Shentide yixiang: dianying ‘jinling shisan chai’ zhong nüxing shenti fenxi,” Dianying 
pingjia 6 (2012): 48. 
119
 He Dao, “Shuyu 13 ge teshu nüxing de shishi: ping yan gelingde ‘jinling shisan chai,’” Renmin 
gongan 15 (2011): 62. 
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Therefore, the book (and the film of the book) actually form a commemoration to the 
departure of this rare “living specimen” [sic].120 Put differently, the coded message 
contained in both the book and the film is that Lei Guiying’s death marked the close 
of an era, following which there is no shame in broaching the subject of comfort 
women. Interestingly, He Dao’s article was published in the high-profile journal 
Public Security (Renmin gongan) rather than in any film magazine, which suggests 
that He’s views were endorsed by party elites. 
 
 
Figure 13. A scene from Flowers of War (Jinling shisan chai, 2011) showing both schoolgirls (left) and 
prostitutes (right) trapped in a Nanjing church.   
 
 Another revealing critique of Flowers of War comes from Chinese film scholar 
Yu Ji. Yu, writing by invitation in a special issue of the journal Film Culture 
(Dianying yishu) devoted to the movie, obliquely suggests that the motion picture’s 
real intention was to criticise the CCP, because the Nanjing prostitutes saved the 
                                                 
120
 Ibid., 63.  
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nation by practising “erotic patriotism,” whereas the Chinese Communists were 
nowhere to be seen.
121
 Actually, the film ridicules the party on other ways too, but 
Professor Yu might have been censured for stating so directly. For example, whilst the 
Communist Party is officially atheist, almost the entire film is set in or around a 
Christian church. The code here is that it is the chapel that physically protects the 
schoolgirls from the Japanese, because the CCP obviously lacks the capacity to do so. 
Another criticism of the party is that it is an alcoholic out-of-work American (played 
by the Batman star Christian Bale) rather than a Communist Party guerrilla who 
prevents Japanese troops from raping young children. If the CCP really beat the 
Japanese then why was the job left to American “white trash?” Finally, why was it left 
to a lone American rather than the Eighth Route Army or the Fourth New Army (or 
the Nationalists for that matter) to plan and execute a successful escape plan for the 
girls, by having the prostitutes take their place at a singing contest at a Japanese 
officers’ mess? In short, the film mocks contemporary Communist pillars of rule (such 
as the party won the war), by hinting that foreigners had a bigger role in defeating the 
Japanese than the CCP cares to admit.
122
  
Flowers of War is a highly-coded document which can be “read” in different 
ways depending on the audience. It can be viewed as a war film purely for 
entertainment, an exposition on comfort women, or even as a blistering attack on the 
CCP. The way in which this latest blockbuster about the war permits multiple 
interpretations, seems not so much like a commentary on Japan, its armies, or even 
the war, but rather the soul of a nation starting to talk to itself. 
 
 
 
                                                 
121
 Yu Ji, “Dang ‘jinling shisan chai’ zaoyu ridannuofu,” Dianying yishu 343, no. 2 (2012): 31. 
122
 On how the party beat the Japanese, see: Aiguozhuyi jiaoyu dacidian (Beijing: Haiyang chubanshe, 
1992), 1–23. 
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Conclusion 
 
 In the last chapter I offered evidence that the image of Japan presented in 
mainland Chinese textbooks is largely one of a wartime invader. In this chapter I have 
argued that the pattern is repeated in PRC film, in that almost the only acceptable 
theme for motion pictures about Japan is that country’s occupation of China during 
the War of Resistance. Since 1949 most films about the war propound the myth that 
by beating the Japanese the CCP has a rightful claim to power. This is part of the 
ruling Communists’ ideology. For much of the past 60 years, those representations in 
cinema have frequently misrepresented Japan in a way that could be conceived as 
stereotyping.  
 In order to assess the extent to which the Japanese are stereotyped in movies, this 
chapter has deconstructed Japanese tropes using categories devised by the film 
scholar Richard Dyer. The resulting analysis shows that whilst no strong case can be 
made that the Chinese depiction of the Japanese on celluloid is racist, the situation 
with respect to stereotyping is more clear-cut.  
 This is because in Mao era films (pre-1976), Japanese forces are caricatured in 
such a way that they epitomise a spent military force, in that they are shoddily dressed, 
incompetent and poorly led. This contrast is especially striking when compared to the 
brutal efficiency of Communist fighting forces. However, representations of Japan on 
film during the reform era are influenced by evolving notions of Chinese ideology and 
identity. As a result, during the 1980s and 90s gone are the buck teeth and Velcro 
moustaches of Japanese soldiers, instead they are replaced by a conceptual framework 
of “Japan” as a much more realistic wartime opponent.  
 In the overwhelming majority of films (regardless of the year they were released 
in) Japanese generals, officers, soldiers, strategy and tactics are secondary 
considerations to the plot. This is because PRC war movies are used as transmission 
vehicles for sending encoded messages on domestic issues, such as “who are the real 
enemies of the state?” (the GMD, landlords, traitors) and “party instructions must be 
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obeyed at all times.”  During the reform era however, directors have increasingly 
appropriated war films for uses only indirectly related to Japan, such as broaching the 
subject of comfort women. In this sense, it appears that compared to war museums 
and textbooks, the state has less control over messages transmitted by movie makers, 
otherwise how could they allow recent blockbusters such as Flowers of War to mock 
the party itself? 
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Chapter 5 
Media Representations of Japan
1
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Ever since newspapers were regularly published in European cities during the first 
half of the seventeenth century, politicians and thinkers across the world have grasped 
their ability to shape the views of ordinary people. Three centuries later in 1922 Walter 
Lippmann famously argued that “news and truth are not the same thing,” and 20 years 
after that the British writer George Orwell added that “no event is ever correctly 
reported in a newspaper.”2 In China the importance of papers in shaping mass opinion 
was not lost on the CCP, as the 1943 editorial from the Liberation Daily (Jiefang ribao) 
below attests:  
 
People want training, they want to understand the world…they want to know what to do 
now…otherwise a newspaper is just a mountain of news and adverts. Papers should sufficiently 
express current feeling and the will of the people…A good journalist is also a good propagandist, 
educator and organiser, and will become an asset to the party…We do not want newspapers to take 
the wrong road, therefore their independence is absolutely forbidden.
3
   
 
This is not to suggest that newspapers were seen as seditious or problematic. On the 
contrary, the Chinese Communists have always seen newspapers as performing a vital 
                                                 
1
 Abbreviations for newspapers used in figures and tables throughout this chapter include: RMRB 
(Renmin ribao/People’s Daily), HLJRB (Heilongjiang ribao/Heilongjiang Daily) and CQRB 
(Chongqing ribao/Chongqing Daily). 
2
 Lippmann, Public Opinion, 226; George Orwell, The Penguin Essays of George Orwell (London: 
Penguin, 1994), 223.  
3
 HQM, 3:304–06. 
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role, with Hu Yaobang explaining in 1985, over 40 years after the above quote was 
made, that “the party’s news undertaking is [still] the party’s mouthpiece, naturally it is 
also the mouthpiece of the people’s government leaders, at the same time it is the 
people’s own mouthpiece.”4 It is in this light that Chinese news commentary on Japan 
should be viewed, as a system in which elite leaders openly admit that party 
newspapers only expound officially approved views.
5
  
Tight control of “mental productive forces” in general, and the Chinese media in 
particular, has been evident ever since the party’s Yenan days during the late 1930s 
and 40s.
6
 This control was and remains vital for the CCP, “because [through its] 
control over material and mental processes, and [its] domination of the major 
institutions of society, [the ruling Communist elite’s] definition of the social world 
provides the basic rationale for those institutions which protect and reproduce their 
‘way of life.’”7 In fact, “definitions of the social world” is really another way of 
saying ideology, which as noted in the introduction is a set of ideas and representations 
by which people collectively make sense of the world in which they live.
8
  
This chapter continues the debate on the construction of Chinese identity and 
ideology. It is a case study of the Chinese media—which I take to include all Chinese 
newspapers and important party theoretical magazines, whilst excluding television 
and radio—analysing the manipulation of Chinese newspaper commentary on Japan.9 
The argument pursued here is that the media has functioned as a major transmission 
system of state views on Japan since the earliest days of the PRC. Perhaps the most 
                                                 
4
 XCGZ, 4:665. The quote implies that there is no discernible difference between party and 
government run newspapers. This chapter therefore uses the terms interchangeably.   
5
 For proof that the previous CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao expounds very similar views, see 
reportage on his 2008 visit to the People’s Daily offices in: RMRB, 21/6/08, 1.  
6
 By which I take to include journalists and editors responsible for newspaper content. 
7
 Stuart Hall et al., Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order (London: Macmillan, 
1978), 59. 
8
 See intro., pp. 6–7.  
9
 Television broadcasts only started in 1958 and it was not until the 1980s that television was 
frequently watched by Chinese people in urban areas, let alone in the countryside. Compared to 
television, radio was a more common form of broadcasting especially during the Mao era, as 
retransmission of radio programmes linked listeners across China via means of loudspeaker networks 
(which were in common use until the early 1990s). Unfortunately, it is exceptionally difficult to source 
transcripts of individual radio programmes. For these varied reasons, the analysis in this chapter 
concentrates on print media, which was available on a daily basis from the earliest days of the PRC. 
See: Alan P. L. Liu, Communications and National Integration in Communist China (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1971).  
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obvious difference between Chinese newspapers and other transmission mediums, 
however, is that they are published frequently (often daily), with the result that they 
are much more responsive to changes in political direction than, say, mainland 
textbooks (printed every six months) or films (which take up to several years to make). 
As the media scholar Marshall McLuhan argues, all transmission mediums have their 
own principles and differing lines of force. As a result, “any medium has the power of 
imposing its own assumptions on the unwary.”10 
This chapter attempts to unpack those principles and lines of force as they relate 
to reportage on Japan, in order to tease out the assumptions imposed on unwary 
readers. Bearing in mind all these factors the chapter proceeds as follows. First, a 
discussion of the criteria for data selection is followed by a brief overview of the 
Soviet news media model. Without such an overview, it is impossible to explain many 
basic Chinese preferences for reporting on Japan, such as a continuing tendency to use 
formulaic language and a repetitive news style. The main body of the chapter then 
uses content analysis in order to map out the volume, subject and attitude of reportage 
on Japan, in both the national and regional party press. Substantial treatment of 
accompanying imagery is also provided, in order to paint a more rounded picture of 
the way in which the state-run Chinese media views Japan. Techniques from CDA are 
additionally used, in an attempt to tease out how the party press uses Japan as a 
vehicle for pursuing a variety of domestic policy objectives, ranging from waging 
internecine power struggles to enforcing party control over the PLA.  
 
Data selection  
   
The analysis in this chapter is mainly based on data from the People’s Daily 
newspaper, complemented by commentary from selected regional newspapers and 
Red Flag magazine. The People’s Daily has been selected because it is the official 
mouthpiece of the CCPCC, which “prints what the Chinese top leadership think the 
                                                 
10
 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (1964; repr., London: Routledge 
Classics, 2001), 15. 
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masses think the top leadership should be thinking about Japan.”11 The importance of 
the People’s Daily is underlined by the fact that, unlike other mainland newspapers, it 
enjoys special circulation rights such as reprints of its editorials on Japan in other 
newspapers. Additionally, CCTV news broadcasts frequently refer to articles published 
in the paper, and during the Mao era it was widely used for weekly political studies as 
well.
12
 These weekly sessions were an excellent means of indoctrinating people who 
were either illiterate (they could have news read to them), or who lived in rural areas 
(and therefore lacked ready access to normal print news distribution networks), or 
both.   
During the reform era weekly political studies for the masses using the People’s 
Daily have been discontinued, and as a result readership has declined, from an 
estimated 2.78 million to 1.80 million during the decade from 1993 to 2003.
13
 
However, the newspaper is still required reading for top officials, PLA officers and the 
senior management of State Owned Enterprises.
14
 Whilst the paper now has to 
compete with several thousand daily newspapers and other published content for 
readers’ attention, the sheer fact that it is read by the nation’s decision makers means 
that its views on Japan have to be taken seriously.  
 A second source of articles examined in this chapter is the Red Flag magazine, 
which bears many similarities to the People’s Daily. It is a publication with a long 
pedigree, having an almost unbroken print run stretching back to 1958. Red Flag is 
available to all CCP members (currently 68 million in number), and it frequently 
contains articles on Japan penned by elite cadres and senior academics. For these 
reasons, the way in which Red Flag portrays Japan is important, even in an internet age 
where much comment on that country is available online. The third and final source of 
newsprint commentary on Japan is from regional newspapers. Because much copy on 
                                                 
11
 Interview with Michael O’Sullivan, former British Council Director (Beijing), at Cambridge 
University, 12/2/10.  
12
 Wu, “Command Communication,” 195. 
13
 Gang Qian and David Bandurski, “China’s Emerging Public Sphere: The Impact of Media 
Commercialization, Professionalization, and the Internet in an Era of Transition,” in Changing Media, 
Changing China, ed. Susan L. Shirk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 42n11. 
14 
For example the municipal archives in Chongqing close at least once a fortnight for political study 
sessions using the RMRB. 
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that country relates to sensitive subjects such as the War of Resistance and bilateral 
disputes, regional papers are frequently required to print verbatim transcripts from the 
People’s Daily and the Xinhua News Agency (hereafter XHS, short for xinhuashe). 
However, provincial newspapers are increasingly innovative in trying to 
circumnavigate such restrictions, for reasons which will be discussed below.   
 
Soviet influence on the Chinese press 
 
 The Chinese Communists closely modelled their print media on the Soviet one, 
therefore comparing the two media systems offers insights into how and why Chinese 
newspapers portray Japan in a certain way. During the early years of the PRC there 
was almost an obsession with emulating the Russians, such that the first editor of the 
People’s Daily, Deng Tuo, travelled to Moscow several times to “learn from 
Pravda.”15 In fact, the Soviets already had a 30 year head start over the Chinese in 
developing their print media, which Stalin saw as “the most powerful weapon of our 
party,” and Khrushchev viewed as “our chief ideological weapon.”16 Peter Kenez 
argues that this early Bolshevik obsession with ideology stemmed from their “[belief] 
that in Marxism they possessed an instrument that allowed them to analyse the 
process of history.”17 The Bolsheviks did not need to look for knowledge (i.e. to 
produce or propagate knowledge) because this had already been achieved through 
Marxism. Kenez continues that “the [Soviet Communist] Party was to lead the 
proletariat to a successful revolution on the basis of its superior understanding of the 
process of history.”18 Therefore, it was unwise to let the masses look after their own 
interests. This is the crux of Kenez’s argument, that the Russian media was designed 
to dictate to rather than to inform readers, because Lenin did not trust workers to 
correctly understand history unaided. For this reason nothing was left to local 
                                                 
15
 Cheek, Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China, 124. Pravda was the Soviet equivalent of the 
RMRB.  
16
 McLuhan, Understanding Media, 214. 
17
 Kenez, Birth of the Propaganda State, 5. 
18
 Ibid., 7. 
216 
 
initiative or spontaneity.
19
 The Chinese media inherited Marxist theoretical constructs 
which dwelt heavily on propagating the ruling party’s interpretation of history, as a 
means of justifying rule. This was undergirded by a strong inclination to lecture to the 
masses, as opposed to informing or educating them, lest they come up with their own 
ideas.  
 Similarities between the Chinese and Soviet media also extended to content. After 
around 1925, Soviet newspapermen “present[ed] everyday labour as an epic battle to 
industrialise the USSR, a battle fought against shirkers and saboteurs within and 
imperialist enemies without. Party members were the vanguard in this imagined battle, 
heroic warriors responsible for leading and inspiring the foot soldiers, ‘the nonparty 
masses’ [sic].”20 When the Chinese came to set up their own newspaper industry, they 
emulated the Soviets by depicting battles against the Japanese (and others) in order to 
rally the masses. Even today, use of battlefield terminology inflects many articles in 
the People’s Daily, with liberal use of terms such as “frontline,” “enemy,” and 
“resist.”  
 Differences did exist, however, in the way in which the two powers presented 
their news. For our purposes though, it is sufficient to note that after the Second 
World War the CCP imported wholesale a Soviet system of news management. As a 
result, even today that early Soviet influence is still highly visible, in terms of the way 
in which Japan is presented in mainland Chinese newspapers. Though Marxist 
rhetoric has been toned down in recent decades, a 1950s reader of the People’s Daily 
would today still instantly recognise much of its style and tone.  
 
Content analysis of the People’s Daily—number and frequency of articles 
 
 Despite the large number of empirical studies on Sino-Japanese relations, we still 
lack an overall framework for conceptualising what is said about Japan. One means of 
                                                 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Matthew E. Lenoe, Closer to the Masses: Stalinist Culture, Social Revolution, and Soviet Newspapers 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 1.  
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quantifying the problem is to conduct content analysis on complete runs of 
newspapers from 1949 through to the present.
21
 In this respect, the People’s Daily is 
an ideal paper for teasing out long-term data trends, because it is one of only three 
daily newspapers with an unbroken print record from 1949 down to the present day.
22
 
However, during the past decade, a number of scholars have questioned the efficacy 
of content analysis, positing that CDA is a more robust means of unpacking 
ideological meaning hidden within text.
23
 All we need to bear in mind for now, is that 
content analysis is still widely regarded as an effective tool for identifying trends 
across large bodies of text, such as print media. For this reason, content analysis is 
used throughout this chapter, except where otherwise stated.  
The aim below is to identify the size of the total data set (all People’s Daily 
articles on Japan) followed by a more detailed examination of data subsets (such as 
People’s Daily articles on the Anti-Japanese War). The former allows us to generate 
an overall picture of how the state media represents Japan, whilst the latter permits a 
more finely textured analysis of the way in which specific Japan-related topics are 
presented.   
 The total data set consists of all news published in the People’s Daily between 
January 1, 1949 and December 31, 2005, a grand total of 1.52 million articles. 
Contained within this total are smaller subsets of articles relating to various aspects of 
Japan (such as the war, the Japanese economy, and so on), listed by category in the 
People’s Daily Indices (Renmin ribao suoyin).24 The years 1949 and 2005 have been 
chosen as the start and end points for data collection, so as to include articles covering 
the founding of the PRC (1949) right up to the sixtieth-anniversary celebrations of the  
                                                 
21
 Content analysis is defined by the communications scholar Bernard Berelson as “a research technique 
for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication.” Its 
central idea is for the words of a text to be classified into many fewer content categories, based on 
meaning, synonyms and so on. Its key assumption is that the study of manifest content is meaningful, 
which is another way of saying that meanings encoded within text are similarly understood by all parties. 
Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research (New York, NY: Hafner, 1971), 18–19; 
Robert Philip Weber, Basic Content Analysis (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1985), 12. 
22
 Berton and Wu, Contemporary China, 89. 
23
 John E. Richardson, Analysing Newspapers: An Approach From Critical Discourse Analysis (New 
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 20. For methodology see chap. 3.  
24
 For example, see: Renmin ribao guonei ziliao zu, ed., Renmin ribao suoyin (Beijing: Renmin ribao 
she, 1955). 
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Figure 14. Comparison of the annual total of People’s Daily articles relative to the annual total of 
articles on Japan (1949–2005).  
 
 
Figure 15. Relative frequency of People’s Daily articles on Japan (1949–2005). 
 
defeat of Japan in World War Two (2005). 
Figure 14 (left hand axis) shows the total number of People’s Daily articles 
printed annually between the years 1949–2005, as well as the total number of articles 
published on Japan during the same period (right hand axis). Figure 15 then expresses 
the ratio of these figures as a percentage (total number of articles/year versus the total 
number of articles on Japan/year). The lowest number of Japan-related articles in the 
People’s Daily appeared in 1949 (140 pieces of news, or 0.7 percent of all articles 
printed in the People’s Daily). This is perhaps unsurprising, as at this time newspapers 
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were frequently just two to four pages in length, which limited coverage on all 
subjects, not just for commentary on Japan. The highest number of Japan-related 
articles occurs in 1960 (1,135 articles, or 3.8 percent of all articles printed), reflecting 
the strength of Chinese disquiet over the United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty 
signed that year. The highest and lowest ratios of Japan-related articles compared to 
the total number of People’s Daily articles are in 1977 (710 articles, 5.1 percent of all 
articles printed) and 2003 (233 articles, 0.6 percent of all articles) respectively.  
The data also shows that prior to normalisation of relations in 1972, an average of 
three percent of all articles published in the People’s Daily were on subjects relating 
to Japan. This figure might not seem particularly significant, yet were the same 
frequency of published news accorded to each one of China’s 14 neighbouring states 
(i.e. states with which the PRC shares a land border), then over 40 percent of People’s 
Daily newsprint would be devoted to foreign affairs.
25
 My point is that before 1972, 
even though state-to-state bilateral contact was minimal, there was extensive coverage 
of Japanese affairs.
26
 To be sure, much of this attention was negative, in that it 
focused either on the War of Resistance against Japan or criticising the Japanese 
political establishment. But the fact remains that during the Mao era, the CCPCC’s 
own newspaper (the People’s Daily) printed hundreds of articles every year closely 
following Japanese political, military and foreign affairs.  
After normalisation of relations in 1972 the total number of Japan-related articles 
peaks at 769 in 1978 (4.9 percent of the total number of People’s Daily articles), 
gradually falling to a low of 242 articles (0.7 percent of the total) in 2002. This rather 
puzzling decline might reflect a lessening of interest in Japanese affairs, following the 
signing of the Peace Treaty in 1978, particularly since its provisions commit the 
Japanese side to eschew force, which was previously a continual worry for the 
Chinese side and therefore subject to much commentary in the People’s Daily.27 
                                                 
25
 Assuming that all articles were of equal length.  
26
 For more information on the informal (or people’s) diplomacy that did exist see: Li Deʼan, Zhou 
enlai yu riben pengyou. 
27
 The full provisions of the treaty can be found in: Liu Jiangyong, Zhongguo yu riben: bianhua 
zhongde “zhengleng jingre” guanxi (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2007), 786–87.  
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Alternatively, the decline might counter-intuitively reflect the rapidly increasing 
contact between the two sides at all levels (elite, working, student, business, etc.), thus 
obviating the need to report on specific bilateral government meetings or trade deals. 
Another possible explanation, is that as the reform period progressed and Chinese 
state organs increasingly interacted with their foreign counterparts in countries all 
over the world, the relative importance of Japan diminished.
28
 This final assertion is 
supported by the fact that, in recent years, a number of high-profile Chinese scholars 
of Japan have argued that PRC elites pay too much attention to the United States and 
not enough attention to Japan.
29
   
Even taking into account the relative decline in People’s Daily reportage on Japan 
in recent years, the paper still prints articles about this neighbouring state almost 
every day. Taken together, the evidence presented above allows us to build a prima 
facie case that since the foundation of the People’s Republic in 1949, elite Chinese 
leaders have been intensely interested in Japan. This proof comes in the form of the 
sheer volume of articles relating to Japan in the People’s Daily, which after all is the 
mouthpiece of the CCPCC and is therefore assumed to be reflective of that 
committee’s views. It is outside the scope of this study to prove a causal link between 
elite interest towards Japan and the number of articles on that country appearing in the 
paper.
30
 However the data in figures 14 and 15 is, at the very least, highly suggestive 
of a keen continuing elite Chinese interest in matters relating to Japan.  
 
Resisting Japan (kangri) and the War of Resistance (kangzhan)   
 
 In addressing the central question of how China views Japan, it is necessary to 
further drill down into the data, and fortunately the People’s Daily Indices provide 
                                                 
28
 Harry Harding, China’s Second Revolution: Reform After Mao (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution, 1987), 242.  
29
 This point was made by Li Tingjiang, “Zhongguo riben yanjiude fanwei he fangfa” (paper presented 
at the second Qinghua University Japan Research Centre scholars’ research colloquium, Beijing, 
13/11/10).   
30
 This might be achieved by comparative analysis of RMRB articles on various nations with respect to 
bilateral trade figures, visits, or speeches made by Chinese leaders.  
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detailed breakdowns of article content as well as their number. Based on data from 
these indices, figure 16 shows the frequency of articles appearing in the People’s 
Daily from 1949–2005 (the same date ranges used above) with the words “resist 
Japan” (kangri) or “War of Resistance” (kangzhan) in the headline.31 As applied here, 
the former term generally refers to Chinese military opposition to the Japanese 
invasion and occupation of mainland China between 1931 and 1945, whereas the 
latter phrase is occasionally applied to other conflicts as well (e.g. the Korean War). 
Both expressions can be used to gauge the intensity of commentary in the People’s 
Daily about Chinese (and particularly Communist) resistance to the Japanese during 
the Second World War, on the assumption that an article which contains kangri or 
kangzhan in the headline contains meaningful content on those subjects. The selection 
of these two terms relating to the war is obviously not exhaustive, in that it excludes 
articles about the 1931–45 conflict which contain the name of a particular battle, army 
or individual in the headline (instead of kangri or kangzhan). 
 
 
Figure 16. Annual total of People’s Daily articles with headlines containing the words “resist Japan” or 
“War of Resistance” (1949–2005).  
 
 
                                                 
31
 In modern day Chinese the character kang means severally “to resist” (n. & v.), “resistance” (n.) and 
“resisting” (present continuous tense). Therefore kangri can severally be translated as “resist Japan,” 
“resistance to Japan,” or “resisting Japan.” In the analysis below these terms are used interchangeably.        
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Notwithstanding this deficiency, the results in figure 16 provide a good first 
approximation, of the proportion of Japan-related content in the People’s Daily which 
focuses on the Anti-Japanese War. The data indicates that prior to 1985, there was a 
dearth of articles specifically relating to kangri or kangzhan. Of those Mao era articles 
containing either of these two terms in the headline, praise is sometimes meted out to 
China’s allies rather than to the Chinese themselves. In 1962, for example, nine out of 
eleven articles relating to kangri are actually praising North Korean wartime 
resistance to Japan. This statistic, coupled with evidence of a concurrent sharp rise in 
the construction of Chinese monuments to the aforesaid Korean wartime resistance 
(i.e. in 1962), provides our first demonstration of the use of this conflict as a political 
tool.
32
 The Chinese Communists’ idea here was to buttress relations with a key 
Communist ally (North Korea) in the immediate aftermath of the Sino-Soviet split, by 
lavishing fulsome praise on the North Koreans’ joint wartime resistance to Japan 
between the years 1931–45. This use of the Anti-Japanese War as a tool for achieving 
immediate CCP political objectives, forms an important part of the analysis in this 
chapter, to which we will return presently. 
The data in figure 16 suggests that prior to 1985, the People’s Daily published 
few articles commemorating the war in terms of “resisting Japan” or a “War of 
Resistance.” This however, is at variance with the findings in chapter one, which 
show that throughout the course of the Mao era (e.g. in 1951–52, 1960, 1965) the 
PRC did commemorate the defeat of Japan, and that the People’s Daily published 
articles celebrating that fact. The reasons for the low prevalence of Mao era articles 
entitled “resisting Japan” or “War of Resistance against Japan” vary depending on the 
specific year. For example, in 1951–52 articles in the press commemorating the war 
were published only in the days immediately surrounding the Japanese defeat and 
formal surrender (i.e. August 15, September 2). In 1960, as shown in table one (see 
chap. 1, p. 37), celebrations focused on north-east China as opposed to the whole 
country and therefore coverage was again relatively limited. In 1965 however, the 
                                                 
32
 For evidence that the Chinese praised North Korean wartime resistance to the Japanese for political 
reasons, see: MFA doc. #106-00763-03.    
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People’s Daily was instructed to commemorate the War of Resistance against Japan 
throughout the month of August (see chap. 1, p. 41), yet the data in figure 16 fails to 
reflect this. One possible reason for this is simply that at this time (1965) the war was 
not presented in terms of resistance to the Japanese. A second more likely reason is 
that as discussed below, in 1965 World War Two was presented more in terms of 
bolstering support for Lin Biao and Mao Zedong, than in terms of resistance to a 
Japanese enemy. In short, the data in figure 16 is not intended to deny the existence of 
Mao era state media commemoration of the war, but rather to highlight the change in 
the way that the conflict was presented during the reform era.  
 In this respect, the year 1985 acts as something of a watershed, since from this 
year onwards, decennial anniversaries of Japan’s defeat in World War Two are marked 
by a sharp rise in pieces about “resisting Japan” (kangri) climbing from 42 articles in 
1985 to 82 and 85 articles in 1995 and 2005 respectively (see fig. 16). One reason for 
this accentuation of decennial anniversaries (starting in 1985) stems from the great 
emphasis which the Chinese place on commemorations involving multiples of 10.
33
 
Another reason is that written Mandarin frequently employs numerical symbolism 
using the number 10, or multiples of 10 (for example in the recent “10 wants, 10 not 
wants” (shi yao shi buyao) political campaign).   
The rapid climb in the appearance of People’s Daily articles about resisting Japan, 
is mirrored by a sharp increase in the number of news stories devoted to the War of 
Resistance in the same years. Whereas prior to 1985 over 90 percent of articles 
containing kangzhan in the headline discussed either the Korean or Vietnam conflicts, 
after 1985, the proportion was almost exactly reversed, with over 90 percent of such 
articles referring to the 1931–45 fighting against imperial Japan. Placing the data 
relating to occurrences of kangri and kangzhan together, indicates a renewed focus on 
the Anti-Japanese War after 1985, especially during the decennial anniversaries of the 
Japanese defeat. Rana Mitter contends that in response to reform era problems of 
rising inequality, inflation and unemployment, the CCP’s “answer [was] to foster a 
                                                 
33
 Whiting, Chinese Domestic Politics, 16. 
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new nationalism, inclusive of all Chinese, regardless of party affiliation and, more 
controversially, nationality, by finding a common enemy to oppose.”34 That enemy 
was “Japan,” hence the new focus on decennial anniversaries of the war. A final point 
to consider here is that for the three years showing a spike in the number of People’s 
Daily articles headlined kangri or kangzhan (i.e. 1985, 1995 and 2005), is that they 
are highly concentrated within a relatively short timeframe of several months.  
 
 
 
Figure 17. Monthly totals of People’s Daily articles entitled “resisting the Japanese” (top) or “War of 
Resistance” (bottom) (selected years).  
 
Figure 17 graphically demonstrates this concentration of articles during the years 
selected (1985, 1995, 2005). The data shows that the number of articles criticising 
Japan and its wartime conduct rise sharply during June and July before peaking in 
August, the anniversary of the Japanese defeat on August 15, 1945. The total number 
                                                 
34
 Mitter, “Old Ghosts, New Memories,” 120. 
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of kangri and kangzhan articles remains high through September, the anniversary of 
the formal Japanese surrender on September 2, 1945 and then drops quickly with 
almost no articles about the war during the final months of the year.        
 Up to this point then, the picture we have is one of a widely varying amount of 
commentary on Japan in the People’s Daily, both in absolute and relative terms. 
However, if we assume that the number of articles on Japan in this paper reflects the 
intensity of interest of elite CCP cadres in that country, then ever since the founding 
of the PRC there has been strong interest in matters relating to Japan. Overlaid on top 
of this keen interest in reporting on Japan is, after 1985, concentrated reportage on 
“resisting Japan” and the “War of Resistance,” mostly during the decennial 
anniversaries of the Anti-Japanese War.   
 
Comparing People’s Daily reportage on the war with other Japan-related news   
 
Armed with this overview, it is now possible to examine in more detail how 
newscasting on Japan (the country, its politics, people and culture) relates to coverage 
of the war. In order to achieve this, content analysis was carried out using all August 
editions of the People’s Daily in every tenth year following end of World War Two  
(August 1955, August 1965, etc.). Decennial anniversaries were chosen for reasons 
described above, and the month of August was selected for analysis because the 
mainland Chinese “celebrate” the 1945 Japanese defeat on the fifteenth day of that 
month.  
 Firstly, data for the total number of Japan-related People’s Daily articles (see table 
9) shows a broadly rising trend, increasing from 35 articles in August 1955 (shortly 
after the Bandung conference in Indonesia, when China was promoting a policy of 
peaceful co-existence), to 112 articles in 2005 (a period of great tension between the 
two countries, culminating in serious anti-Japanese rioting across parts of mainland 
China). There are three inter-relating factors that are responsible for the increases: 
greater PRC contact with Japan (e.g. following normalisation in 1972); continued 
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interest in Japan by the CCPCC (who sponsor the paper); and a gradual increase in the 
number of pages per edition, meaning that more column space is available for articles 
on Japan.
35
  
 
Table 9. Attitudes of People’s Daily articles on Japan for the month of August (selected years)  
Number of RMRB articles published in 
August adopting an attitude towards 
Japan which is… 
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 
Favourable  10 14 17 11 5 2 
Neutral 10 2 27 11 8 9 
Unfavourable 15 65 3 70 124 101 
Monthly totals  35 81 47 92 137 112 
 
Secondly, in terms of attitude of reportage, with the exception of August 1975, all 
other years show high levels of negative People’s Daily reporting on Japan.36 In four of 
the years selected, 1965 and 1985–2005 inclusive, over three-quarters of all People’s 
Daily articles about Japan published in August are either negative or extremely 
negative. In 1955 and 1975 there exist relatively higher levels of positive reportage, but 
even here in 1955 the positive articles are on very narrowly defined subjects, such as 
the JCP or the activities of friendship associations.  
Thirdly, table 10 provides an indication of how normative media content on Japan 
has changed with time. In all years except 1975, there are substantial numbers of 
articles dealing with Japanese politics (ranging from 15 articles in 1955 to 45 articles 
in 2005). Such articles concentrate exclusively on problematic areas of the bilateral 
                                                 
35
 As an illustration of articles penned by CCPCC members, see: Liu Shaoqi, “Shaoqi tongzhi zaihuaibei 
zhanhou,” RMRB, 15/8/65, 5.  
36
 The classification used here draws heavily on Whiting, Chinese Domestic Politics, 29–30. A 
favourable article about Japan is one which would: support China in some way; discuss Japanese 
political or security issues in a way which enhances China’s international standing; portray a Japanese 
individual, the Japanese government or certain Japanese groups or factions in a favourable way. A neutral 
article about Japan is one which would: express no preference or viewpoint on Japan; is neutral in tone 
and content; supplies figures or facts on Japan with no commentary. A negative article on Japan is one 
which would: criticise China, does not support China or portrays China in a negative light; discuss 
Japanese political or security issues in a way which lowers China’s international standing. 
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relationship, such as Japanese soil being used as a staging post for American “imperial” 
forces in the Vietnam War (1965) and Japan trying to “peddle the idea of a China threat” 
(2005). Articles on PRC domestic politics generally record elite Chinese leaders 
attending Anti-Japanese War commemorations at museums, cemeteries and memorials. 
Similarly, culture related articles about Japan focus on museum exhibitions about the 
war, or republishing Anti-Japanese War songs, such as “Head for the enemy’s rear” 
(Dao diren houfang qu) by Qi Hai on August 14, 1965. Positive representations of 
Japanese food, art, design or other cultural phenomena are almost completely absent. 
Articles on trade peak in 1975, a time when China had virtually shut itself off from the 
outside world and needed international trade so as to generate foreign exchange and 
encourage inward investment. Numerous trade-related articles from the 1980s onwards 
urge Chinese manufacturers to learn from the Japanese, and to close the technology gap 
between the two countries.  
 
Table 10. Content of People’s Daily articles on Japan for the month of August (selected years) 
Total number of Japan-related RMRB 
articles published in August on… 
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 
Japanese business and trade … 1 12 6 3 6 
PRC domestic politics  5 11 14 12 17 14 
JCP and JSP 7 2 … … … … 
Japanese foreign politics  15 16 9 15 16 45 
History 1 26 … 37 70 23 
Military 4 2 … 3 5 12 
Culture  2 13 … 6 21 6 
Education  … … 2 3 5 1 
Sport … … 5 3 … 5 
Friendship associations  1 10 5 7 … … 
Monthly totals  35 81 47 92 137 112 
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Figure 18. Monthly totals of Japan-related articles in the People’s Daily 18 months prior to and 18 
months following decennial anniversaries of the Japanese defeat. Data for 2006 is unavailable. In all 
six graphs the x-axis represents the month (1=January, 3=March, etc.), and the y-axis represents total 
number of Japan-related RMRB articles published during that month. 
 
During the Mao era, the JCP, the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) and assorted 
friendship associations acted as the main conduit for unofficial state-to-state ties 
between the PRC and Japan. Thus, these organisations were generally presented in a 
favourable light, with articles making frequent use of words such as peace (heping) and 
friendly relations (youhao guanxi), indicating that the propaganda organs differentiated 
between the Japanese government, and those political parties which supported 
increased trade or normalisation of relations.
37
 After normalisation, the need for these 
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 On Propaganda Department influence with respect to policymaking see: Anne-Marie Brady, 
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unofficial conduits lessened and they ceased to feature in People’s Daily reportage. 
Finally, the number of articles on military affairs shows a steady increase in 
prominence in the years studied, reflecting PLA and governmental concern about the 
size of Japanese defence spending.  
The main point to bring out from the data is that the picture painted of Japan is 
broadly negative, partly because of the attention paid to the war (even before 1985), 
and partly because of the relentless focus on Japanese politics. However, it might be 
argued that these August commemorations distort the way in which Japan is reported 
in the Chinese state-run press, by over-emphasising the attention paid to the 1931–45 
conflict. There are two methods of controlling for this potential bias.  
One, the total numbers of articles relating to Japan in the months and years falling 
either side of the decennial anniversaries, can be compared to the total number of 
articles relating to Japan during the anniversaries themselves, as shown in figure 18 
above. Here People’s Daily Indices are used to calculate the monthly totals of articles 
on Japan over a three year period, centring on each of the six decennial anniversaries 
after 1949 (1954–56, 1964–66, etc.). If Chinese news media commentary on Japan 
only focuses on the war, then reportage on Japan ought to significantly decline during 
the months and years where no such major anniversary of the war takes place. The six 
charts in figure 18 show data for both 18 months prior to and 18 months following the 
decennial anniversaries. The charts indicate that no such decline in coverage takes 
place, implying that overall reportage on Japan does not exclusively focus on that 
nation’s defeat in World War Two. There is no need to explain the charts in detail, 
although it is worth mentioning that the sharp decline in the number of People’s Daily 
articles on Japan in late summer 1976, for example, was caused by the need to increase 
space for blanket coverage of Chairman Mao’s death. 
Two, content analysis of the total number of articles relating to Japan in a specific 
month can be compared to the August data, in this case February—which is an ideal 
month for comparison because no major war commemoration takes place (see tables 
                                                                                                                                            
“Regimenting the Public Mind: The Modernisation of Propaganda in the PRC,” in Asian Futures, Asian 
Traditions, ed. Edwina Palmer (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2005), chap. 10. 
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11 and 12). The aim here is to compare February and August reportage on Japan, in 
order to test the extent to which data is skewed by the decennial anniversaries. 
 
Table 11. Attitudes of People’s Daily articles on Japan for the month of February (selected years) 
Number of RMRB articles published 
in February adopting an attitude 
towards Japan which is… 
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 
Favourable  6 2 6 12 20 4 
Neutral 13 10 14 16 14 8 
Unfavourable 6 32 2 … … 6 
Monthly totals  25 44 22 28 34 18 
  
Table 12. Content of People’s Daily articles on Japan for the month of February (selected years) 
Total number of Japan-related RMRB 
articles published in February on… 
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 
Japanese business and trade 3 2 4 16 18 7 
PRC domestic politics  1 4 7 1 2 … 
JCP and JSP 5 4 1 … … … 
Japanese foreign politics  14 17 6 2 7 9 
History … … … … 1 … 
Military … 14 … 1 … 1 
Culture  2 3 … 3 3 1 
Education  … … 1 2 2 … 
Sport … … 2 3 1 … 
Friendship associations  … … 1 1 … … 
Monthly totals  25 44 22 29 34 18 
 
One obvious difference between the two sets of data (February and August) is 
that in February there appears to be a steadier flow of Japan-related reportage, with 25, 
22 and 18 articles in 1955, 1975 and 2005 respectively. By comparison, in August 
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there appears to be a rising crescendo of commentary on Japan, which as noted above 
is mostly related to the war. Another major difference between coverage in the two 
months selected is that whereas in August the coverage is mostly negative, six months 
earlier it is mostly neutral. Table 11 shows that with the exception of 1965, where 32 
out of 44 articles (73 percent) were negative, in other years the “undercurrent,” as it 
were, of negative articles was generally less than one-third of the total.
38
 These 
figures imply that negative reportage on Japan is more concentrated during the 
months surrounding the decennial anniversaries of the Japanese defeat in World War 
Two (i.e. there is more negative reportage in August compared to February during the 
years selected).  
Table 12 shows some similarities between the February and August reportage on 
Japan. In February of the years selected there was a growing interest in business and 
trade with time, rising from 3 articles in 1955 to 18 articles in 1995. This was 
accompanied by a strong and continuing interest in Japanese foreign policy (at least 
as reported in the People’s Daily). The data in table 12 also shows marked differences 
in emphasis, in that with the exception of 1965, February coverage of history (i.e. the 
war) and Japanese military affairs is largely absent.  
In sum, the data strongly suggests that whilst the war and Chinese memory of that 
conflict frequently receive near blanket coverage during the run up to the anniversary 
of the August 15 defeat (especially after 1985), this trait does not extend to the whole 
year in which the anniversary falls. Put more simply, Chinese commentary on the war 
in the party press appears to be highly concentrated in the weeks and months 
immediately surrounding the main August 15 decennial anniversary.
39
 A further 
important point to note is that the data also shows the existence of an undercurrent of 
negative reportage on Japan, which persists outside formal commemorations of that 
country’s wartime invasion of China, although further research is required to ascertain 
                                                 
38
 Numerous MFA documents attest to the deterioration in bilateral relations in 1965 after Sato Eisaku 
came to office on 9/11/64, for example see: MFA doc. #105-01409-01. 
39
 The data showing frequency of occurrence of the terms resist Japan and War of Resistance in 
headlines (see figs. 16 and 17) reinforce this conclusion, in that the appearance of these two explicitly 
war related headlines is also concentrated in decennial (as opposed to quinquennial or annual) 
anniversaries of the Japanese defeat. See also n31. 
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the extent to which this is linked to contemporary events.     
 
Contemporary political messages embedded within official media discourse on Japan 
 
 It is widely accepted that newspapers suppress or distort news such that “no 
newspaper can give the whole truth even if it wants to.”40 The English (but not the 
Chinese) language scholarship on this subject is vast, and covers a wide range of 
views.
41
 At one end of the spectrum the function of newspapers is seen as being 
constrained within a wider set of social and political claims, which are themselves 
embedded within a dominant perspective (ideology) or historical context.
42
 At the 
other end of the spectrum “language is [seen as] an instrument of control as well as of 
communication…[such that newspaper readers are both] manipulated and informed, 
preferably manipulated while they suppose they are being informed.”43  
 In avowed Communist states, the party press performs additional functions 
peculiar to these countries, such as conveying encrypted messages to unnamed 
political actors. It is therefore no surprise that Hu Qiaomu once averred that “news 
tools contain many layers of meaning, although superficially [all] news…can be 
thought of as education propaganda.”44 So, on the one hand, all news contained in 
Chinese party newspapers can be seen as propaganda, educating the masses within a 
dominant ideological perspective. On the other hand, embedded within this news copy 
are deeper layers of meaning which transmit coded messages to high-ranking officials. 
As a result, senior cadres in China do not read the People’s Daily in order to “find out 
what is going on in the world,” instead they read it precisely for these coded 
messages.
45
       
                                                 
40
 Denys Thompson, Between the Lines: Or, How to Read a Newspaper (London: F. Muller, 1949), 22. 
41
 For an overview of this literature, see: Denis McQuail, Media Performance: Mass Communication 
and the Public Interest (London: Sage, 1992).  
42
 Martin Conboy, The Language of Newspapers: Socio-Historical Perspectives (London: Continuum, 
2010), 7. 
43
 Robert Hodge and Gunther R. Kress, Language as Ideology (London: Routledge, 1993), 6.  
44
 HQM, 3:193. Hu’s comment made in January 1955 still holds true today. 
45
 Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, pp. 24–33, 406n1; Ithiel de Sola Pool, The Prestige Press: A 
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Research on reading habits of Soviet newspapers—which as we have seen bear 
marked similarities to the contemporary Chinese press—shows that readers can be 
classified into two categories.
46
 In the first group are “non-leaders” who read all 
passages, if they read an article at all. In the second group are “leaders” who skim 
most passages whilst reading others in detail. This latter group always omit the same 
parts of articles (suggesting that they know what they are omitting) and the decision to 
switch from skimming to close reading is based on content, not structure.
47
  
It is assumed that the examples of embedded messages below, drawn from 
decennial anniversaries of the war (1955, 1965, etc.), are intended for “leaders” rather 
than “non-leaders.” Whilst the content analysis described earlier in this chapter 
provides an overview of the number, attitude and content of commentary on Japan, 
the aim here is to drill down further into newspaper articles about the war using CDA. 
In the introduction to this chapter, I noted that there has been criticism of content 
analysis as a research tool in communications studies, because it is more effective at 
defining the limits of discourse (what is said) rather than how it is said. The analysis 
below uses CDA to unpack how implied meanings are inserted within selected news 
articles.      
Table 13 shows that in both the People’s Daily and Red Flag editorials, 
commentaries and reportage about the war frequently weave other political messages 
into the text. In all of the articles studied there was a very deliberate attempt to link 
victory in the Anti-Japanese War with contemporary political issues. This plausibly 
suggests that, as with textbooks, Anti-Japanese War films and even war museums, 
over the past 60 years the war has proved a convenient vehicle for discussing 
politically contentious topics. An alternative interpretation is that a high proportion of 
articles in party newspapers and periodicals contain embedded messages. Three 
examples of policy objectives embedded into articles on the war are discussed below: 
bolstering Mao’s authority (1965), American bases in Vietnam (1965) and PLA support 
                                                                                                                                            
Comparative Study of Political Symbols (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970). 
46
 Rosmarie Rogers, How Russians Read Their Press: Patterns of Selection in Pravda and Izvestia 
(Cambridge, MA: Center for International Studies MIT, 1968), 2. 
47
 Ibid.  
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for the CCP (1995).    
 
Table 13. Embedded political messages in People’s Daily and Red Flag articles on Japan  
Date Implied political message  
August 1955 Oppose U.S. imperialism, oppose U.S. involvement in Korea, oppose U.S. bases in 
Japan, China is a legitimate state, China is a strong state  
August 1965 Bolster Chairman Mao’s authority within the CCP, oppose U.S. use of Japan as a 
logistics base for the Vietnam War, China is the leading socialist power  
August 1975 Oppose Soviet Union imperialism, oppose Soviet hegemonic tendencies in the Kuril 
islands dispute with Japan 
August 1985 Support the GMD, promote the history of joint CCP-GMD resistance to the Japanese 
in the war, China is both a victor and a victim of previous Japanese aggression  
August 1995 Japan does not correctly interpret history, Japan should transfer more aid and 
technology to China, the PLA does not support the CCP strongly enough    
August 2005 Japan is a resurgent militarist power, China is not a threat to the world or to Japan, it is 
Japan that is the threat 
   
In the tenth edition of Red Flag (1965), the defence minister Lin Biao wrote an 
article entitled “May the people’s victory in the war last 10,000 years” (Renmin 
zhanzheng shengli wansui), arguing that the Chinese won the war against the Japanese 
only because of the party and Mao’s outstanding leadership.48 Lin’s article compared 
the history of the Anti-Japanese War with contemporary American actions in Asia, by 
arguing that American imperialism was “repeating the scale of Japanese imperialism in 
China and Asia.” In other words, if the United States decided to invade the PRC from 
Vietnam (where American forces were embroiled in a war against the Vietnamese 
Communists), then history would repeat itself.  
This article was useful to Lin Biao, not only as a smokescreen for pushing his own 
agenda but also for buttressing his political master Mao Zedong. The former was 
accomplished by Lin aligning himself to Mao politically, with the aim of increasing 
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the day-to-day influence of the PLA in affairs of state. The latter was achieved by 
emphasising the (true) myth that Mao’s military strategy had withstood the test of time, 
because it could be put to use again in 1965 should the United States decide to invade 
China. Lin’s article also hinted at future political campaigns, by asserting that “we are 
now making preparations for the next stage of the revolution,” which was possibly an 
allusion to the forthcoming Cultural Revolution.
49
   
A second embedded political message linked to the Anti-Japanese War was that of 
American bases in Japan, a problem which riles the PRC leadership to this day. In the 
following quote made on August 15, 1965, a People’s Daily editorial entitled “The 
great victory of the Chinese people in the War of Resistance against Japan” (Zhongguo 
renmin kangri zhanzhengde weida shengli) concentrates on the Anti-Japanese War, but 
concludes by noting:  
 
Under the direction of the CCP and Chairman Mao, today 650 million Chinese people have grown 
and developed so as to build a socialist country…[which engages in] unremitting struggle against 
American imperialist invasion in order to secure peace for the world…American hegemony in 
Japan and Taiwan, and using [these states] as a base for the Vietnam War is the biggest threat to 
stability in the region.
50
 
 
In other words an article which was ostensibly about Japan, used its conclusion to 
appeal for the United States to stop encircling the PRC with bases (which at the time 
were being used as a launch pad from which to wage war in Vietnam). Thus whilst 
Chinese propagandists appeared to be stuck in a time warp criticising Japan about the 
war, Japan had in fact decided to move on, in order to help the so-called American 
imperialists engage in another conflict. This editorial suggests that Chinese foreign 
policy did not exist in a vacuum and that China was in fact very worried about the 
containment policy being put into practice on its periphery.
51
 These first two examples 
demonstrate that the state press was using memory of the war to concurrently promote 
multiple policy objectives (bolstering support for Mao and denigrating the role of the 
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United States in Vietnam).  
A third issue embedded in Anti-Japanese War rhetoric was that of control over the 
army. This can be seen from the People’s Daily editorial on Army Day, August 1, 1995, 
which noted that whilst the army and the party jointly won the war, the party comes first, 
suggesting that CCP Chairman Jiang Zenmin was having problems asserting his 
authority over the PLA:   
 
During the War of Resistance against Japan the CCP and its leaders were the mainstay of the people 
and the army…Patriotism is the essence and a source of strength for the Chinese people. 
[Conversely,] if you are backward you will be beaten. [There is a] need to strengthen the 
construction of party-army relations, and to support the absolute control of the army by the party. At 
all times, [the army] should resolutely protect the rights of the third generation leaders with Jiang 
Zemin at the core.
52
  
 
Mao and Deng both had problems in controlling the PLA despite the fact that they were 
both former military commanders.
53
 So it should come as no surprise that Jiang Zemin, 
as a mere third generation leader with no personal combat experience, should 
experience difficulties in directing the armed forces. In the three short examples just 
discussed the embedded messages are written in national newspapers and periodicals. 
However, regional newspapers send coded messages just as clearly, and it is to these 
that we now turn.  
 
Regional papers   
 
Elite leaders are usually based in a nation’s capital and it is not automatic that 
their views on a particular subject will be transmitted to people in the provinces. 
National politicians in Beijing face this very same problem. Indeed, after the founding 
of the PRC they foresaw a need for regional papers which would reach the masses, 
who mostly lived outside the capital and the big cities. As early as 1950, Hu Qiaomu 
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lamented that far more local papers were needed in order to achieve this goal.
54
 It is 
not necessary here to discuss the chronological development of the regional 
newspaper industry, suffice to say that there was rapid growth in the number of 
non-national newspapers, both during the 1950s and then again during the reform 
era.
55
 This increase provided a robust platform from which to transmit the party’s 
message on Japan. The sociologist Herbert Gans argues that in any country “if media 
has geographic diversity then it should have different content,” and the analysis below 
confirms this.
56
 However, there exists considerable debate between those who argue 
that the Chinese regional press has no independence and those who maintain the 
opposite. It is therefore necessary to expound these opposing viewpoints before 
moving on to compare and contrast, regional and national coverage of Japan.  
Starting with those who contend that the regional party press does what it is told. 
One editor-in-chief of a national Chinese newspaper interviewed avers that, in China, 
senior media executives of both party and commercial papers have always been given 
precise instructions on what is permissible commentary on Japan. The propaganda 
bureau accomplishes this “by laying down ‘red lines’ on Japan-related issues, that is, 
boundaries which cannot be crossed under any circumstances.”57 The editor continued 
that in addition to these so-called red lines (which limit geographic diversity), there 
exist other more subtle forms of controlling the press, such as self-censorship by 
journalists and “higher-level guidance” from elite politicians. The former applies to all 
journalism, and not just in China, in that if journalists want to keep their jobs and be 
promoted, then they need to exercise some form of self-censorship.
58
 The latter only 
applies to topics of extreme sensitivity, such as party corruption or Japanese politics. A 
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second senior media source explains the current policy: 
Natural disasters are now “open” unlike before, but the Diaoyu islands crisis would definitely fall 
into the sensitive category. Self-censorship by journalists is a completely different issue, which 
covers more how one should do one’s job and the morals of being a journalist. XHS reports until 
given higher-level guidance, as befits its role as the premier purveyor of news in China. All papers, 
even local ones, are required to use XHS copy if they choose to report on an issue for which 
higher-level guidance is sought. However, there is now no compulsion for any paper to use XHS 
copy, so a commercial newspaper could also choose not to report an event for which higher-level 
guidance has been sought. However, on these sensitive issues, if they decide to print, they are not 
permitted to change a single character of the XHS copy.
59
  
These two interviews seemingly contrast with secondary scholarship on regional 
newspapers, which argues that the provincial media has some latitude in reporting 
sensitive issues. For example, the Sinologist Daniel Lynch posits that party 
management of print media has always been decentralised, and therefore even during 
the Mao era oversight of regional papers was devolved to territorial party committees. 
Then, starting in the 1980s administrative decentralisation at all levels of government 
allowed local media a high degree of autonomy on all issues.
60
 This assertion is 
supported by the political scientist Susan Shirk, who states that the regional 
commercial media are increasingly attempting to circumvent controls on using XHS 
content on “hot-button” topics such as Japan. They attempt to do this by either 
plagiarising foreign news or by relying on interviews.
61
 Guoguang Wu (himself a 
former deputy editor at the People’s Daily) concurs that whilst an article written by 
politburo members or their private staff cannot be changed before its release, if an 
editor vehemently disagrees with its style or content, he will occasionally express his 
disapproval by delaying publication.
62
   
On the one-hand, media figures in Beijing argue that there is little or no scope for 
regional creativity in reportage on Japan, especially with respect to news where 
higher-level guidance is required. On the other hand, scholars such as Susan Shirk 
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contend that the overseas news output of party papers is increasingly at variance with 
their commercial competitors. One means of testing whether regional Chinese copy 
on Japan mirrors content in the People’s Daily is to conduct content analysis. 
Unfortunately, many provincial papers (especially commercial ones) suffer from 
incomplete runs and almost none are available as electronically searchable databases. 
For this reason, the analysis below concentrates on official party newspapers, for 
which regional editions are much more widely available. Rather than examining 
named newspapers in detail, the idea here is to provide an empirically-based selection 
of different types of articles, which permits a more nuanced understanding of the way 
in which the regional party press presents news about Japan. 
 
Mao era regional newspapers  
 
During the Mao era most regional papers carried little news about events in Japan 
or Sino-Japanese relations. Reportage on Japanese elections or negotiations pertaining 
to bilateral fishing agreements, for instance, might receive extensive coverage in the 
People’s Daily but often no space whatsoever in a provincial newspaper. One area of 
conformity between Mao era national and regional newspapers though, was that on 
occasion they were both instructed to reprint keynote policy speeches relating to 
Japan.
63
 Classified (neibu) propaganda directives also gave precise instructions to all 
papers, detailing which articles they had to publish on certain dates, such as wartime 
commemorations of the Japanese defeat.
64
 
Figure 19 shows an example of an event where papers across the country all 
published the same article on the same date, in this case celebrating the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the Japanese surrender in World War Two. Here a joint editorial on 
September 3, 1970 by the People’s Daily and the PLA Daily entitled, “Smash the 
resurgence of Japanese militarism” (Dadao fuohuode riben junguozhuyi) is reprinted 
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word-for-word in all party newspapers.
65
 The format of the article, the paragraph 
sub-headings and even the punctuation are identical in papers printed thousands of 
miles apart, including the Beijing Daily, the Chongqing Daily and the Harbin Daily. 
Even the formatting of the papers is similar, in that the editorial is placed below the 
same quotation from Mao Zedong, “Peoples of the world unite, smash the American 
invaders and all their running dogs,” where running dogs, of course, refers to the 
Japanese.  
Another area of conformity between national and provincial newspapers in 
reporting on Japan relates to censorship. This might seem rather an odd assertion to 
make, but provincial archives contain countless examples of visits by Japanese 
delegations and important personages, which are reported neither in the national nor 
the local press. One reason visits by Japanese dignitaries went unreported is that they 
did not always run smoothly. For example, during visits to Chongqing in the 1950s 
there was local hostility towards Japanese guests, which manifested itself in the form 
of: children throwing rocks at passing cavalcades, concerns that visiting Japanese who 
asked too many questions were in fact intelligence agents, and embarrassment at poor 
organisation (when cadres forgot to meet an arriving Japanese delegation at 
Chongqing railway station, for instance).
66
 
A second plausible reason for failing to report the occurrence of Mao era 
Japanese visits to China—both nationally and locally—relates to sensitivities over the 
war. Again, using Chongqing as an example, on several visits to the city Japanese 
politicians formally apologised for their country’s wartime actions, which ought to 
have been front-page news all over China, especially (as in one case) the speaker was 
the leading LDP member Kuno Tadashi. During a September 1964 visit to the city he 
said, “Twenty years ago Japan invaded China and caused absolute havoc there. We are 
very sorry to China [sic].”67 However, such contrition coming from a Japanese  
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Figure 19. Identical coverage of the anniversary of the Japanese surrender on 3/9/70 (selected 
newspapers). Clockwise from top right: People’s Daily, Chongqing Daily, Harbin Daily, Beijing Daily. 
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politician, did not accord with the official Chinese desire to paint the Japanese 
governing class as unrepentant militarists and a nascent threat. The apology was 
therefore suppressed and never printed in any Chinese newspaper.
68
 
 
Reform era coverage of Japan in the provinces     
 
Provincial coverage of Japan-related news in the reform era (1978-present) shows 
much continuity with that of the Mao era. For example, most regional copy on Japan 
reprints national news without alteration, such as coverage of Emperor Akihito’s visit 
in 1992 or the dispute over the Diaoyu islands in 2012. So in this respect, since the 
start of the reform era in 1978, most of the country has continued to read what 
national rather than local newspaper editors think about Japan.   
However, post-1978 national and local reportage on Japan differs in three main 
respects. One, commercial newspapers (which reappeared for the first time since the 
early 1950s, after newspapers were permitted to sell advertisements in 1979) have 
continually sought to push the boundaries of what can and cannot be said on Japan, 
with increasing success.
69
 Commercial Chinese papers sell news for profit, and so 
they have a vested interest in promoting their own viewpoint on issues such as 
Sino-Japanese relations, because this will help them to sell more papers and therefore 
increase revenue.
70
 Two, increasing interaction between Japanese and Chinese people 
at the provincial level (party, government, trade, etc.), has been accompanied by a rise 
in the number of articles detailing bilateral trade visits in the regional press.
71
 These 
articles are often short, noting nothing more than the dates of the visit, the people 
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involved, the industry and the size of the potential deals discussed.
72
 
 
 
Figure 20. Reform era coverage of the Anti-Japanese War in selected newspapers (15–16 August, 
national events only). 
 
Three, reform era commemoration of the Anti-Japanese War—a subject which 
my research argues plays a major part in defining the way in which the Chinese state 
has chosen to represent Japan since 1949—shows subtle regional variations. Figure 20 
shows war reportage in three newspapers for every year of the reform era from the 
years 1978–2010 inclusive: the People’s Daily, the Heilongjiang Daily and the 
Chongqing Daily.
73
 I selected the Heilongjiang Daily both because its geographical 
area of coverage (Heilongjiang Province) was a region where the CCP was active 
during the war, and also because during the reform era the Unit 731 museum near 
Harbin became a centre of national war memory (see chap. 2). The Chongqing Daily 
was selected for the opposite reason, namely that from 1938 onwards the city was the 
Nationalist capital, from which Jiang Jieshi directed much of the war effort until the 
Japanese defeat in 1945. Articles from regional newspapers published in areas where 
the CCP and the GMD were active in the war (the Heilongjiang Daily and the 
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Chongqing Daily), are then compared to those from a national paper (the People’s 
Daily). Data in figure 20 is provided for two dates annually, the fifteenth and sixteenth 
of August. These dates have been selected, so as to capture both news articles relating 
to the anniversary of the Japanese defeat on August 15 itself (recounting details of 
battles fought against the Japanese invaders for example), as well as reportage of 
commemoration events that took place on August 15 published the following day 
(such as visits of national leaders to war museums).    
The data in figure 20 shows that first, after 1978 coverage of the anniversary is 
frequently more extensive in Beijing than in either Heilongjiang or Chongqing. 
Assuming that the number of articles about the conflict and its commemoration 
accurately reflects the leadership’s interest in the subject, the data suggests that the 
national leadership is generally more focused on remembering the war than party 
committees in either Harbin or Chongqing.  
Secondly, the majority of articles published by regional papers relating to the war 
and the history problem, seem to fall into two distinct categories. One main category 
reprints news pieces from the XHS and the People’s Daily. Major policy speeches by 
national Chinese leaders on Japan and condemnations of visits to the Yasukuni shrine 
all fall into this class. The other main category concerns articles originally published 
in the national press which merely commemorate the war, such as those writing about 
the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bomb blasts. These appear to be used selectively 
by the regional press as “filler” articles. Use of these filler pieces varies considerably 
between regional papers, indicating that no specific instructions are issued from 
Beijing as to precisely which filler articles should be published outside the capital on 
which date.  
Thirdly, in all papers examined the volume of coverage relating to the August 15 
anniversary appears to reflect a complex range of contemporary, national, domestic 
political considerations. For the conjecture that the volume of post-1978 war memory 
reportage in the Chinese state press reflects the contemporary state of Sino-Japanese 
relations to be true, then during periods of bilateral amity Chinese media criticism of 
Japan’s wartime actions ought to be relatively subdued. Conversely, during periods of 
245 
 
bilateral discord the volume of articles attacking Japan’s war record ought to rise. This 
is in fact exactly what happens, and coverage of the war anniversary in both national 
and provincial newspapers can be used as a barometer for the state of Sino-Japanese 
relations, with the caveat that from 1985 onwards, commemoration of decennial 
anniversaries of the Japanese defeat is especially prominent in all party papers.
74
  
During periods of friendly bilateral relations—such as during the immediate 
aftermath of the signing of the Peace Treaty in 1978, and during the early 1990s when 
the PRC was largely ostracised by the international community as a result of the 1989 
Tiananmen Square incident—criticism of Japan’s war record was extremely muted. 
As a result, between the years 1978–81 and 1990–91 there were no articles published 
about the anniversary of the Japanese defeat in any of the three papers examined. 
Conversely, during periods of bilateral discord (such as the 2001–06 premiership of 
Koizumi Junichiro), the frequency with which articles criticising Japan’s war record 
appear rises sharply. The evidence certainly allows the generation of a tentative 
hypothesis, that the frequency of criticisms of Japan’s war record on major 
anniversaries (e.g. on August 15), in both provincial and national newspapers, 
provides an approximate gauge of the current state of Sino-Japanese relations. 
Chinese party newspapers are especially efficacious at providing such a gauge, 
because they have always been required to act quickly and sensitively, to even the 
slightest fluctuations in political direction on issues such as Japan.
75
  
Finally, the data can also be used in order to examine how the local party press 
presents the wartime fight against Japan in their locality. The data in figure 21 
suggests that articles relating to the war from a local perspective are largely missing 
from normative discourse on the Anti-Japanese War. For instance, on anniversaries of 
the Japanese defeat the Heilongjiang Daily largely ignores the former Japanese CBW 
camp Unit 731, located near the provincial capital Harbin. This is despite the fact that 
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Unit 731 was made a national patriotic education site in 1982 and was opened to the 
public in 1985.
76
 During the reform era, the total number of Heilongjiang Daily 
articles published on August 15–16 relating to the Anti-Japanese War (128 articles), 
outnumbers the number of pieces published on the war as it was fought in north-east 
China (32 articles), by a ratio of four-to-one. Put differently, since 1978, on the 
anniversary of the Japanese defeat, there has been less than one article per year 
reflecting on the fighting in Heilongjiang Province, and less than one article every two 
years on Unit 731. This reinforces the findings in chapter two that the Heilongjiang 
CCP territorial committee (which publishes the Heilongjiang Daily) wishes to avoid 
drawing attention to Unit 731, preferring to promote the province as an investment 
and tourist destination instead.      
 
 
Figure 21. Reform era coverage of the Anti-Japanese War in the Heilongjiang Daily and the Chongqing 
Daily (15–16 August, local events only). 
 
This pattern of downplaying the war as it was fought locally is repeated in the 
Chongqing Daily. Figure 20 shows that on the dates selected there is a strong 
correlation in the volume of state-wide reportage relating to the war in the People’s 
Daily and the Chongqing Daily. This suggests that during the reform era, provincial 
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party papers have tended to follow the lead of national papers in their reportage of 
remembering the war.  
However, coverage of the city’s role in fighting the Japanese is much more 
sporadic, in that not a single article on the subject appears in the Chongqing Daily 
until 2005 (see fig. 21).
77
 Instead, the Chongqing Daily commemorates the 
anniversary of the war every year with articles highlighting the CCP’s contribution to 
defeating the Japanese. This supports my argument in chapter one that the Chinese 
Communists have reluctantly and belatedly admitted the Nationalists’ contribution to 
defeating the Japanese. Between the years 1978–2010, on August 15–16 the 
Chongqing Daily published ninety-five articles on Communist wartime resistance, of 
which only nine related to the war as seen from Chongqing, and only two of those 
nine news pieces even mention the GMD.
78
 This means that articles highlighting the 
CCP’s contribution to beating the Japanese outnumbered those on the GMD’s 
contribution by a ratio of nearly fifty-to-one! These nine articles were all published to 
coincide with the sixtieth and sixty-fifth anniversaries of the Japanese defeat (in 2005 
and 2010).  
Examining just one of these nine articles about memory of the war provides 
insights on how the CCP views the GMD. Like so many of the textbooks, films and 
newspapers examined in this study, superficially the 2005 article described below is 
about Japan and the war, but surface and reality differ, in that the real intention of the 
article is to deliver a blistering attack on the Nationalists. The article in question is an 
editorial from the August 15, 2005 edition of the Chongqing Daily (see fig. 22). This 
was the very first article to be published in the Chongqing party’s newspaper to admit 
that the city played a major role in fighting the Japanese, “The contribution of 
Chongqing in the history of the Chinese people’s War of Resistance against the 
Japanese” (Chongqing dui zhongguo renmin kangri zhanzhengde lishi gongxian). The  
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Figure 22. Chongqing Daily editorial showing how the CCP’s version of the war in Chongqing 
dominates the Nationalist one (15/8/05 edition, p. 3). Note how the article on the war as seen from 
Chongqing at the bottom of the page is completely dominated by the article above it, which vilifies the 
Nationalists and emphasises how the CCP won the war.  
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article never mentions Jiang Jieshi and only passingly refers to the Nationalists, in the 
context of joint CCP-GMD resistance. It highlights the fact that Chongqing was 
China’s wartime capital as well as the point that its residents had to endure frequent 
Japanese air raids, yet it hardly acknowledges that the Nationalists were based there. 
Instead, the editorial devotes more space to the circumstances that led the CCP to 
locate its wartime southern headquarters (zhonggong zhongyang nanfang ju) in 
Chongqing, and how since the war, Chongqing has thrived under Communist tutelage. 
In short, 60 years after the Japanese defeat, the reluctant admission that the city of 
Chongqing played a role in World War Two, does not equate to lavishing praise on the 
leader who made his wartime capital there, namely Jiang Jieshi.  
 
Imagery of Japan in Chinese newspapers 
 
 It is fitting that the final part of this chapter should focus on images of Japan in 
Chinese newspapers, because the power of images is such that they can be used for 
very tangible purposes, even “handling roles that society no longer [handles] by itself,” 
such as certain religious functions for instance.
79
 Many scholars have noted the 
importance of imagery, including Roland Barthes, who posits that “pictures…are 
more imperative than writing, they impose meaning at a stroke, without analysing or 
diluting it.”80 Before examining examples of images accompanying copy on Japan 
drawn from Chinese newspapers, two points of clarification are necessary. First, 
images can either be denotative or connotative. Stuart Hall argues that cultural “codes 
of denotation are precise, literal [and] unambiguous.”81 This means that a photograph 
of a Japanese flag, for example, is readily identified as such and cannot be confused 
with say a rifle or a tank. Conversely, “connotative codes are the configurations of 
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meaning which permit a sign to signify, in addition to its denotative reference, other, 
additional implied meanings.” 82  Secondly, Hall continues that unlike real life, 
photographs lack the movement, gestures, interaction and speech needed to tease out 
these additional implied meanings (i.e. forms of knowledge derived from social 
practices which order dominant meaning patterns). A photograph therefore represents 
a truncated version of reality, as perceived through the cultural codes just described.
83
 
The analysis below therefore concentrates on connotative rather than denotative codes 
of meaning found in People’s Daily newspaper imagery, because their additional 
implied meanings assist in answering our central question of how China views Japan. 
 During the Mao era the People’s Daily was frequently only four and occasionally 
a mere two pages in length. This fact, accompanied by the relatively long length of 
commentary pieces and editorials, left little room for photographs, pictures and 
cartoons to accompany articles about Japan.
84
 Even still, it is noteworthy that despite 
the large volume of People’s Daily reportage on Japan between the years 1949–76 
(see above), visual representations of Japanese leaders, delegations or people were 
largely absent, in a very similar way to school textbooks. Through much of the Mao 
era, many key events in the history of Sino-Japanese relations were reported verbally 
rather than visually.
85
 Furthermore, press photographs of other foreign delegations to 
the PRC frequently featured in preference to Japanese ones. 
Even when elite leaders such as Zhou Enlai met with visiting Japanese 
delegations, pictures of the visit were rarely printed in the national press. We know 
that photos of these visits were taken, because top PRC leaders’ memoirs include 
them as plates.
86
 My point here is that during the 1950s and 60s, omission of 
photographs taken during visits by Japanese delegations was used to downplay their 
significance, by not drawing attention to them in a visually stimulating way.  
 
                                                 
82
 Ibid. 
83
 Ibid., 226–27.  
84
 Cheek, Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China, 132. 
85
 For example, few if any photographs accompany RMRB reportage of key events such as the million 
strong Chinese demonstrations against the signing of the United States-Japan Security Treaty (23–
24/1/60), or the repatriation of the first tranche of Japanese POWs from China to Japan (20–22/3/53). 
86
 For example see: Li Deʼan, Zhou enlai yu riben pengyou. 
251 
 
 
 
Figure 23. People’s Daily montage showing Anti-Japanese War cartoons (17/8/65 edition, p. 6). 
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August 1965 seems to mark a sea change in the way visual representations of 
Japan are presented in the People’s Daily. As part of the celebrations held that month 
to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of victory over Japan, full-page photo montages, 
maps and cartoons depicting Chinese resistance to the Japanese invaders were printed 
in the paper (see fig. 23). The economist Kenneth Boulding offers a model for 
comparing groups of images, such as those contained in the August 1965 war 
montages. He contends that as a medium, visual “messages can cause no change, very 
limited change or revolutionary change” in perception by the target audience, whilst at 
the same time “adding to, reorganising or clarifying [the response].”87 These images 
also have a rating “according to some scale of betterness or worseness [sic]…and that 
the hierarchy of [these different] scales is very important in determining the effect of 
the messages on the scales themselves.”88  
Taking the montage on page six of the August 17, 1965 edition of the People’s 
Daily as an example (fig. 23), the Chinese masses are presented as united in their 
opposition to the Japanese enemy, an enemy rated as “extremely low” on a scale of 
betterness or worseness. These visual messages are not intended to cause any basis 
change in the readers’ perception of Japan (i.e. a highly-negative perception), in line 
with pejorative visual tropes of Japan found in contemporary history textbooks (see 
chap. 3) and Anti-Japanese War films (see chap. 4).  
Stuart Hall provides a slightly different means of classifying images, by focusing 
on the compelling theme of difference in mass media imagery, “a secret fascination 
[with] otherness,” represented by differences in opposites (such as enemy/ally, 
attack/defeat) and extremes too.
89
 Hall traces this fascination back to Saussure, who 
argues that we can “only construct meaning through the dialogue with the other.”90 
Figure 23 suggests that People’s Daily editors clearly understood power relations 
between opposites. On the one hand, the defending Chinese are portrayed as vigorous 
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healthy men and women, who are numerous, well trained and properly equipped. On 
the other hand, the Japanese enemy are shown as cowering, crouching or lying on the 
ground, wearing shabby uniforms and supplied with inferior weapons.  
These illustrations compare interestingly with representations of Japan in other 
formats. For example, there are strong similarities between the right hand cartoon on 
the second row of figure 23 and the still from the film Underground War (see chap. 4, 
fig. 9). In both pictures, a fearless Communist guerrilla is shown towering over “little 
Japanese” soldiers scattered in front of him, emphasising his superiority. Note also how 
the top left and bottom right cartoons in figure 23, show the Japanese invaders as 
having abnormally shaped bodies with scruffy, unkempt uniforms, in marked contrast 
to the healthy Communist fighters. This juxtaposition of opposites is also found in 
Chinese school textbooks, such as in the pictures accompanying the story of Yu Lai 
(chap. 3, fig. 8). 
In the same way that news in the People’s Daily conveys multiple layers of 
meaning intended for various audiences, images (and montages) printed in the paper 
are also designed to send differing signals to a range of readers. To see how this works 
in practice, an examination of the photographic montage shown in figure 24 (People’s 
Daily, August 29, 1965, p. 6) transmits a variety of messages about the war in pursuit 
of contemporary domestic policy objectives.
91
  
At the top of the montage are two photos, one of Mao Zedong at the Communist 
headquarters in Yenan penning his strategy on resisting Japan, the other a copy of the 
resulting book—On Protracted War (Lun chijiu zhan). These two images dominate 
the top half of the montage, suggesting that not only was Yenan the nerve centre of the 
war (because that was where Mao’s treatise on beating the Japanese was formulated), 
but also that it was Mao Zedong rather than Jiang Jieshi who was the chief architect of 
the Chinese wartime resistance. It is striking that other than Mao no other Chinese 
leader is shown in the montage, not even a Communist one, with the implication that 
during the war Mao dominated the CCP to the exclusion of all other leaders. Whilst  
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Figure 24. People’s Daily war montage emphasising Chairman Mao’s contribution to defeating Japan 
on the top row (29/8/65 edition, p. 6). 
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Mao was in the ascendancy at Yenan, he was still vying with Wang Ming for 
supremacy at this time.
92
 It is therefore no coincidence that on the eve of the Cultural 
Revolution, when Mao was again struggling to gain political ascendancy (this time 
over moderates such as Liu Shaoqi), that he should be portrayed as the architect of the 
Chinese wartime victory over Japan.
93
 The clear message here is that because Mao 
was the author of the Chinese victory in World War Two, he indubitably still had the 
right to rule in 1965, 20 years after the Japanese defeat.  
The second row of figure 24 shows ordinary people flocking to enlist in the 
Eighth Route Army and the Fourth New Army, both of which were commanded by 
CCP generals.
94
 These pictures severally attempt to deny any role to non-Communist 
forces in fighting the Japanese, to reinforce contemporary CCP doctrine that it was the 
Chinese Communists who beat the Japanese, and that the people love the army 
(otherwise why would they flock to join the Communist guerrillas?). On the third line 
there is “proof” that the CCP acting in concert with peasants did in fact beat the 
Japanese, by showing captured enemy positions and ammunition dumps on the left, 
and peasants uprooting railway tracks laid by the invaders on the right. Again, the 
interpretation of the war as presented in this montage is very economical with the 
truth, because it was the GMD and not the CCP that bore the brunt of the resistance to 
Japan. 
As noted above, at this time (1965) the commander-in-chief of the PLA Lin Biao, 
politically aligned himself to Mao Zedong by writing articles praising the chairman’s 
eternal contribution to winning the war.
95
 It is therefore plausible that this montage 
was a means of showing the army’s (i.e. Lin Biao’s) support for Mao in 1965. This 
possibility exists because it is laid out with a framework that shows the Communist 
armed forces faithfully implementing Mao’s strategy.  
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It is ironic that although the subject of this montage is ostensibly beating the 
Japanese, imperial soldiers only appear in one out of the eleven pictures (fig. 24 
bottom right). As with other mediums (e.g. war films), the war here was used as a 
means of pursuing domestic policy aims in the here-and-now, in this instance, 
building a case for unopposed rule by Mao Zedong supported by the PLA. This 
interpretation is vindicated by the events of the following year (1966), where two of 
the main agents influencing the onset of the Cultural Revolution were Mao Zedong 
and Lin’s PLA.  
An alternative means of unpacking the meaning of the images in figure 24, is to 
use the theory espoused by the political scientist W. E. Griffiths. Writing about 
totalitarian societies in general, he posits that they normally have sacred texts, which 
are authoritative because they are prophetic. Within these texts history is constantly 
revised for ostensibly rational (i.e. ideological) purposes, in combination with ritual 
and protocol (Mao’s poetry, Stalin’s uniform and so on).96  
Applying Griffiths’ insight to the imagery in figure 24, it could be argued that 
Mao’s On Protracted War is presented here as a sacred authoritative text in the 
country’s premier newspaper, the People’s Daily. History for the CCP, at least as 
shown in this montage, focuses only on the 1937–45 war. In fact it might be 
dangerous for party propagandists to focus on previous conflict with Japan (for 
example, the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95)), because to do so would potentially 
give legitimacy to others who fought the Japanese, such as Manchu military 
commanders during the late Qing. In a sense history, or at least history as the CCP 
chooses to portray it, only starts after the founding of the CCP in 1921, which is why 
this montage shows resistance during the Second rather than the First Sino-Japanese 
War. “History” has been revised to airbrush out the GMD and warlords who, 
problematically for the CCP, resisted the Japanese outside the Communist command 
structure. Eulogising On Protracted War as a sacred text not only bolsters the 
Communists’ claim to power, but also Mao Zedong’s pre-eminent role within the 
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party.  
After 1965 these montages and images of the war appear time and time again, 
continually bombarding the masses until they internalise them. One of the reasons for 
this was that Mao, like Lenin, never ever disagreed with Marx. Mao therefore 
believed that “teaching is repeating is teaching.”97 The laborious redundancy of 
writing “suggest[ed] a belief by Mao that great danger [would] ensue from the 
slightest misunderstanding of his words,” and this equally applied to the endless 
recycling of the images accompanying those words.
98
  
 
Media images of Japan during the reform era 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the first textbook crisis in 1982, Chinese territory 
was visually mapped in new ways which helped to redefine the war geographically. 
This was done by combining wartime images in such a way as to emphasise the 
1931–45 humiliation of all Chinese people by Japanese invaders, regardless of where 
that humiliation took place. As an example of this, figure 25 shows a montage of 
wartime atrocities allegedly committed by the Japanese in Nanjing, Shanghai and 
Guangzhou (People’s Daily August 4, 1982). These photographs, and others like them, 
published in the weeks following the outbreak of the textbook crisis,
99
 highlight a 
subtle shift away from China as “victor” in the war, to China as “victim” in the war.100 
The new perceived victimhood was geo-referenced, in that it was increasingly 
identified with specific locations, such as Nanjing and Harbin.  
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Figure 25. Images from the People’s Daily showing wartime atrocities allegedly committed by the 
Japanese in Nanjing, Shanghai and Guangzhou (4/8/82 edition, p. 4). 
 
The historian Aled Jones offers clues as to the importance of location, in his work 
on how the nineteenth-century Welsh print media played a pivotal role in defining 
what it meant to be Welsh. Journalism in Wales during this period generated a 
powerful sense of place, by fixing the variation of Welsh knowledge and defining 
Welsh perceptions of reality.
101
 Jones contends that the ritual repetition of leeks, 
dragons, harps and other images of Wales “signif[ied] to the reader an unmistakeable 
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identification with a concept of nationality.”102 If we assume that the same processes 
are at work here in both Welsh newspapers and the Chinese party press, then from 
1982 onwards images of the war are used to enhance Chinese identity for all PRC 
citizens, rather than just the CCP’s wartime supporters. It is therefore no coincidence 
that the images shown in figure 25 are all from areas outside CCP control during the 
war. By rooting the war in multiple locations, China’s own media was (rather like 
nineteenth-century Wales) being used to generate a powerful sense of place, that is, 
“China,” or more precisely, “China, including areas which were under the command 
of non-Communist forces during the Anti-Japanese War.” To understand this 
definition more clearly, it is necessary to consider competing definitions of nationality 
before and after 1982. 
Before August 1982, one “working definition of China as a nation” was that the 
Chinese people were united in their resistance to the Japanese enemy, under the 
leadership of the CCP.
103
 Furthermore the Nationalists’ traitorous inability to resist 
the Japanese in World War Two, led to their ultimate downfall in the ensuing 1946–49 
civil war. After August 1982, images (and news stories) about the Anti-Japanese War 
in specific locations, many of them never held by Communists, added new 
complexities to this working definition in two ways. Firstly, from this time onwards 
the media increasingly focused on China as victim rather than China as victor.
104
 
Secondly, China was now conceived as a territorial space where atrocities were 
committed by the invading Japanese against all Chinese, regardless of their political 
affiliation. In other words, after 1982 it was now politically acceptable for the war 
against Japan to be “imagined” in locations such as Nanjing, Shanghai and 
Guangzhou (as shown in fig. 25) which were outside Communist control.
105
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Figure 26. A People’s Daily war montage which gives prominent place to Nationalist resistance to the 
Japanese at Taierzhuang (bottom left painting) (30/8/85 edition, p. 8).  
 
 
In chapters one and two we saw that the 1981 historical questions resolution 
formally rehabilitated the Nationalists and their role in resisting the Japanese. In 
subsequent chapters it was then demonstrated how this rehabilitation gradually 
filtered down through textbooks (chap. 3) and films (chap. 4). Similarly, in 
newspapers rehabilitation of the GMD gradually gathers momentum after 1982, 
visually as well as in print.  
As an exemplar of this, figure 26 from the August 30, 1985 edition of the 
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People’s Daily shows a montage of the Anti-Japanese War. In many ways the montage 
seems typical of the genre, replete with pictures of Communists repelling the Japanese. 
Yet on closer inspection, it can be seen that a prominent role in the fighting exists for 
the GMD, because the bottom left portrait shows a scene from the battle for 
Taierzhuang. The painting here depicts the fierce action for Taierzhuang railway 
station, which changed hands several times during the assault at immense human 
cost.
106
 As discussed in the last chapter, this battle, directed by General Li Zongren, 
was fought by Nationalist troops (with warlord reinforcements) with no contribution 
from CCP forces. The message embedded within this montage is that although the war 
still plays a vital part in imagining how the Communists came to power, it is now 
accepted that the GMD played a role in the war. However, this visual rehabilitation 
was slow and grudging.
107
 For example just four days after the montage shown in 
figure 26 was printed, on September 3, 1985 another war montage showed pictures of 
CCP, Soviet and American soldiers resisting the Japanese on Chinese soil, neglecting 
to mention that the GMD did the same.  
It would be misleading, however, to assume that the only images of Japan 
appearing in the Chinese party press are historical images of the war. Photographs of 
contemporary Sino-Japanese summits and bilateral talks now inflect the People’s 
Daily and other party newspapers, but not in a way that draws attention to Japan or 
gives it face. Using Kenneth Boulding’s model of coding images described above, 
these photos seem to be designed in such a way as to cause no basis change in readers’ 
assumed negative perceptions of Japan. Two examples demonstrate how this works.  
One, following the visit to Beijing by Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei in 
September 1972, a Japanese diplomatic mission was opened in Beijing on January 11, 
1973.
108
 This landmark event in post-war Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations was 
reported with a news item precisely one sentence in length—and no photo. It might be 
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argued that as the opening of the embassy took place during the Cultural Revolution, 
the editors of the People’s Daily preferred to concentrate solely on domestic rather 
than international issues. After all, in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution China 
closed most of its diplomatic missions abroad.
109
 Yet this is emphatically not the case 
because on January 11–12, 1973 the People’s Daily provided almost blanket coverage 
for the visit by President Mobutu of Zaire, accompanied by numerous photos. A 
similar pattern is repeated for the arrival of the first post-war Japanese ambassador to 
China on March 28, 1973. A terse, factual article commemorating the event with no 
accompanying photograph, is buried on page six of the following day’s edition of the 
People’s Daily.  
Two, throughout the early 2000s, a period when Sino-Japanese relations were 
harmed by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s attitude towards the history 
problem, Chinese party papers ignored or downplayed meetings with Japanese leaders 
at ASEAN+3 summits (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “+3” refers to the 
participation of China, Japan and South Korea). For example, at the close of the 
November 2002 ASEAN+3 conference the Chinese premier, Zhu Rongji was 
photographed with other leaders attending the summit, a photo which was then 
published in the November 4, 2002 edition of the People’s Daily (not shown).110 Yet 
almost the only leader missing from the photo call is the Japanese prime minister. 
This omission in itself may not seem significant, until one considers the fact that in 
subsequent years Japanese leaders and diplomats are cut from most pictures taken at 
other ASEAN+3 meetings. At the 2004 summit, for instance, Chinese premier Wen 
Jiabao is photographed seated next to his Japanese counterpart, Koizumi Junichiro, 
yet the photo printed on page three of the November 30, 2004 edition of the People’s 
Daily only shows Wen (see fig. 27).
111
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Figure 27. Photograph printed in the People’s Daily showing Premier Wen Jiabao at the 2004 ASEAN 
summit seated next to Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro who has been cut from the picture (30/11/04 
edition, p. 6). 
 
 
Figure 28. People’s Daily image showing Prime Minister Abe Shinzo seated at President Hu Jintao’s 
right hand (8/10/06 edition, p. 1). 
           
In the same way that the readout on pressure barometers fluctuates with the 
weather, photographs of noteworthy events in Sino-Japanese relations appear to 
reflect changes in bilateral ties. In other words, images can be used to move Chinese 
party press representations of Japan up as well as down Boulding’s scale of betterness 
or worseness. To illustrate, after the January 17, 1995 Kobe earthquake, the People’s 
Daily ran a series of images lauding Japanese technological innovation, such as clean 
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toilets (not shown), public telephone booths that actually worked and so on.
112
 As 
another example, this time related to international politics, as soon as Prime Minister 
Koizumi was replaced by Abe Shinzo, the People’s Daily ran articles accompanied by 
large colour photos of the new Japanese prime minister, attending talks in Beijing 
with President Hu Jintao on October 8, 2006 (see fig. 28). Unlike the examples 
discussed above, figure 28 implies equality, because instead of cutting Abe Shinzo out 
of the photo, he is shown as a worthy interlocutor to President Hu, seated right beside 
him.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has argued that since 1949 the party press has formed an important 
conduit for expressing views on Japan. During the Mao era the People’s Daily and 
other state newspapers were read by CCP elites and the masses alike. As a result of 
policy changes during the reform era, however, party newspapers have had to 
compete with a vibrant commercial press, which has resulted in a declining readership. 
In spite of this, the output of media organs such as the People’s Daily retain their 
importance, both because they transmit views of party elites on Japan and also 
because they are read by the nation’s decision-makers. 
 Four aspects of state media commentary on Japan were examined: overall output, 
embedded messages, regional variations on news copy and news photos. Taking each 
of these aspects in turn. First, content analysis of Japan-related news copy in the 
People’s Daily demonstrates continued intense official interest in Japan since 1949, 
with hundreds of articles published annually about that country. In some years as 
much as five percent of all People’s Daily copy is related to Japan. This compares 
interestingly with the analysis in chapter one, which also argues for the existence of 
strong interest in Japan by Chinese elites from 1949 right through to the present day. 
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A significant proportion of People’s Daily reportage on Japan relates to the war, and is 
often highly concentrated in the weeks and months surrounding the decennial 
anniversaries of the Japanese defeat. Moreover, news copy on the war at this time is 
predominantly negative (often more than two-thirds of articles), although news at 
other times is often less critical of Japan (with an “undercurrent” of approximately 
one-third of negative articles).  
 Secondly, different audiences read newspaper articles on Japan in different ways. 
For example, a general reader might read all of a page-long editorial on the role of the 
PLA in fighting Japan in World War Two, whilst a high-ranking cadre might closely 
scan only small sections of it for clues on, say, contemporary party control over the 
army. This fits in with the broad claim made at the start of this study, that “Japan” is 
frequently used as a means of pursuing diverse policy objectives, such as intensifying 
links with North Korea in the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet split.  
 Thirdly, during the Mao era the regional party press faithfully reprinted national 
copy on Japan, although usually only for important visits, policy statements and so on. 
During the reform era provincial party papers have continued to reprint pieces sent 
from Beijing, together with a generous helping of articles on local bilateral trade 
cooperation. However, reform era local media commentary on the war now differs 
from its national counterparts in one important respect—how they remember the 
conflict as it was fought locally. For instance, the Heilongjiang Daily declines to draw 
attention to the Unit 731 museum right on its doorstep (on the outskirts of Harbin), 
whereas the Chongqing Daily now uses memory of the war to utterly repudiate the 
GMD’s role in resisting the Japanese. 
Finally, imagery on Japan contained in newspapers can tell us much about how 
elite politicians and party newspaper editors see that country. Images (photographs, 
montages, cartoons) are also used, like other transmission mediums discussed in this 
thesis, in pursuit of domestic policy objectives. For example, during the lead-up to the 
Cultural Revolution, when Mao was fighting party moderates such as Liu Shaoqi for 
supremacy, war montages emphasising Mao Zedong’s wartime strategy implied that 
Mao was still indubitably China’s paramount ruler. As another example, almost 20 
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years later in 1982, in the aftermath of the first textbook crisis, photos of Japanese 
atrocities committed outside of CCP base areas were published, as a means of subtly 
admitting that non-Communist forces also made contributions to defeating the enemy.  
As an afterword, it seems that all, or nearly all, of the articles published in the 
party press (about contemporary Japan, its wartime record and memory of the war) 
contain embedded messages. For those with knowledge of how to decode them, there 
is a wealth of untapped information waiting to be analysed, not just on how the CCP 
sees Japan, but on how it sees China too.   
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Conclusion 
 
 
Despite the large number of empirical studies on Sino-Japanese relations, we still 
lack an overall framework for conceptualising what is said about Japan. This study 
has attempted to provide one, in order to identify the normative character of Chinese 
imagery of Japan. I have done this by analysing five mainland Chinese “institutions,” 
namely elite views, war museums, the education system, Anti-Japanese War films and 
newspapers. In the introduction, I noted that the conceptual framework for this study 
could be likened to a cinema, screening a film entitled Angry States. Much of the 
analysis in this thesis has concentrated on the activities of our imaginary cinema 
projection room, examining what is screened to Chinese audiences and why. 
This study has made four sets of broad claims. The first is that since the 
foundation of the People’s Republic in 1949, elite Chinese politicians have been 
intensely curious about Japan, its political affairs, people, territory, economy, recent 
history (especially the war) and the potential for a resurrection of Japanese militarism. 
This finding contradicts the opinion of those scholars outside China, who posit that 
prior to the reform era, Japan was largely ignored by both Chinese people and their 
elites. I have presented evidence showing that CCP leaders have continually paid 
great attention to the way in which Japan is presented to ordinary Chinese people. For 
example, in the CCPCC’s own newspaper, the People’s Daily, even prior to 
normalisation of relations in 1972, articles were published about Japan almost every 
day, despite the fact that the paper was frequently only two to four pages in length at 
this time. Elite party views of Japan are important, because in all the institutions 
examined, Chinese leaders have sought to shape and influence the direction of debate 
on China’s former enemy, whether Deng Xiaoping calling for monuments to Japan’s 
invasion (1982) or Jiang Zemin complaining that school textbooks do not contain 
enough history about the war (2000). 
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However, intense interest in Japan should not be equated with a monolithic view 
of that country across all party and government structures. During the late 1950s for 
example, the State Council in Beijing and the Heilongjiang territorial CCP committee 
clashed over whether to preserve the ruins of Unit 731. Even after officials in the 
capital “won” this argument, by insisting that evidence of the enemy’s (i.e. Japanese) 
crimes must be preserved, the local party committee blithely ignored the edict from 
Beijing. In doing so they permitted local residents to cart off bricks, steel cables and 
other debris from the site, thus ensuring its almost total destruction by the mid-1970s. 
As another example, throughout the Mao era, teaching was subject to almost 
continuous political interference, which severely affected the ability of schoolchildren 
to absorb instruction on Japan as presented in history and language textbooks. In 
regional party newspapers too, recent memory of the war has been severally used to 
play down awareness of Japan’s former biological warfare activities (Harbin), and to 
attack the contribution of the Nationalists to fighting the Japanese (Chongqing).  
 So should we take this as evidence of politics as usual, whereby the development 
of views on Japan is chaotic and cyclical (from enemy to friend and back to enemy 
again) rather than linear (from enemy to friend to trading partner)? In one important 
respect the answer is no, because my second claim is that one CCP politician stands 
out as having an overarching influence on fashioning mainland Chinese views of 
Japan since 1949—Mao Zedong’s former secretary Hu Qiaomu. From the 1940s right 
up until his death in 1992, the influence of Hu’s work on propaganda, newspapers, the 
oversight of culture and many other aspects of everyday Chinese life cannot be 
underestimated. It is therefore remarkable that no major English biography of the man 
even exists. Hu Qiaomu’s influence stems not just from his position as Mao’s 
amanuensis. As my research has shown, Hu Qiaomu has been at the heart of many 
debates informing how China views Japan, ranging from shaping the patriotic 
education campaign, to drafting the CCPCC historical questions resolution which 
rehabilitated the GMD’s wartime role in facing the Japanese.  
 This relentless emphasis on the war is crucial, because in the five institutions 
examined, history of the War of Resistance against Japan has frequently been used as 
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a political weapon. PRC representations of China’s erstwhile foe are framed within a 
dominant ideology, in which the Chinese people collectively make sense of the world 
in which they live. Throughout this study, that “making sense of the world,” the way 
the world needs to be if one-party Communist rule is to be maintained, is 
encapsulated in the phrase “the party is the mainstay of the people” (zhongliudizhu). 
This is code for the CCP beat the Japanese and therefore has the right to rule. This 
explains why the war or, more precisely, the war as the Communists fought it, has 
featured so prominently in commentary about Japan over the past six decades. The 
contribution of other contenders for power who also fought the Japanese (for example 
Qing forces in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), and the Guomindang between 
the years 1931–45), is often criticised or downplayed.  
Within this dominant ideological position of CCP rule constructed through 
museums, textbooks, films and newspapers, there is a perceptible evolution in views 
of Japan. My third claim is that the speed of this evolution varies considerably 
between institutions. The slowest rate of change is found in textbooks. Here the state 
education system transmits largely pejorative representations of Japan via classroom 
teaching materials and, after 1981, the patriotic education campaign. These images of 
Japan change slowly, such that 1950s history lessons on that country bear an uncanny 
resemblance to today’s classes. This largely unchanging view of previous conflict 
with Japan is what I term sticky, binding together negative views of successive 
generations of Chinese schoolchildren. 
Wartime commemorative structures also exhibit slow rates of change, in that the 
sites on which war museums now rest were largely ignored until the aftermath of the 
first textbook crisis in 1982, after which time Hu Qiaomu argued for the rapid 
construction of commemoration halls. The state-led narratives of hate, despair and 
loss communicated in these museums, have only very recently been joined by other 
histories, such as messages of hope conveyed by the “atonement for Japanese crimes” 
monument unveiled at Unit 731 in 2010.  
In contrast to war museums, newspapers are required to respond much more 
rapidly to changes in political direction. My research demonstrates that newspapers 
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have always acted as a barometer of contemporary sentiment towards Japan, framed 
within a loose overall structure of commemoration of the Anti-Japanese War.  
War films, to this day one of the very few accepted themes for mainland Chinese 
motion pictures about Japan, have exhibited relatively rapid rates of change in their 
representations of China’s erstwhile foe. This incredibly popular genre has not been 
subject to the same stringent oversight as textbooks and newspapers however, in that 
since the mid-1980s film directors have been permitted greater latitude in the way 
they present Japan. In doing so, films such as The Bloody Battle for Taierzhuang 
(1985) and Flowers of War (2011) have explored the limits of the party’s resistance to 
the Japanese, on which it predicates its right to rule.   
My fourth and final claim, is that Chinese views of Japan have frequently been 
used by political actors for pursuing a range of policy objectives unrelated—or only 
tangentially related—to Japan. These range from using newspaper editorials about the 
war to criticise the PLA for not supporting the party leadership (1995), and advocating 
equal rights for women in the film Daughters of China (1949), to using memory of 
the war to bolster relations with North Korea (1962). Perhaps the most blatant use of 
history (i.e. the war) as a political weapon discussed in this thesis though is the 
patriotic education campaign, masterminded by Hu Qiaomu during the early 1980s. 
This campaign, with its emphasis on Japanese aggression and the century of 
humiliation, was originally conceived as a means of indoctrinating cadres so as to 
prevent a recurrence of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). It then rapidly morphed 
into a platform for inculcating China’s youth on the benefits of socialism and 
continued CCP rule. After the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, the campaign became 
increasingly anti-Japanese and virulently nationalistic.  
The overall image we have then, is an increasingly nationalistic anti-Japanese one 
based mainly, but not exclusively, on the twin pillars of denigrating Japan’s wartime 
conduct and criticising contemporary Japanese leaders. Viewed in this light, it is 
therefore not such a surprise that the CCTV presenter Bai Yansong in the television 
series Yansong Looks at Japan (discussed in the introduction to this thesis) famously 
said “[we] Chinese people often admit that we don’t understand Japan, we just hate it.” 
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Portraying Japan in such a negative light means that newspaper articles, school 
textbooks and war films collectively act rather like tinder, which the slightest spark 
can set ablaze. No wonder then, that many Chinese people I talk to all over the 
People’s Republic freely admit that they hate Japan. In this respect, almost 70 years 
after the close of World War Two, China is still very much an Angry State.   
272 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reference Matter 
273 
 
Glossary 
 
 
731 budui  731部队 
9.18 lishi bowuguan  “九·一八”历史博物馆 
aiguo 爱国 
aiguozhuyi 爱国主义 
aiguozhuyi jiaoyu 爱国主义教育 
aiguozhuyi jiaoyu jidi 爱国主义教育基地 
aiguozhuyi jiaoyu yundong  爱国主义教育运动 
bainian guochi 
Bai Yansong 
百年国耻 
白岩松 
ba lu jun 八路军 
bantuʼerfei 半途而废 
bao xi bu bao you  报喜不报忧 
Beijing 北京 
biaolibuyi 表里不一 
Changchun 长春 
Chen Boda 陈伯达 
Chen Chu 陈楚 
Chen Yi 陈毅 
274 
 
chengyu 成语 
Chongqing   重庆 
dayuejin  大跃进 
dangʼan guan 
dazhong 
档案馆 
大众 
Deng Liqun  邓力群 
Deng Shichang 邓世昌 
Deng Tuo 邓拓 
Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 
Diaoyu dao 
diguozhuyi(zhe) 
钓鱼岛 
帝国主义（者） 
diren 
dongbei 
敌人 
东北 
fang  放 
fenshensuigu 粉身碎骨 
Fu Hao 符浩 
Fujian sheng 福建省 
gongʼan ju (PSB) 公安局 
gongrong gongcun  共荣共存 
Gou Lanzhi  苟兰芝 
Guan Hua 
 
管桦 
 
275 
 
guanyu jianguo yilai dangde ruogan lishi 
wentide jueyi 
关于建国以来党的若干历史
问题的决议 
Guangzhou 广州 
Guo Moruo 郭沫若 
guomindang (GMD or Guomindang) 国民党 
Haʼerbin (Harbin) 哈尔滨 
hanjian 汉奸 
Heilongjiang sheng 黑龙江省 
hengqishuba 横七竖八 
heping 
Hubei sheng 
和平 
湖北省 
Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 
Hu Qiaomu 胡乔木 
Hu Sheng 胡绳 
Hu Tsung-hsien (Hu Zongxian) 胡宗宪 
Hu Yaobang 胡耀邦 
Ji Pengfei 姬鹏飞   
Jiang Jieshi 蒋介石 
Jiang Jingguo 蒋经国 
Jiang Qing 江青 
Jiang Zemin 江泽民 
Jiangsu sheng 江苏省 
276 
 
jianshang 奸商 
jiefang jun (short for PLA) 
jiefang ribao 
解放军 
解放日报 
jieshi 结实 
Jilin sheng 吉林省 
jilü yanming 纪律严明 
jinxing 进行 
junfa 军阀 
kangri 抗日 
kangri zhanzheng  抗日战争 
kangzhan 
langya shan wu zhuangshi 
laobaixing 
抗战 
狼牙山五壮士 
老百姓 
Lei Guiying   雷桂英 
Li Hongzhang 李鸿章 
Li Lanqing 李岚清 
Li Peng 李鹏 
Li Zongren 
Liang Xiaotao 
李宗仁 
梁晓涛 
Liaoning sheng 辽宁省 
Lin Biao 
Liu Changchun 
林彪 
刘长春 
277 
 
Liu Shaoqi 刘少奇 
Liu Xiyao 刘西尧 
Lu Chuan 陆川 
luohou jiu ai da 落后就挨打 
Ma Benzhai 马本斋 
Ma Xulun  马叙伦 
mafan 麻烦 
Manzhou 满洲 
Mao Zedong 毛泽东 
meiguo diguozhuyi 
Mei Lanfang 
美国帝国主义 
梅兰芳 
minbing 
Mudanjiang 
民兵 
牡丹江 
Nanjing 南京 
nanjing datusha jinian guan 南京大屠杀纪念馆 
nanjing kangri hangkong lieshi jinian guan 南京抗日航空烈士纪念馆 
neibu 内部 
pilin pikong yundong  批林批孔运动 
Pingfang 平方 
Pu Tongxiu   浦通修 
putonghua 普通话 
Qi Benyu 戚本禹 
278 
 
Qi Jiguang 
Qiqihaʼer 
qizhuangshanhe    
戚继光 
齐齐哈尔 
气壮山河 
qinhua rijun guandongjun 731 budui zuizheng 
chenlie guan 
侵华日军关东军 731 部队罪
证陈列馆 
qinlüe 侵略 
Qufu 曲阜 
rang lishi jinggao weilai 
renmin ribao (RMRB) 
让历史警告未来 
人民日报 
riben gongchandang (JCP) 日本共产党 
riben gui (riben guizi) 日本鬼 （日本鬼子） 
riben junshizhuyi 日本军事主义 
riben shehuidang (JSP)  日本社会党 
riben zougou 日本走狗 
rizhong jianshan 
Shaanxi sheng 
日中见善 
陕西省 
Shandong sheng 山东省 
Shenyang 沈阳 
shiyao shibuyao 十要十不要 
shou 
sige diren 
手 
四个敌人 
Songhua jiang 松花江 
279 
 
Taiʼerzhuang 
Taiyuan 
Tianjin 
台儿庄 
太原 
天津 
tingzhibuqian 停滞不前 
waijiao bu (MFA) 外交部 
Wang Jiaxiang 王稼祥 
Wang Jingwei 汪精卫 
Wang Ming 王明 
Wang Zhen 王震 
wei Manzhou 伪满洲 
Weihaiwei 威海卫 
Wen Jiabao 温家宝 
wenhua bu (MOC) 文化部 
wenhua da geming  文化大革命 
wokou 
wo shi yige bing  
倭寇 
我是一个兵 
Xiʼan 
xiao ba lu 
xiao yingxiong yulai 
西安 
小八路 
小英雄雨来 
xihua 新华 
xinhuashe   新华社 
Xinjiang 新疆 
280 
 
Xinjing 新京 
xin si jun 新四军 
xuanchuan 宣传 
Yanʼan (Yenan) 
Yang Guangyuan 
延安 
杨光远 
Yang Hucheng 杨虎城 
yange xunlian 严格训练 
yishiweijian 以史为鉴 
youhao guanxi 
yuwen 
zai dangde lingdao xia 
友好关系 
语文 
在党的领导下 
Zhang Junzhao 张军钊 
Zhang Xiangshan 张香山 
Zhang Xueliang 张学良 
Zhang Yimou 
Zhang Zizhong 
张艺谋 
张自忠 
Zhao Guanxing 赵官型 
Zhao Yiman 赵一曼 
Zheng He  郑和 
zhisangmahuai 指桑骂槐 
zhiyuan hao 致远号 
zhongfa 中发 
281 
 
zhonggong zhongyang dang xiao 中共中央党校 
zhonggong zhongyang nanfang ju 中共中央南方局 
zhongguo gongchandang (CCP) 中国共产党 
zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang 
weiyuanhui (CCPCC or CC) 
中国共产党中央委员会 
zhongguo jiaoyu chubanshe 
zhongguo jun 
zhongguo lishi 
zhongguo ren 
中国教育出版社 
中国军 
中国历史 
中国人 
zhongguo renmin jiefang jun (PLA) 中国人民解放军 
zhongguo renmin kangri zhanzheng jinian guan 中国人民抗日战争纪念馆 
zhongguo shehui kexue yuan (CASS) 中国社会科学院 
zhonghua renmin gonghe guo (PRC) 中华人民共和国  
zhonghua renmin gongheguo he ribenguo 
heping youhao tiaoyue 
中华人民共和国和日本国和
平友好条约 
zhongliudizhu 中流砥柱 
zhongri guanxi 中日关系 
zhongyang dianshi tai (CCTV) 中央电视台 
Zhou Enlai 周恩来 
Zhu Wan  朱纨 
Zhu Zhiying 朱之盈 
zhuanxin 专心 
282 
 
zilihangjian 字里行间 
zuozhan yonggan 作战勇敢 
283 
 
Select Bibliography 
 
Abbreviations 
 
 
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
 
BJRB: Beijing ribao (‘Beijing Daily’). Newspaper 
 
CASS: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
 
CBW:  Chemical and Biological Warfare 
 
CCP: zhongguo gongchandang (‘Chinese Communist Party’) 
 
CCPCC: zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui (‘CCP Central 
Committee’)  
 
CCTV: China Central Television 
 
CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
CHOC:  Cambridge History of China 
 
CHOJ:  Cambridge History of Japan 
 
CHQ: Chongqing Municipal Archive, Chongqing, followed by file and page 
number  
 
CQ: China Quarterly. Periodical 
 
CQRB:  Chongqing ribao (‘Chongqing Daily’). Newspaper 
 
DPP:  Democratic Progressive Party 
 
FRUS: Foreign Relations of the United States, followed by file and page number  
 
GMD: guomindang (‘Guomindang, Kuomintang or Chinese Nationalist Party’) 
 
284 
 
HLJRB: Heilongjiang ribao (‘Heilongjiang Daily’). Newspaper  
 
HQM:  Hu qiaomu wenji (‘The Selected Works of Hu Qiaomu’)  
 
HRB: Ha’erbin ribao (‘Harbin Daily’). Newspaper 
 
[J]:   Japanese author or title  
 
JCP:  Japanese Communist Party 
 
JS: Jiangsu Provincial Archive, Nanjing, followed by file and page number 
 
JSDF： Japan Self-Defence Forces 
  
JSP: Japanese Socialist Party 
 
LDP:  Liberal Democratic Party 
 
LSG:  Leading Small Group 
 
MFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing; in footnotes MFA refers to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, Beijing, followed by file and page 
number   
 
MOC: Ministry of Culture 
 
NIE: National Intelligence Estimate 
 
NPC: National People’s Congress 
 
NXHB:  Nanjing xinhua ribao (‘Nanjing Xinhua Daily’). Newspaper 
 
ODA:  Overseas Development Aid 
 
PLA:  zhongguo renmin jiefang jun (‘People’s Liberation Army’)  
 
PRC:  zhonghua renmin gonghe guo (‘People’s Republic of China’) 
 
PSB:  Public Security Bureau 
 
RMRB:  Renmin ribao (‘People’s Daily’). Newspaper 
 
RW:  Riben wenti wenjian (‘Documents on the Japan Problem’) 
 
285 
 
UNSC:  United Nations Security Council 
 
XCGZ: Zhongguo gongchandang xuanchuan gongzuo wenxian xuanbian (‘A 
Literary Selection of CCP Propaganda Work’). 4 vols. 
 
XHS:  xinhuashe (Xinhua News Agency) 
 
YW (C): Yuwen chuxue ban (‘Language [Textbook] Lower Middle School 
Edition’). Textbook 
 
YW (X): Yuwen xiaoxue ban (‘Language [Textbook] Elementary School Edition’). 
Textbook 
 
ZJN:  Zhongguo jiaoyu nianjian (‘China Education Yearbook’) 
 
ZL:  Zhongguo lishi chuzhong ban (‘Chinese History Lower Middle School 
Edition’). Textbook  
 
ZL (C): Zhongguo lishi cankao ziliao chuzhong ban (‘Chinese History Reference 
Material Lower Middle School Edition’). Textbook 
 
ZL (J): Zhongguo lishi jiaoshi jiaoxue yongshu chuzhong ban (‘Chinese History 
Classroom Teaching Guide Lower Middle School Edition’). Textbook 
 
ZRN: Zhongguo renkou nianjian (‘China Population Yearbook’) 
 
 
286 
 
 
Primary Sources 
 
Archives 
 
 
The following files from Chinese government archives have been used. The file 
number is followed by its archive catalogue title and date of document within file.  
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing (MFA) 
 
105-00076-01: Guanyu rikou tewu shangcun yilai cailiao (‘Materials regarding 
Japanese devil special agents and the Shangcun Xilai [J] incident’), 11/9/50.  
 
105-00076-03: Rikou qisanyi budui xijun zhanfande zuixing ziliao (‘Material on the 
biological war crimes committed by the Japanese invaders at Unit 731’), 1/2/50.  
 
105-00092-02(1): Guanyu pingfang xijun gongchang jishi (‘On records from the 
Pingfang biological warfare factory’), 19/3/50.  
 
105-00217-01: Riben “huifu rizhong, risu bangjiao guomin huiyi” zhuxi jiuyuan 
fangzhizhu yaoqiu fanghua shi de laiwang dian (‘Telegram correspondence 
concerning the request to visit China by the Japanese “Normalisation of 
Sino-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet diplomatic relations citizens conference” 
chairman Jiuyuan Fangzhizhu [J]’), 25/11/55.   
  
105-00239-03: Waijiao bu yazhousi biandui ri heyue yu riben zai wuzhuang (‘MFA 
Asia Director General with respect to a peace treaty with and re-arming of Japan’), 
22/12/50.  
 
105-00548-09: Guanyu chuli ha’erbin pingfangqu rikou 731 budui xijun gongchang 
feixude yijian (‘Concerning some suggestions on dealing with the ruins of the 
Japanese devils Unit 731 biological warfare factory in the Pingfang district of 
Harbin’), 16/2/57. 
 
105-00737-05: Guanyu jinian kangri zhanzheng shengli shiwu zhounian shi (‘With 
287 
 
respect to events commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the victory in the 
War of Resistance against Japan’), 30/8/60. 
 
105-00737-09: Shoudu gejie renmin fandui meiri junshi tongmeng dahui jihua (‘Plans 
for a rally by people of the [Chinese] capital to oppose the U.S.-Japan Security 
Alliance’), 16/1/60. 
 
105-00899-04: Wo jixu pengji riben zhengfu dishi wo shi (‘I continue to attack the 
Japanese government’s hostility towards me’), 10/5/58.  
 
105-00954-04: Ha’erbin pingfangqu qinhua riben jun xijun gongchang yizhi chuli 
wenti (‘Concerning the problem of the Japanese invading China army biological 
warfare factory ruins at Pingfang district in Harbin’), 29/3/59.   
 
105-01214-04: Waijiao bu guanyu wo zhuwai shilingguan tong rifang renyuan jiechu 
wentide qingshi baogao ji zhishi (‘Report on an MFA request for instructions and 
directives concerning the problem of our foreign consulates and contact with the 
Japanese side’), 16/9/63.    
 
105-01216-05: Chen yi fuzongli jiejian riben jizhe tanhua zhaiyao (‘An abstract of 
talks between Deputy Prime Minister Chen Yi and Japanese journalists’), 28/11/63.  
  
105-01409-01: Zhou enlai zongli tong riben chuandao huitan qingkuang (‘Report of 
talks between Premier Zhou Enlai and Chuan Dao [J] from Japan’), 21/4/65.   
 
105-01759-17: Guowuyuan waiban: riben ziyouminzhudang he longduan zibende yixie 
dongxiang (“riben qingkuang” (dishiqi qi)) (‘State Council Foreign Affairs Office: 
Some trends concerning the LDP and the monopoly capitalists (“The Situation in 
Japan” (Issue No. 17))’), 24/4/65.    
 
106-00763-03: Guanyu zai heilongjiang he jilinsheng xiujian kangri zhongchao lieshi 
jinianbei shi (‘Concerning the construction of monuments in Heilongjiang and 
Jilin Province to Chinese and Korean heroes who resisted the Japanese during the 
war’), 5/12/63. 
   
106-01481-03: Shoudu gejie renmin fandui “rihan tiaoyue” dahui fangan 
(‘Suggestions concerning a rally by the people of the capital to oppose the 
“Japan-Korea Treaty”’), 17/11/65.  
 
117-00785-01: Beijing gejie renmin zhichi riben renmin fandui rimei junshi tongmeng 
tiaoyue dahui wenjian (‘Documents relating to a rally by the people of Beijing in 
support of Japanese people opposing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance’), 2/5/60.  
 
118-00086-02(1): Guanyu dongbei ribenrende qingkuang bao (‘Report concerning the 
288 
 
situation of Japanese people in north-eastern China’), 1/6/50.   
 
118-00086-03: Shenyang riben qiaomin dongtai, ji dongbei waishi ju xinhan 
(‘Developments concerning Japanese nationals in Shenyang, and letters from the 
North-Eastern China Foreign Affairs Bureau’), 1/6/50.  
 
118-00086-05: Shenyang shi riben qiaomin cailiao ji chuli yijian (‘Material on and 
suggestions for handling Japanese nationals in Shenyang’), 10/12/50.  
 
118-01211-04: Laodongbu guanyu ribenji jishi “shicheng ai zhi zhu” tuiti wenti dao 
chongqing waishi bangongshide fuhan (‘A reply to the Chongqing Foreign Affairs 
Bureau from the Ministry of Labour concerning the retirement of the “ardently 
love Chongqing” group of Japanese technicians’), 2/1/63.  
 
Jiangsu Province Archive, Nanjing (JS) 
 
4019-003-0087: Guanyu dierci quanguo waishi gongzuo huiyi wenjian (‘Documents 
relating to the second national foreign affairs conference’), 7/1/59.   
 
4019-003-0204: Zhongyang guanyu xiang quandang quanmin jinxing jiaqiang tong 
geguo renmin youhaode xuanquan gongzuode tongzhi (‘Announcement from the 
CCPCC to all party cadres and all citizens concerning friendly propaganda work 
towards foreigners from all countries’), 8/5/64.   
 
4019-003-0207: Zuohao riqiao huiguo tanqin gongzuo wenti (‘How to resolve the 
problem of repatriation of Japanese nationals and their returning home to visit 
relatives’), 3/5/64.   
 
4019-003-0249/0250: Jiedai zhongri qingnian dalianhuan cailiao (‘Material relating 
to the hosting of a large-scale Sino-Japanese youth delegation’), ?/8/65.  
 
Chongqing Municipal Archive, Chongqing (CHQ) 
 
1056-1-103: Jiedai a’man, yidali, xibanya, yindu, yingguo, riben dangzheng daibiao 
tujihua, jianbao, zongjie (‘Plans, report and summary of hosting governmental and 
political party visits from Oman, Italy, Spain, India, England and Japan’), 1/11/57.  
 
1065-1-204: Guan yu jiedai riben (dongjingdu gejie youhao daibiaotuan, songcun 
qiansan, bensan wuxiong, jiuye zhongzhi, deng) waibinde jihua, jianbao (er) 
289 
 
(‘Plan and second report concerning Japanese foreign guests (various friendly 
delegations from Tokyo, including Songcai Qiansan, Bensan Wuxiong, Jiuye 
Zhongzhi [J])’), ?/8/65.  
 
Other Primary Sources 
 
731 budui zuixing tiezheng (ʻUnit 731 Cast Iron Criminal Proofʼ). Ha’erbin: 
Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 2001. 
 
731 budui zuixing tiezheng (ʻUnit 731 Cast Iron Criminal Proofʼ). Changchun: Jilin 
sheng dangʼan guan chubanshe, 2003. 
 
Aiguozhuyi jiaoyu dacidian (ʻA Patriotic Education Dictionaryʼ). Beijing: Haiyang 
chubanshe, 1992. 
 
Beijing ribao (‘Beijing Daily’) (BJRB). 
 
Chongqing ribao (‘Chongqing Daily’) (CQRB). 
 
Communist China Yearbook, 1962. Hong Kong: China Research Associates, 1963. 
 
Economist, The. 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–57 (vol. 3); 1964–68 (vol. 30) (FRUS). 
 
Gaige kaifang yilai sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo dashi ji (ʻMajor Political Thought Work 
Events of the Reform and Opening-up Periodʼ). Beijing: Renmin daxue chubanshe, 
2007. 
 
Guangming ribao (‘Guangming Daily’). 
 
Ha’erbin ribao (‘Harbin Daily’) (HRB). 
 
Heilongjiang ribao (‘Heilongjiang Daily’) (HLJRB). 
 
Hongqi (‘Red Flag’). Party theoretical journal 1928–34 and 1958–88. In 1988 replaced 
by Qiushi (‘[Seeking] Truth’) magazine.   
 
Hubei sheng xuanchuan nianjian, 2005 (ʻHubei Province Propaganda Yearbook, 2005ʼ) 
(Wuhan, 2006). 
 
Jiangsu sheng xuanchuan nianjian, 2005 (‘Jiangsu Province Propaganda Yearbook, 
290 
 
2005’). (Nanjing, 2005). 
 
Jiangsu sheng xuanchuan zhishi (2005) No. 9 (‘Jiangsu Province propaganda directive 
(2005), No. 9’), 14/4/05. Quoted in Jiangsu sheng xuanchuan nianjian, 2005. 
 
Jiefang ribao (‘Liberation Daily’, also known as ‘PLA Daily’).  
 
Materials on the Trials of Former Servicemen of the Japanese Army Charged with 
Manufacturing and Employing Bacteriological Weapons. Moscow: Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, 1950. 
 
Ming shi (ʻThe Ming Historiesʼ). Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1936. 
 
Nanjing xinhua bao (‘Nanjing Xinhua Daily’) (NXHB). 
 
Qinhua rijun xijun zhan ziliao xuanbian (ʻA Selection of Material Relating to the 
Invading Japanese Militaristʼs Biological Warfareʼ). Hulunbeiʼer: Neimenggu 
wenhua chubanshe, 2010.  
 
Renmin jiaoyu chunbanshe tongxun (‘People’s Education Press Newsletter’). 
 
Renmin ribao (‘People’s Daily’) (RMRB).  
 
Renmin ribao suoyin (ʻPeopleʼs Daily Indicesʼ). Beijing: Renmin ribao she, 1949–
2010. 
 
Riben wenti wenjian (ʻDocuments on the Japan Problemʼ). 5 vols. Beijing: Shijie zhishi 
chubanshe, 1965. (RW). 
 
Yuwen chuxue ban (‘Language [Textbook] Lower Middle School Edition’) (YW (C)). 
  
Yuwen xiaoxue ban (‘Language [Textbook] Elementary School Edition’) (YW (X)).  
 
Zhongguo dang’an bao (‘China Archive News’).  
 
Zhongguo dianying nianjian, 1981 (ʻChina Film Yearbook, 1981ʼ). (Beijing, 1982). 
 
Zhongguo gongchandang xuanchuan gongzuo wenxian xuanbian (ʻA Literary 
Selection of CCP Propaganda Workʼ). 4 vols. Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 1996. 
(XCGZ). 
 
Zhongguo jiaoyu bao (‘China Education News’).  
 
Zhongguo jiaoyu nianjian (ʻChina Education Yearbookʼ). (Beijing, 1949–81, 1984, 
291 
 
2001, 2009) (ZJN).  
 
Zhongguo lishi cankao ziliao chuzhong ban (‘Chinese History Reference Material 
Lower Middle School Edition’) (ZL (C)).  
 
Zhongguo lishi chuzhong ban (‘Chinese History Lower Middle School Edition’) 
(ZL). 
 
Zhongguo lishi jiaoshi jiaoxue yongshu chuzhong ban (‘Chinese History Classroom 
Teaching Guide Lower Middle School Edition’) (ZL (J)). 
 
Zhongguo renkou nianjian, 2009 (ʻChina Population Yearbook, 2009ʼ). (Beijing, 2009) 
(ZRN). 
 
Zhongguo waijiao gailan, 1987 (ʻOverview of Chinese Diplomacy, 1987ʼ). Beijing: 
Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1987. 
292 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
 
731 budui rijun qinhua zuizheng bowuguan, ed. Qinhua rijun guandongjun qisanyi 
xijun budui (ʻUnit 731: Japanese Germ Warfare Unit in Chinaʼ). Beijing: 
Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2005. 
Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston, 
MA: Little, Brown, 1971. 
Anderson, Benedict Richard O’Gorman. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 2nd ed. London: Verso, 1991. 
Angell, Norman. The Public Mind: Its Disorders: Its Exploitation. London: Noel 
Douglas, 1926. 
Apple, Michael W. Cultural Politics and Education. New York, NY: Teachers 
College Press, 1996. 
———. “The Text and Cultural Politics.” Educational Researcher 21, no. 7 (October 
1992): 4–11+19.  
Apple, Michael W., and Linda K. Christian-Smith. The Politics of the Textbook. New 
York, NY: Routledge, 1991. 
Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin. Key Concepts in Post-Colonial 
Studies. London: Routledge, 1998. 
Bachman, David M. Bureaucracy, Economy, and Leadership in China: The 
Institutional Origins of the Great Leap Forward. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991. 
Bai Yansong. Yansong kan riben (ʻYansong Looks at Japanʼ). Beijing: Zhongguo 
wenxue chubanshe, 2007. 
Bao Haichun, ed. Qinhua rijun xijun zhan ziliao xuanbian (ʻA Selection of Material 
Relating to the Invading Japanese Militaristsʼ Biological Warfareʼ). Hulunbei’er: 
Neimenggu wenhua chubanshe, 2010. 
Bartelson, Jens. “We Could Remember it for you Wholesale: Myths, Monuments and 
the Constitution of National Memories.” In Memory, Trauma and World Politics: 
293 
 
Reflections on the Relationship Between Past and Present, edited by Duncan 
Bell, 33–53. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
Barthes, Roland. “Myth Today.” In Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader, 
edited by John Storey, 93–139. 3rd ed. Harlow: Pearson Education, 2006. 
———. The Fashion System. New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1983. 
Barthes, Roland, and Susan Sontag. A Barthes Reader. London: Cape, 1982. 
Baum, Richard. Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. 
Baxter, R. R., and Thomas Buergenthal. “Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 
1925.” American Journal of International Law 64 (1970): 853–79. 
Bazin, Andre. What Is Cinema? Edited by Hugh Gray. Berkeley, CA: California 
University Press, 1967. 
Beasley, W. G., and Edwin G. Pulleyblank. Historians of China and Japan. London: 
Oxford University Press, 1961. 
Bell, Duncan. Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship 
Between Past and Present. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
Belting, Hans. Likeness and Presence: A History of the Image Before the Era of Art. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994. 
Benedict, Ruth. The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture. 
London: Secker & Warburg, 1947. 
Bennett, Tony. The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics. London: 
Routledge, 1995. 
Benton, Gregor. “The ‘Second Wang Ming Line’, 1935–38.” In vol. 1 of Mao Zedong 
and the Chinese Revolution, edited by Gregor Benton, 287–320. Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2008. 
Berelson, Bernard. Content Analysis in Communication Research. 1952. Reprint, New 
York, NY: Hafner, 1971. 
Berry, Chris. “If China Can Say No, Can China Make Movies? Or do Movies Make 
China? Rethinking National Cinema and National Agency.” Boundary 25, no. 3 
(1998): 129–150. 
294 
 
———. “‘Race’ (minzu) Chinese Film and the Politics of Nationalism.” Cinema 
Journal 31, no. 2 (1992): 45–58. 
Berry, Chris, and Mary Ann Farquhar. China on Screen: Cinema and Nation. New 
York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2006. 
Berton, Peter, and Eugene Wu. Contemporary China; a Research Guide. Stanford, 
CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1967. 
Bhabha, Homi K. Nation and Narration. London: Routledge, 1990. 
Bogatyrev, Petr. “Costume as a Sign.” In Social Aspects of the Human Body: a 
Reader of Key Texts, edited by Ted Polhemus, 257–62. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1978. 
Borg, Alan. War Memorials: From Antiquity to the Present. London: Leo Cooper, 
1991. 
Boulding, Kenneth Ewart. The Image; Knowledge in Life and Society. Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1956. 
Brady, Anne-Marie. Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in 
Contemporary China. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008. 
———. “Guiding Hand: The Role of the CCP Central Propaganda Department in the 
Current Era.” Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 3, no. 1 (2006): 
58–77. 
———. “Regimenting the Public Mind: The Modernisation of Propaganda in the 
PRC.” In Asian Futures, Asian Traditions, edited by Edwina Palmer, 157–69. 
Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2005. 
Braudy, Leo. The World in a Frame: What We See in Films. Garden City, NY: 
Anchor Press, 1976. 
Brown, Roger. Social Psychology. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Free Press, 1986. 
Burke, Peter. Eyewitnessing: The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence. London: 
Reaktion Books, 2001. 
Calder, Kent E. “China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry.” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 
(1985): 129–139. 
Callahan, William A. China: The Pessoptimist Nation. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010. 
295 
 
Carr, Edward Hallett. What Is History? (40th anniversary edition). Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001. 
Cathcart, Adam, and Patricia Nash. “War Criminals and the Road to Sino-Japanese 
Normalization: Zhou Enlai and the Shenyang Trials, 1954–1956.” 
Twentieth-Century China 34, no. 2 (2009): 89–111.  
Center for International Affairs Harvard University. Communist China, 1955–1959: 
Policy Documents with Analysis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1962. 
Certeau, Michel de. The Writing of History. New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press, 1988. 
Chang, Julian. “The Mechanics of State Propaganda: The People’s Republic of China 
and the Soviet Union in the 1950s.” In New Perspectives on State Socialism in 
China, edited by Timothy Cheek and Tony Saich, 76–124. London: M.E. Sharpe, 
1997. 
Cheek, Timothy. Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China: Deng Tuo and the 
Intelligentsia. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. 
Chen Boda. Ping “zhongguo zhi mingyun” (ʻA Critique of “Chinaʼs Fate”ʼ). Beijing: 
Zhongyuan xinhua shudian, 1949. 
———. Renmin gongdi: jiang jieshi (ʻPublic Enemy Number One: Jiang Jieshiʼ). 
Beijing: Zhonghua xinhua shudian, 1948. 
Chen Chuan-sheng, Shin-ying Lee, and Harold W. Stevenson. “Academic 
Achievement and Motivation of Chinese Students: A Cross-National 
Perspective.” In Growing up the Chinese Way: Chinese Child and Adolescent 
Development, edited by Sing Lau, 69–92. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 
1996. 
Chen, Jack. Inside the Cultural Revolution. London: Sheldon Press, 1976. 
Chen Jian. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001. 
Chen Xiaoming, Liu Kang, and Shi Anbin. “The Mysterious Other: Postpolitics in 
Chinese Film.” Boundary 2 24, no. 3 (1997): 123–141. 
Cheng Linsheng. Aiguozhuyi zongheng tan (ʻA Talk About Patriotismʼ). Lanzhou: 
Gansu renmin chubanshe, 1983. 
296 
 
Cheng Yongming, and Shi Qibao. Zhongri jingmao guanxi liushi nian (ʻSixty Years 
of Sino-Japanese Economic and Trade Relationsʼ). Tianjin: Tianjin shehui kexue 
chubanshe, 2006. 
Cheng Zhaoqi. Nanjing datusha yanjiu: riben xugou pai pipan (ʻNanjing Massacre 
Research: Japanese Imaginary Criticismsʼ Cliqueʼ). Shanghai: Shanghai cishu 
chubanshe, 2002. 
Chuang, H. C. Studies in Chinese Communist Terminology No. 13: The Little Red 
Book and Current Chinese Language. Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1968. 
Clark, Paul. Chinese Cinema: Culture and Politics Since 1949. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
———. “Film-making in China: From the Cultural Revolution to 1981.” China 
Quarterly 94 (June 1983): 304–22. 
Coble, Parks M. “China’s ‘New Remembering’ of the Anti-Japanese War of 
Resistance, 1937–45.” China Quarterly 190 (June 2007): 394–410. 
———. “Remembering China’s War with Japan: The Wartime Generation in 
Post-war China and East Asia and their Contemporary Uses.” Modern Asian 
Studies 45, no. 2 (2011): 379–98. 
Cohen, Paul A. China Unbound: Evolving Perspectives on the Chinese Past. London: 
Routledge, 2003. 
———. Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent 
Chinese Past. Guildford: Columbia University Press, 1984. 
Conboy, Martin. The Language of Newspapers: Socio-Historical Perspectives. 
London: Continuum, 2010. 
Cui Shuqin. Women Through the Lens: Gender and Nation in a Century of Chinese 
Cinema. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2003. 
Cullen, L. M. A History of Japan, 1582–1941: Internal and External Worlds. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Culp, Robert. “Rethinking Governmentality: Training, Cultivation and Cultural 
Citizenship in Nationalist China.” Journal of Asian Studies 65, no. 3 (August 
2006): 529–554. 
Curtin, Michael. Playing to the World’s Biggest Audience: The Globalization of 
Chinese Film and TV. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007. 
297 
 
Deng Tuo. Deng tuo wenji (ʻThe Selected Works of Deng Tuoʼ). Beijing: Beijing 
chubanshe, 1986. 
Deng Xiaoping. Deng xiaoping wenxuan, 1938–1965 (ʻA Literary Selection of Deng 
Xiaopingʼs Works, 1938–1965ʼ). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1989. 
———. Deng xiaoping tongzhi lun jiaoyu (ʻComrade Deng Xiaoping Discusses 
Educationʼ). Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe, 1990. 
Denton, Kirk A. “Heroic Resistance and Victims of Atrocity: Negotiating the 
Memory of Japanese Imperialism in Chinese Museums.” Japan Focus, 2007. 
http://japanfocus.org/-Kirk A.-Denton/2547. 
———. “Museums, Memorial Sites and Exhibition Culture in the People’s Republic 
of China.” China Quarterly 183 (September 2005): 565–86. 
van Dijk, Teun A. “Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis.” Discourse & Society 4, 
no. 2 (1993): 249–83. 
Dikötter, Frank. The Discourse of Race in Modern China. London: Hurst, 1994. 
Dobrenko, Evgeny. Stalinist Cinema and the Production of History: Museum of the 
Revolution. Edited by Sarah Young. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2008. 
Donald, Stephanie, Michael Keane, and Hong Yin. Media in China: Consumption, 
Content and Crisis. Abingdon: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002. 
Duara, Prasenjit. Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of 
Modern China. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
Duncombe, Brenda. “Communism and Religion.” Irish Jesuit Province 65, no. 765 
(March 1937): 155–160. 
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